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The Rise & Fall of Krugerism

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THE TRANSVAAL FROM WITHIN.

By J. P. FITZPATRICK.

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Some Press Opinions (*continued*).

of the case of the Uitlanders. At the same time Mr. FitzPatrick keeps his feelings well in hand. He has striven, not without success, to be just to his Boer opponents. The book deserves serious attention, particularly from those who may still doubt whether the Boer oligarchy merits the extinction by which it is threatened.'

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The Newcastle Daily Chronicle: 'We heartily wish that Mr. FitzPatrick's book were in the hands of every Englishman at the existing juncture. It is pre-eminently the volume to be read and re-read by all who wish to grasp the facts of the South African difficulty. Mr. FitzPatrick deals with facts, and were the facts which he narrates with great literary skill as well known to the English people as they are to him, no politician would dare to mount a public platform and ask what has happened that we should go to war with the Transvaal.'

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WILLIAM HEINEMANN, 21, BEDFORD STREET, W.C.

THE RISE AND FALL OF KRUGERISM

From the *Times* Review, August 8, 1900.

'In "The Rise and Fall of Krugerism" we have another "Transvaal from Within," written, however, this time from a different point of view from that of Mr. Fitzpatrick. Outside the Dutch disaffected policy there are two loyal British policies in South Africa. One is the local self-government policy, which advocates the delegation of as much authority as possible to local self-governing institutions; the other may be called the "Imperial factor" policy, and advocates the retention of as much authority as possible in the hands of the Imperial Government. Mr. Fitzpatrick wrote as a loyal Afrikander from the local self-government point of view; Messrs. Scoble and Abercrombie write as loyal British residents in South Africa from the "Imperial factor" point of view. Mr. Fitzpatrick was born in Cape Colony, and believes in the power of British colonies to manage their own affairs. The writers of the present book leave it to be inferred that they were born in Great Britain, and their advocacy is for an attitude on the part of the Imperial Government which would justify a more complete dependence in the outlying parts of the Empire upon the ways of Downing-street. It is a part of our self-grown system of Empire that there should be a mutual relation between these two policies. No advocate of either would fail to acknowledge how much the Empire has at different times owed to the other. It is, therefore, extremely useful at such a time as the present to have books dealing with the South African situation written from both points of view. . . .'

THE RISE AND FALL OF KRUGERISM

A Personal Record of Forty Years in South Africa

J. Waldie Pierson Nov. 1900

BY

JOHN SCOBLE

'TIMES' CORRESPONDENT IN PRETORIA PRIOR TO THE PRESENT WAR

AND

H. R. ABERCROMBIE

OF THE INTELLIGENCE DEPARTMENT, CAPE COLONY

Popular Edition

LONDON

WILLIAM HEINEMANN

1900

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This little Work is respectfully Dedicated

TO THE

RIGHT HON. JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN

Colonial Secretary

TO

SIR ALFRED MILNER

Governor of the Cape Colony and High Commissioner of South Africa

AND TO THE

RIGHT HON. CECIL JOHN RHODES

Founder of Rhodesia

THE TRIUMVIRATE

IN WHOSE HANDS IS PLACED THE FUTURE OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE IN SOUTH AFRICA

WITH THE FERVENT HOPE OF ITS OLDEST ENGLISH RESIDENT THAT THEY MAY SUCCESSFULLY ACCOMPLISH THEIR TASK OF ESTABLISHING PEACE, CONTENTMENT, AND PROSPERITY AMONG ITS VARIOUS NATIONALITIES

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PREFACE

THE present volume has no other pretension than to be the record of the political evolution of South Africa from the beginning of Mr. Kruger's active part in Transvaal politics to the present day, as seen from the point of view of those British residents who have watched the flow and ebb of Krugerism run symmetrically with the ebb and flow of British Imperialism. Their story begins before the discovery of gold, and will outlive it. They are the pioneers, the mainstay of Empire, and as such they claim to be heard by their countrymen at home independently of any temporary consideration accorded to those who for the time have riveted on the Transvaal the greedy desire of the world, and have helped—sometimes accidentally, sometimes patriotically—in the struggle for a free British South Africa. We say helped *only, because without the Loyalist settlers the Johannesburg Uitlanders* would not *have fought, and* could not *have won.*

THE

RISE AND FALL OF KRUGERISM

CHAPTER I

AFRICANDER AMBITIONS

'AFRICA for the Africanders' is the watchword of the Dutch Republican party in South Africa, and it is perhaps desirable to investigate what is meant by the term 'Africander' in order more correctly to appreciate its object, ambition, and moving spirit. In order to do so it is necessary to dwell very briefly on the history of Cape Colony, and the characteristics of its original settlers.

It is well known that in 1486-87 the Cape of Good Hope was doubled by the Portuguese navigator Bartolommeo Dias, who gave it the name of Cabo Tormentoso. His discovery was verified by Vasco da Gama in the following year; but it does not appear that the Portuguese made any attempt to effect a permanent settlement, using it simply as a port of call for passing vessels.

In 1620 the Cape was visited by two Englishmen, Captain Andrew Shillinge and Captain Humphrey Fitzherbert, who took formal possession of the Cape Peninsula in the name of James I. of England. Their action was, however, not confirmed by that monarch,

who failed to realize the importance of the proposed addition to his dominion.

In 1648 a Dutch merchantman was wrecked in Table Bay, and the crew on reaching their homes sang the praises of its climate, the fruitfulness of its soil, and its general advantages as a settlement. These reports induced the Dutch East India Company to take measures for the appropriation of the Cape Peninsula, and an expedition was sent out for the purpose under J. A. van Riebeck. In April, 1652, he anchored in Table Bay, and formally took possession of the Peninsula on behalf of the company.

The men who accompanied Riebeck, consisting chiefly of soldiers and sailors, formed the nucleus of the first Dutch colony in Africa, and are consequently the progenitors of the mixed race which now claim to be styled 'Africanders.'

These original Dutch settlers had their numbers augmented from time to time by men of other European nationalities, viz., Germans, Danes, Portuguese, and Flemish, all of whom were welcomed as giving additional strength to the settlement, and enabling it to cope more effectually with the native tribes by which it was surrounded, and with which frequent difficulties arose out of the thievish propensities of the aborigines.

In 1670 some ninety men released from their contract with the Dutch East India Company were permitted to occupy lands on the Riebeck River, in the vicinity of the present suburb of Rondebosch, but with restrictions which later on were found to be intolerably irksome.

In the years 1688-89 some 300 men, women, and children, who had fled from France to Holland upon the revocation of the Edict of Nantes, came to the Cape, and were well received by the Dutch already settled in South Africa.

Soon after this increase in the number of independent settlers disputes arose between them and the Dutch East India Company, which claimed a practical monopoly of trade, and treated its private subjects arbitrarily and with harshness.

As soon, therefore, as the number of settlers had become sufficiently large and important to influence public opinion, remonstrance after remonstrance was forwarded to the directors of the company in Holland, and it would appear that the French immigrants were in the forefront in demanding liberty of speech and trade. A deputation being sent to Governor van der Stell to remonstrate met with the curt reply that 'they must restrain their French impertinences,' and no redress was forthcoming. The men, however, who had sacrificed so much for the sake of their religious principles, and among whom were some of the best blood of France, were not likely to put up with tyranny or official insolence in the new land to which they had resorted to escape persecution in the old. Consequently a secret petition was sent to the directors, signed by the majority of the burghers, the result of which was that Governor van der Stell was relieved of his duties.

In 1714 the population had increased to over 2,100 souls, and families began to remove farther and farther away from the seat of Government on the spot of the present Cape Town. Thus commenced the nomad life, and that hunger for land and property which has been a distinguishing characteristic of the Dutch Boer down to the present day.

It is from these people, who in their own country, whether in Holland or France, were ready to lay down their lives, and forfeit their property, for the sake of civil and religious rights and liberties, that the present race of republican burghers has descended.

It is not an uncommon thing for persons who insist upon the fullest liberty for themselves to be very much indisposed to grant the like freedom to others, and the hybrid Dutch race which constitutes a large proportion of the population in South Africa furnishes an illustration of this paradox.

The Nederlanders fought long years for freedom from the yoke of Spain, and the French Huguenots, rather than bow to what appeared to them the idolatrous practices of the Roman Church, quitted country, possessions, and even elevated social positions, for the sake of their religious convictions. Yet history has shown these very men as intolerant in spirit as were those from whose oppression they had made the heaviest sacrifices to escape, enduring incalculable hardships, miseries, and dangers with cheerfulness and fortitude.

No sooner had the Dutch settlers in the Cape found the opportunity than they began to oppress the French immigrants, discouraging the use of their language so successfully that at the present day but few, if any, of their descendants are able to speak the language of their French ancestors.

By intermarriage with the Dutch the consolidation of the two strains was effected, although the burghers of the Transvaal and Free State, with their strong and stolid Teutonic qualities, have retained but few of the more vivacious and brilliant characteristics of the Latins.

The Boer of the present day, in his almost general ignorance, has a fairly good opinion of his personal value, convinced that what he does not know is not worth knowing. The management of a span of bullocks and the government of the country are, he thinks, equally within his powers, and, his ambition once having been stimulated, he has arrived at the conclusion that he and his people are the only legitimate rulers of the Austral subcontinent.

It may be admitted that the acute development of this idea is of comparatively recent growth. Prior to the discovery of the gold-fields in the Transvaal, the Boers had no means of carrying into effect the great idea of founding a new nation; but the germ has always existed from the time that the Cape Colony became a Dutch possession.

The emancipation of the slaves held by the burghers in accordance with the law passed by the English Parliament, coupled with the very bad arrangements made for the payment of compensation to slave-holders, was the primary cause of the revolt against the authority of the British Government as shown by the Great Trek of dissatisfied Boers to the north and east of the Cape Colony. It is not necessary at this moment to enter into minute details with regard to their movements, but it is unquestionable that that discontent laid the foundation both of the Free State and Transvaal Republics, whence all our trouble during these latter years has sprung.

The original voortrekkers from the Cape carried with them a deep impression that they had been treated with injustice by the Government, and that conviction may be regarded as the basis of the hostility of the Republics towards Great Britain and her sons, and the disaffection of a considerable number of Her Majesty's subjects in the Cape Colony.

With the discovery of the extraordinary richness of the Transvaal gold-fields came the opportunity of paying off old scores, and President Kruger has not ceased since his election to the Presidency of the Republic to mould his people to his views, as well as to adopt stringent measures for the purpose of ultimately disgusting the Uitlander population to such an extent as to induce them to quit the country, where their continued presence was not desired.

The enormous interests which have been created during the past decade have, however, rendered it impossible for the new population, who have founded cities, and have raised the Transvaal from a position of absolute bankruptcy to a wealthy and prosperous State, to vacate their position and abandon the results of their arduous labours and vast expenditure of capital.

Remonstrance was tried, and proved futile, whilst the Boer Government effectually prevented an appeal to force from within, partly by arming the Dutch burghers and depriving men of other nationalities of the right to possess arms, and partly by putting public meetings under Government control so as to prevent the expression of popular sentiment among the unenfranchised residents in the country—despite their numerical majority, their wealth, energy, intelligence, and the services they had rendered to the State and people.

The old intolerance imbued in the Dutch-French Boer of 200 years ago was then made manifest by the denial of the ordinary rights of citizenship to those who in the space of ten years had developed the country to a greater extent than the Boers themselves could have done in a century.

And the wealth obtained from the gold-fields provided the means which it was hoped would enable the Dutch population of South Africa to drive their British fellow-citizens into the sea, and once more place in the hands of the Dutch the ruling power from Cape Town to the Zambesi.

The founding of a 'beautiful young Africander nation' was to be the crowning effort of the Transvaal and Orange Free State in wresting the government of South Africa from the Imperial Power. As a means to that end, both Republics armed vigorously, and made the most elaborate preparations for a death struggle *with Great Britain.*

The idea of exchanging British rule for that of a Federal Republic, as entertained by the Dutch in South Africa, has undoubtedly been fostered by the deplorable policy of the British Government during the past half-century, for there has been no settled policy at home, and vacillation and temporising with the interests of South Africa have frequently shaken the confidence in the home Government of Cape Colony and the adjacent States.

The lack of a definite policy has been fruitful of many dangers and burdens to the British nation, but in no instance has the risk accompanying it been more fully illustrated than in the case of the South African colonies and States.

It is not our purpose to hark back to the beginning of the century for examples of inconsistent treatment; it will be necessary only to refer to the history of the two South African Republics to prove our contention to the hilt.

When the Boers emigrated from the Cape Colony they took possession of, and occupied, the district north of the Orange River and Natal.

The portion now known as the Orange Free State was formerly an appendage to the Cape Colony, and its people British subjects. After a time, however, it was found that the difficulties with the natives were of such frequent occurrence, and caused so considerable an expenditure, as, in the opinion of the British Government, to render it worthless, and it was consequently resolved to abandon all sovereign rights over the district, and let the emigrant farmers do their best to turn the country to account.

Prior to this mistake, Sir Harry Smith, then Governor of the Cape Colony, had found it necessary to march a force of troops into the Orange River Sovereignty in order to *quell a rebellion* which had arisen against

British authority, and he inflicted a severe defeat upon the Boers at Boomplaats, putting a price upon the heads of some of the rebel leaders.

The authority of the British Government was maintained until the close of 1853, but on February 23, 1854, the sovereignty was abandoned, and the Orange Free State Republic was established, in spite of the protests of a large proportion of the population, who wished to remain under the protection of Great Britain.

Subsequent events have proved this conduct to have been a mistake; but some allowance must be made for the ignorance of the English Ministers at that date, who regarded the majority of the Dutch people in the South African colonies as nuisances, to be got rid of at the first opportunity, and at any cost to national honour and prestige.

It was not many years after the abandonment by Great Britain of all the rights pertaining to the British sovereignty that the Free State burghers became involved in serious differences with the Basuto nation, relative to the boundaries of their country and the Free State. War was the result, and the Free State appealed to Sir George Grey, then the High Commissioner, to arbitrate upon the respective claims of the parties. His decision was in favour of the Free State, and was for a time submitted to by the Basutos. Soon, however, the natives commenced stealing cattle, and made themselves intolerable as neighbours, and in 1865 the Free State took up arms, and war in a desultory kind of way was carried on against Moshesh and his people.

After great sacrifices in men and money the burghers had all but succeeded in crushing the Basuto power, when, without warning, the British Government intervened on their behalf, taking over the nation as British subjects, so that all the sacrifices made by the farmers

were made of no avail, except that they had the British guarantee for the safety of their borders.

After that the Free State, under the fostering care of the late Sir John Brand, flourished exceedingly, and up to the unfortunate alliance promoted by President Reitz, and carried more completely into effect by President Steyn, the career of the Free State was marked by great prosperity, giving offence to none of the surrounding States.

The alliance with the Transvaal at once converted the Free State burghers into active enemies of Great Britain, which is to-day, with the blood of its sons, paying the price of incompetent advisers.

The country was originally British territory, but the short-sighted and parsimonious policy of the home administrators relinquished it, so that all the blood and treasure that had been expended upon the establishment and maintenance of British authority was lost.

Having once recognised the claims of the Free State with regard to the boundaries fixed by Sir George Grey, the British Government intervened at the very moment when the burghers had everything in their own hands for the subjugation of the Basutos, saving them from the consequence of their conduct at the expense of the burghers.

The Free State felt sore about this interference, and the feeling of the burghers was not rendered more cordial when the diamond-fields were taken from them upon very weak grounds. It is not therefore a matter for surprise that a people who tenaciously remember injuries and slights should have thought it possible to 'pay out' Great Britain for the slights of the past, and the meanness which has characterized the policy of the Ministers of the Queen since Her Majesty's sovereignty was formally relinquished.

But if the case of the Free Staters was bad, the

system adopted by the British Government as to their own subjects in the Transvaal was far worse. Shiftiness and expediency, as dictated by the conflict of political parties at home, has been accompanied in the latter instance by the most flagrant betrayal of the interests of both white and coloured inhabitants of the Transvaal by the wilful breach of promises made by the highest representatives of the British Crown and in the name of Her Majesty the Queen.

Mr. Gladstone on taking office declared above his own signature that 'he could not advise Her Majesty to cancel the annexation in consequence of the new obligations and responsibilities that have been created by that act.' Yet within a brief space after that solemn declaration he concluded a peace with the rebels against Her Majesty's rule, by which the Transvaal was relegated to Boer authority, and the 'obligations' and 'responsibilities' which he had formerly and most properly assigned as abundant reasons for refraining from destroying the work of his predecessors were thrown to the winds.

The disgraceful peace concluded under the shadow of Amajuba on British territory, and within view of the graves of those who fell in defence of British rights, will prove a monument of dishonour to Mr. Gladstone's memory and to those who were associated with him. That act of national humiliation and perfidy has proved the fruitful source of all our present troubles.

As in the Free State, so in the Transvaal, was the national feeling of the Boers encouraged by the weakness of British Ministers, until it culminated in the present war, with its enormous cost in life and limb and gold.

Possibly the annexation of the Transvaal in 1877 may be considered premature even by those who approved generally of the policy which led to it, but the grand

mistake was in not holding to it with wise tenacity once the republic had become British territory. It is absurd to say that the majority of the Boers were opposed to the annexation by Sir Theophilus Shepstone, or that the petition to the British Government was not on the whole a *bonâ-fide* document. To our knowledge, the petition was signed by a considerable number of Civil Servants in the employ of the Boer Government under President Burgers, and it is a fact that when the 13th Regiment was marched in from Natal the farmers' wives in numerous cases baked bread and cooked meat for the refreshment of the troops at halting-places in the vicinity of occupied farms. It was only when the Boers waxed fat upon the money expended for the troops, and had after their fashion become ungrateful for their deliverance from their black enemies, that the question of the righteousness of the annexation was mooted. It may be taken as a natural sequence of the vacillating policy which was adopted towards the Free State that the agitators among the Boers of the Transvaal should point to the Free State as a sample of British colonial policy. It was reasonable to argue that if the burghers of the Transvaal were only sufficiently persistent in their demands for the retrocession of their country, and backed it up with the assertion that the annexation was obtained by unfair and unjust means, the Transvaal would once more become a sovereign State, and every burgher would be able to become a law unto himself. The Free State had become so, and why not the South African Republic?

It is not necessary here to dwell on the connection Paul Kruger had with the secret movement to oust the British from the Transvaal, even whilst he was a member of the Executive under the British régime and receiving pay for his services from the Imperial exchequer. *The fact* is quite clear that he was the secret

chief of the movement, and had even then no small share in stimulating the more ignorant of the population to throw off the authority of Great Britain in South Africa.

It will be easily understood that the descendants of the men who threw off the intolerable burdens of the Dutch East India Company and the progeny of the French immigrants who revolted from the cruel religious intolerance of the French Government would carry the germ of freedom in their composition wherever they might go. The same reasons which induced them to rebel against control in their native land, drew them into the wilds of Africa, and there having no one to dictate to them, they attained to that perfect freedom from all restraint for which they hungered. After some years of wandering, in which they were fighting for their lives with the aborigines, the Free State and Transvaal were sufficiently populated to become centres from which civilization might be extended under a wise and beneficent system of government. But these recalcitrant British subjects were more intent upon seizing the land from natives and parcelling it out among themselves than upon the spread of those principles on which alone a nationality can be founded with any prospect of permanence. Men dwelt so far apart that there was but little intercourse amongst them, and still less a semblance of that central authority which had been established after the Convention of Sand River. By the convention the autonomy of the Transvaal was recognised by the British Government, so that each farmer became a king upon his own stretch of land. The ingrained idea of personal independence was thus fostered, until it grew into the monstrous development of the right to tyrannize over those who were not of the favoured Dutch-French origin; and slavery and its concomitants became estab-

lished as against the natives, whilst other nationalities were looked down upon by even the most ignorant Boers. That sentiment, combined with the experience of the methods of the British Government half a century ago, paved the way to the present condition of affairs, and we have to pay the price of recovering our own, once weakly surrendered, in order to keep up the prestige of our Empire.

The Boers' hereditary confidence in themselves has been fed and fostered by the vacillation which has characterized the treatment of South Africa by successive British Governments. The Boers have been confirmed in the belief that they have only to ask long and loudly, with a veiled threat of serious consequences, to obtain what they may happen to desire. Shreds of Old Testament history have led them to consider that the God whom they profess to worship will direct their bullets so as to bring about a victory to their arms. President Kruger's recent exhortations to the commandoes in the field to trust to God rather than to markmanship, as He would direct their bullets so as to secure the defeat of their enemies, is a tolerably clear proof that they consider themselves the chosen people among the moderns, and, like the Hebrews of old, under the protection of the Most High.

An element not to be disregarded in this connection is the resentment felt towards Great Britain for her interference in the domestic institution of slavery. That feeling remains unchanged to the present day, and it is an unquestionable fact that Boers in the Transvaal, and possibly also in the Free State, have established a system scarcely to be distinguished from slavery and slave-trading, as it existed before August 1, 1834 (see Appendix B). The Boer's dislike to paying taxes is a feature which is not confined to him, who, however, may be considered to occupy a unique position

as a taxer of the population which he does not recognise as being of his own household.

The Dutch Boer, as he is, will at all times be difficult to manage, more especially as he considers all conciliation and kindness to be an infallible sign of weakness and fear. A Boer would understand and respect German methods, but he has nothing but contempt for a Government which has a tender regard for the prejudices and susceptibilities of its subjects.

CHAPTER II

PRE-ANNEXATION DAYS

THE writer made acquaintance with the Transvaal about the middle of 1873, when he joined the band of gold-seekers upon the then recently discovered alluvial deposits of the precious metal in the Lydenburg district. These deposits were discovered and brought into prominent notice by Messrs. Thomas MacLachlan, McLeod, and Macdonald, on the farm Geelhoutboom, whence the name of those goldfields, Mac-a-Mac, is derived. Although large nuggets were not plentiful, the creeks and watercourses yielded a sufficient return to attract some hundreds of men to the place, and to justify President Burgers in his attempt to establish an orderly system of administration in place of the rough-and-ready rules which the diggers had framed.

It was, as far as we can recollect, in the month of November, 1873, that President Burgers made his official visit to Mac-a-Mac, and his advent was welcomed by the diggers with enthusiasm. A project was set on foot to entertain him at a public banquet, and subscriptions were readily forthcoming for that purpose. At that time, of course, there were not many local facilities for such a function, but that difficulty was overcome by the appointment of a caterer resident in Lydenburg,

who with great enterprise managed to convey over the apologies for roads all the requirements for a banquet for about 250 hungry miners. Everything had to be brought—plate, linen, and china as well as food and drink—a distance of thirty-six miles, over hill and dale, through rivers and vleis, through bush and briar, at a time when the word 'road' was a misnomer. It was, however, accomplished in due time, and for a sum which in those days must be regarded as moderate in the extreme. The present writer had the honour to preside at the banquet, and can bear testimony to the cordiality of the feeling which prevailed both towards the Government and the people of the Transvaal at that time.

President Burgers made himself very popular, and his speeches and official actions gave great satisfaction to the community upon the newly-found gold-fields. He appointed, at the request of the majority of the diggers, Mr. Macdonald as Gold Commissioner, and invested him with certain powers necessary for the good ordering of the fields. That gentleman, being an old experienced American gold-digger, used to the rough-and-ready justice adapted to the needs of a heterogeneous community, and not caring to be trammelled by the niceties of statute law, did very well for the time, and was popular with the men over whom he had been placed.

The President christened the district where gold had been found in payable quantities 'New Caledonia,' in compliment to the number of Scotchmen who had flocked thither, and at a farewell picnic given to him, and the visitors who came in his train, produced two nuggets—the Emma and Adeline, as they were named after the daughters of the President—to the great astonishment of the diggers, who were not at all aware of their having been found. These nuggets

were afterwards coined into about £800 'Burgers' sovereigns,' and were sold to the public at 30s. each, as being the first coined produce of the Transvaal gold industry.

Shortly after these festivities and the return of the President to Pretoria, some sensational discoveries were made at Pilgrims' Rest, about seven miles distant from Mac-a-Mac, and a large number of the diggers left the earlier diggings for the richer prospects at that place. The population speedily grew to over a thousand; ladies began to make their appearance, and the camp rapidly assumed a brighter aspect. Before many months were over, balls and concerts became frequent accessories to camp life, and social functions were carried out with great propriety. Pilgrims' Rest produced large quantities of heavy gold—the nuggets ranging from 1 ounce to 150 ounces in weight, and in one case 13 pounds weight of gold was taken out of a 'pot-hole' in four solid lumps, which were afterwards exhibited in the Cape Colony by the lucky discoverer.

With increasing wealth and the prospect of some stability came the desire of the diggers to be represented in the Legislature (Volksraad), and President Burgers supported the appeal, with the result that the Raad sanctioned the making of New Caledonia into an electoral district, privileged to send two members to Pretoria, to represent the digging communities at Pilgrims' Rest, Mac-a-Mac, and Spitzkop. Messrs. Macaulay and Cameron were elected, and went to Pretoria, where they took part in senatorial duties without exciting jealousy or suspicion on the part of their colleagues or the Dutch people. This fact has not been brought to public notice as prominently as it should have been as a precedent for the extension of the franchise to *the large* Uitlander population which

has gathered since the discovery of gold at the Kaap and on the Witwatersrand fields.

So far as the writer is aware, there has been no repeal of the special law creating New Caledonia an electoral district; but that is not of much consequence now, as the great majority of the men who were invested with full citizenship have been dispersed by the closing of the fields to the alluvial diggers and by the action of the Kruger Government in granting concessions for gold-mining in those parts of the country where the enterprise and industry of the first-comers had proved their value. The Transvaal Government by this policy threw itself completely into the power of the men who possessed capital, whilst those who had nothing but brain and muscle were completely excluded from all chance of bettering themselves by the pursuit of the fascinating industry of gold-digging.

Shortly after President Kruger came into office the policy of granting concessions was adopted. The first of these, we believe, was the grant of exclusive rights of mining upon portions of three farms, which had formed the Pilgrims' Rest diggings. This concession was made the basis of a company known as the Gold Exploration Company, and the miners were driven from the property thus obtained. It must be said, however, in justice to the concessionaire, Mr. D. H. Benjamin, that he paid upwards of £60,000 in compensation to the evicted diggers, the amount to which they were severally entitled being ascertained and fixed by Commissioners appointed by the Government. Still, the system was faulty, and has been productive of evil consequences to the State ever since.

To return to the political position during the later part of President Burgers' official existence. The great difficulty which that gentleman had to contend with was the general poverty of the country. Taxes could

not be collected for the purpose of carrying on the government, and there was not yet a sufficient number of people on the gold-fields to take the burden of supporting the administration of the whole country upon their shoulders. In no district of the country were the fiscal imposts more readily paid than on the gold-fields, but the art of fleecing had not at that time been developed to the perfection to which it has since attained. The result was that the President found himself hampered both financially and morally by the defection of the people, who did not appreciate his patriotic policy and his attempt to raise their status as an independent nation, and his position became one of almost insuperable difficulty.

Unfortunately, while the Treasury was almost empty the trouble of a war with the native chiefs, Johannes and Secocoeni, supervened, and the burghers were called out to restore obedience. It is not necessary to say more upon this point than that the burghers, after a short campaign, refused to remain longer in the field, and 'Huis toe' (Home we go) was a reply to the ardent exhortations of the poor President, who begged them with tears not to give up the struggle with Secocoeni before his subjugation had been effected. The burghers returned to their homes, and the President, depressed beyond measure at the financial and political condition of the country, went back to Pretoria. The necessary sequence to this was the desire for annexation of the Transvaal by Great Britain.

We may here in passing contrast Mr. Kruger with his impulsive predecessor, Thomas François Burgers, whose great and fatal mistake it was to endeavour to force the people into genuine progress and a proper appreciation of the demands made by civilization before they became fitted for self-government! Mr. Burgers was twenty years in advance of his time, but all those who knew

him will continue to hold a high opinion of his character, the purity of his motives, and, from his point of view, the height of his ideals. There was only one blot in his character, and that was his distrust of England and Englishmen. Individually he was ready to admit their possession of good qualities: but in judging them as a nation his view was obscured by racial prejudice.

CHAPTER III

THE ANNEXATION DISCUSSED

THE alleged causes of the war of independence were the failure to keep the promise of according popular representation made by Sir Theophilus Shepstone in the annexation proclamation, and the military style of government adopted by his successor, Sir O. Lanyon. No doubt there is some truth in these allegations, which offered sufficient grounds for the agitation set on foot by certain malcontents, of whom Mr. Kruger and Dr. Jorrisen were the chief. It may, however, be safely asserted that the immediate causes for the turning of popular opinion against British rule were the parsimony of the authorities in Downing Street, and the short-sightedness of their treatment of the two most important persons concerned in the matter.

The ability and influence of Mr. Paul Kruger were to a certain extent recognised as valuable, and a position was given to him upon the Executive, of which Sir Theophilus Shepstone was the chief. But Mr. Kruger's estimate of his value was higher than that accorded to him by the Administrator, and it was not long before he became discontented with the amount of his honorarium (£300 per annum), and he made it known that he would not continue to give his services longer for such a pittance. By a misrepresentation of facts he was enabled to add another hundred to his income,

and that addition was subjected to an inquiry by the Home Government, the Colonial Secretary (Mr. Osborn) being called upon to make it good. This naturally led to a somewhat warm correspondence with Mr. Kruger, who, however, could not be induced to disgorge. From the time that he resigned his seat upon the Executive he became an avowed enemy of the new régime, and used his influence amongst his fellow-countrymen to promote discontent and bring the Government into odium. At that time the aspect of affairs in the Transvaal was by no means so bright as it became a few years later, and it is sad to think that if the British authorities had recognised the value of Mr. Kruger's services, and had treated him with liberality, the present costly war might very probably have been unnecessary, while the shock to British honour and prestige which attended the retrocession of the country would have been avoided.

The other person of influence possessing a subtle brain, and although a Doctor of Divinity, not very scrupulous as to what use he put it, was Dr. Jorissen. He was one of the importations from Holland by Mr. Burgers, and joined with Mr. Kruger in bringing about an acute condition of discontent amongst the people. He, too, had a grievance against the British authorities in that he was removed from his office as State Attorney on the ground of incompetence. An offer was then made to him of the position of Landdrost of Pretoria, but the step from almost irresponsible exercise of power to that of a stipendiary magistrate at £600 per annum was too great a degradation to be submitted to, and the position was refused by him. The prospect of becoming a leader in the rebellion against British rule in conjunction with Paul Kruger appealed to his vanity, and he became an active advocate of anti-British propaganda. He, too, might have been molli-

fied by a little regard for his *amour propre*, but his refusal of the position of Landdrost was considered final, and he threw in his lot with the other side.

These two men, each possessing influence, the one with the mass of the ignorant Boer population and the other on account of his intellectual power with the more cultured section of the burghers, were let loose upon the nation. Neither was scrupulous as to the character and quality of his arguments. Paul Kruger appealed to the religious sentiment, and urged upon the attention of his compatriots the godless character of the administration, preaching the doctrine that the Boers were God's chosen people, and that the favour of the Almighty would be on their side in any struggle with the new Government. He impressed upon his credulous people that the English were nowhere mentioned in the Bible, and but few of his hearers thought fit to question him as to where the mention of the Boers as men after God's own heart would be found. His frequent appearance in the pulpit gave him a sacrosanct influence with his hearers, and added not a little to his power. He used his reputation for special holiness precisely as the Mahdi did when he contemplated the conquest of the Soudan, and eventually wrested it from the enfeebled hands of the Egyptian Government. It is to be borne in mind that there was at that time no counteracting influence in the shape of a public press to give the other side of the questions affecting the interests of the people. But few amongst the farming class read anything except the Bible, and were therefore open to the arguments backed up by texts which Paul Kruger was in the habit of applying to their condition as a chosen people. The majority of those who were sufficiently educated to read a newspaper relied upon the *Volksstem* for their political information. In its columns a much purer system of

republicanism was taught by the late Jan Celliers than has obtained of late under the management of Dr. Engelenburg, a Hollander who has kindled racial antipathies by the rabid style of his writing. The *Volksstem* nowadays is a newspaper subsidized by the Government, and reflects with much accuracy the opinions and policy of its patrons. In the early days the late Mr. F. Jeppe established a paper called *De Oude Emigrant* in Potchefstroom, which was so fearless a critic as to bring down upon it the wrath of the Government, and it was speedily suppressed by an order from the Volksraad, with especial vigour, because it was published in Dutch. It was followed by the *Potchefstroomer*, which still exists as a subsidiary Government organ, following the lead of the *Volksstem* in Pretoria, but devoid of the brilliance and ability of that paper. The fact that both these newspapers were in the vernacular brought home more readily their doctrines to the people, and as they appealed to the national aspiration of the Boers to be entirely independent of every exterior influence, political, religious, or social, and there being nothing to counteract that tendency, the idea of creating a Dutch Republic upon such principles became almost a religion with them. The ministers of the Dutch Church became prophets sent by God to relieve the chosen people from a bondage which they were taught to believe was intolerable and burdensome.

The annexation of the Transvaal, although effected without any display of force, and with the tacit consent of the mass of the people, only held the idea in check for a little time, just so long as the country remained poor, so that neither taxes could be collected nor officials paid their salaries. For just about one year there was a cessation of the agitation, Paul Kruger being a salaried member of the Executive; but as soon as

that connection was severed his propaganda started afresh. So serious did this become, that the English administration decided to publish a newspaper in Dutch for the information of the people. The *Boerenvriend* was started, and distributed gratis amongst the burghers; but the expense of keeping a paper of that kind going without subscribers or advertisements speedily put an end to the enterprise. The opportunity was thus lost of effecting a change in public opinion by the dissemination of an antidote to the pernicious doctrines of the republican Dutch press and the personal efforts of Paul Kruger, assisted by Dr. Jorrisen, who had already sounded the note of opposition to the continuance of the British administration. As a matter of course, the *Advocate*, published at Potchefstroom, and the *Transvaal Argus*, published at Pretoria, both in the English language, did not reach the masses, and the work of the agitation against the new Government went merrily on until Colonel Lanyon, the Administrator, thought proper to arrest the editor and proprietor of the *Volksstem* for inciting the burghers to refuse the payment of taxes. This strong measure rather increased the energy of the rebellious movement, and made Mr. Jan Celliers a martyr in the popular cause, which was just the very thing to be avoided, unless the Government was prepared to follow the matter up with promptitude and decision such as the occasion required. Mr. Celliers became in the popular eye a patriot, and was made after the retrocession the recipient of a memorial in the shape of a new and improved printing plant made in Belgium, as a mark of the national appreciation of his services on behalf of the independence of the country.

Secret meetings were held during 1880 in almost every country village and district by the Dutch

burghers, the result of which was afterwards demonstrated by the completeness of the arrangements made for obtaining the retrocession of the country. Field Cornets and Commandants were elected other than those appointed by the British authorities, and every arrangement made for a general rising of the Dutch population. Colonel Lanyon, the Administrator, apparently did not attach much importance to these movements, notwithstanding that he was in possession of reports made by some of the Landdrosts upon the matter. The late Sir G. P. Colley, who met his death at Amajuba, made a tour of the Transvaal about the middle of 1880, and the result of his inquiries and experience was that the Boers were loyal. He told the writer that he had been received everywhere with the greatest courtesy and kindness, and that everything had been done to make his journey satisfactory and pleasant. As to the meetings of the Boers for drill and rifle practice, it was merely carrying out the law providing for periodical wapenschouws, and no inimical deductions could be made from that fact. Nor did he think much of the other facts, relative to secret meetings and illegal appointments of Field Cornets and Commandants which had been made, as indicative of a policy of resistance to the British authority. No doubt he felt secure, and, as far as he could see, a like feeling was entertained by the Administrator, Sir Owen Lanyon, for there was no evidence of vigilance or careful inquiry into the designs of the Boers. The consequence was that everything was in order throughout the Transvaal for a general rising on December 16 (Dingaan's Day), 1880, on which day, or very shortly afterwards, every village was occupied, and the British garrisons besieged.

It is outside the scope of this book to dwell upon the incidents of the war which followed. Its history is recorded in the works of Mr. John Nixon ('A Com-

plete History of the Transvaal War') and of Mr. T. F. Carter, whose work is crowded with valuable facts. The first-named book gives the view of events from the inside, whilst the latter deals with the progress of affairs external to the Transvaal.

A score of years have now nearly passed since the outbreak of the Boer War of Independence, as the burghers of the Transvaal delight to call their revolt; but it does not seem that the lessons which were so obvious to those who understand the Dutch Boer have made sufficient impression upon the mind of the British public or the British Ministers. There has been too much sentimental twaddle indulged in, in the idea that the Boers were a people 'rightly struggling to be free.' The naked fact is that, ever since they managed to shake off the trammels of civilization, they have been possessed with the idea that no other race of men beside themselves have any right to be in South Africa. That has been the basis of every political movement in the past, as soon as they could settle the question of personal predominance amongst themselves. It has passed into history now, but must have escaped notice, that when Prince Alfred made a tour through South Africa, Sir George Grey, then Governor of the Cape Colony, had to apply for a permit for His Royal Highness to pass through the Transvaal on his way to Natal, a favour which was graciously accorded as a personal tribute to the exalted position of His Royal Highness.

It has, from the very earliest period, been the policy of the Boers to keep up, as a fundamental principle, their isolation from the rest of the world, and they have discouraged as much as possible the intrusion into their country of strangers in blood and habit.

What was the cause—the excuse for—the annexation? Was it justifiable or expedient? The first question is easily answered by a perusal of the Queen's Commission

to Sir Theophilus Shepstone (see Appendix A). Was it justifiable? To this question many answers have been given. The majority of writers have stated that the British Government was persuaded to go into the Transvaal by the action of unscrupulous speculators and land agents; but that argument has been used over and over again when any movement has taken place for the good of the community. It can generally be traced to an inspired source, and it is favoured by the Bond, the Hollanders, and the subsidized press.

Nevertheless, there is not the slightest doubt that the annexation of the Transvaal was a necessity and for the good of that country. On the score of expediency it was a mistake. Once in possession, it cannot be denied that we made errors in not speedily fulfilling our promise to give responsible government, and in the appointment of Colonel Lanyon in the place of Sir T. Shepstone. Our intentions were sound, our policy was honest; but the tide of our diplomacy ran too fast for the Boers, and their leaders were eager to take advantage of any circumstance which might lead them back to their old positions (see Appendix K). The country at the time was described as, 'like a ripe cherry, ready to fall into our mouths'; and there is no doubt that many, driven to desperation by misgovernment and the fact that the country was hopelessly bankrupt (there was 3s. 6d. in the Treasury), thought the psychological moment had arrived, when such was far from being the case. Outside opinion could not sway Sir Theophilus Shepstone, 'a man whose work amongst natives, with whom calmness and dignity are so necessary, will be remembered so long as there is a black man south of the *Z*ambesi,' and it is due to his knowledge of the serious danger in which the country stood from native sources, as well as the fact that it could not alone hope to breast the storm it had done

so much to raise, that his opinion was confirmed that nothing short of annexation could save the Transvaal from fearful calamity. And yet 'the cherry was not ripe,' so far as the Dutch population was concerned.

Had England withheld her hand, the fiercest native tribes in South Africa would doubtless within a few months have been at the Boers' throats. Secocoeni, Cetewayo, and the savage northern tribes of the Zoutpansberg (who had previously defeated Paul Kruger at Schoemansdal, and have of late years given the Transvaal so much trouble), would not have hesitated to combine forces for the purpose of finally destroying their hereditary enemy. To avoid this calamity was the plain duty of England, even if the natives had only the faintest chance of succeeding. We did our duty, but at what a cost! We saved the lives of the Boers, and in their stead hundreds of British soldiers and loyal colonists drenched with their blood the plains of Natal and the Eastern Transvaal. British fighters only too soon afterwards received their reward in the shape of bullets from the rifles of the very people they had succoured. It must not in fairness, however, be assumed that all Boers were disloyal; many had to be driven by force to fight against us, and there were some who positively refused to leave their farms to fight against men whom they looked upon as their best friends.

We need only give a passing glance at the Zulu War, to notice one bright spot in that critical time in the devoted courage of Piet Uys and his companions from the Wakkerstroom district, who laid down their lives by the side of the British soldiers, content to know they were doing their duty. This is as it should be, and as it will be when equality drives away the shadow which Krugerism has cast over South Africa. We can but contrast with Uys's action the answer of General Joubert to Sir Bartle Frere, when the latter

appealed to him to cast in his lot with the English in fighting the common foe. He said 'he could only discuss the grant of the independence of the Transvaal, and until that was accomplished the people would do nothing.'

But we have digressed. Returning therefore to the subject of annexation, it must be admitted that President Burgers, the Volksraad, and the Executive protested against it, in order to leave a loophole, if necessary, for a future policy; but Burgers in his vindication only proves conclusively the justification of British intervention. He says, referring to the Secocoeni campaign:

'How different elements here combined against me; how the motley army, constantly stirred up to mutiny, at last openly deserted me, are matters of history. It was not here, however, where the greatest mischief was done. At home, in the capital, in the cities, the spirit of evil was busy, and on my return from the expedition I was betrayed and deserted. By the aid of the Raad, however, which met in extraordinary session in the spring of 1876, the evil was arrested, and a plan arranged to carry on the war to a successful issue by means of a volunteer corps. But now stepped in openly another element which formerly acted only in secret, viz., British interference, *which got a strong support from the Boers themselves and one of their chief leaders, P. Kruger*, who had betrayed me and contrived to split up the Boers into two great parties by accepting the candidature for the Presidency, after having induced me to accept it, and having promised his as well as his party's support; and this during my absence on the south-west boundary to settle some matters with the natives. . . . The Boers following Kruger considered themselves absolved from their obligations to the State under my rule, while the Boers adhering to me did not care to support a State of which Kruger was to become the chief; and so both parties not only refused to pay their war-taxes, but also the ordinary nominal tax on land and other taxes. This soon had its effect, and when Shepstone came to Pretoria the Government was already unable to meet any of its money obligations. The men of the forts fighting for the 'country could neither get their pay nor their supplies, officials no salary, post contractors no money. . . . By the end of January, 1877, the exchequer was empty. At the same time the clerical faction was active in seducing the people.

Slips were printed and distributed; everyone was roused in the name of God and religion to abandon the Liberal President. Faint-hearted friends were induced to sit quiet, while a constant cross-fire of lies was kept up, and the pulpit was degraded into a political catapult.

'I foresaw the dangers which would accrue from this state of things for the Republic; and, in order to upset Shepstone's design at one blow by uniting all parties, I proposed to Kruger that he and I both should withdraw from the candidature for the Presidency, promising at the same time that I would exert my utmost to get in a man like Stockenstroom, and to assist him with all my might. This Paul Kruger flatly refused to do, saying that I might withdraw, but that he would not. Fruitlessly did I press him by showing how our danger lay in our want of unity; how the English Government would have cause to step in on the ground of humanity to avert a civil war, to prevent a general rising of the natives, etc. He would not hear of retiring.'

Mr. Burgers also states that Shepstone made no secret to him of his intention to annex the country, unless matters were altered to the satisfaction of the British Government. He thereupon submitted a plan to Sir T. Shepstone embodying the necessary reforms, with which he declared himself satisfied, and which if carried by the Raad would have obviated the necessity for annexation. Let us quote Mr. Burgers' own words to show how the Volksraad treated these measures which were so vital to their country. He says:

'For days every article was wrenched from the Opposition till half the Constitution was adopted. But while this stronghold was being erected others were undermined, and during those long discussions the traitors had time to demoralize the people by discord still more. Paul Kruger was doing his utmost to make the Boers believe that I was aiming at becoming a dictator, and that the new Constitution was a means of self-aggrandisement proposed by me and intended to be forced from the people now they were in danger. . . . This was but too successful. The Raad began to flag in its zeal, and only adopted half the measures proposed. Constantly worried by calls for payment while we had no money in the treasury, harassed and pressed by the English party with memorials in favour of confederation or annexation, asked for payment by the Boers for losses *sustained* in the war, while they refused to pay up

their taxes, driven almost to despair by betrayal and corruption on all sides, ruined in my private estate as well as in health, I at last made a final attempt by boldly proclaiming the new Constitution as far as it was adopted, and by forming the new Cabinet. But here also I met with insurmountable obstacles. Joubert refused to accept, even for a time, the office of Secretary for Native Affairs. Struben also refused, and so did one or two others; while those who would accept were objected to on the ground that they were new-comers.

'Seeing my last attempt fail, the British Commissioner, having a handful of names fairly or foully obtained in favour of annexation, thought his time had come to act.'

This posthumous letter is characterized by much vituperation of England. Strange to say, this enlightened man could not free his mind from the general Boer idea that as a nation we are perfidious. It is impossible to quote all his remarks, but the concluding ones are a complete vindication of the arguments which have been brought forward in favour of the annexation. He says:

'Had I not endured in silence, had I not borne patiently all the vile accusations, but out of selfishness or fear told the plain truth of the case, the Transvaal would never have had the consideration it has now received from Great Britain. *However unjust the annexation was, my self-justification would have exposed the Boers to such an extent, and the state of the country in such a way, that it would have been deprived both of the sympathy of the world and the consideration of English politicians.*'

The italicized portions of the above remarkable vindication show that when these lines were written Kruger was playing one of those political games at which he has so few equals in South Africa. Uncertain whether the English party did not after all offer the best share of 'the loaves and fishes,' and ever watchful for the openings which the future might have in store for him, he engaged in a non-committal policy, which, while ruining his country at the time, and discrediting and destroying the unhappy President Burgers, enabled *him either to* fall into line with the English, provided

they paid him well enough, or, as events turned out, to pose as the saviour of his people from British oppression.

It is easy to sway Boer opinion by an appeal to former events, and to make them accept without challenge facts that have been 'arranged' with plausible cunning. But these agitators had something far more substantial behind them than this; they had secured the promise of assistance from many Cape and English politicians. While this was perhaps excusable on the part of the former, it could be little short of treachery on the part of the latter.

Both before and during the war it was openly asserted that the show of force was merely a piece of bluff, and that the Boers had only to make a sufficient demonstration to have the country handed back to them. They received communications during the war, at a time when matters were critical, and when many of the Boers were on the point of leaving for their farms, urging them to hold on, as the success of their plans was assured to them by their friends in England; and this continued while English and loyal colonists were exposed to horrors which only a close state of siege can produce.

The Boers had their own committee in London, mainly composed of Irish traitors and renegade Radicals. But such responsible people even as Mr Leonard Courtney and Sir Donald Currie were persistent in urging their cause. The latter is now no doubt convinced of the mistake he then made; but the former has even recently had the audacity to defend those actions and applaud his country's enemies.

It is not fitting to speak ill of the dead, but a word in passing must be devoted to Mr. Gladstone's policy, which is dealt with more fully elsewhere. His was the ill-starred lot *to be blind* to the issues at stake, to

juggle with the Empire from motives of expediency, to deceive the public with the cry of blood-guiltiness, when to-day Lord Kimberley admits the real explanation of that pernicious peace—'fear of the effects of the war on the Free State and Cape Colony.' It has been freely stated in the Transvaal that at this period Mr. Gladstone cabled to Mr. Hofmeyr as the leader of the Dutch party at the Cape, asking him for advice, to which the latter replied, 'Remember the example of the American colonies.' The exact wording may not be as stated, but that the leaders of the Africander Bond were consulted, of that there can now be no doubt.

For the lesser lights of the Cabinet there can likewise be nothing but blame. That the Duke of Argyll should admit that the matter was treated departmentally, and he knew very little about it, seems extraordinary to a colonial. Mr. Chamberlain showed in his speeches at that time an inexplicable lack of comprehensive knowledge of the subject, and one can only be thankful that he so soon saw the error of those days. It is to-day difficult to realize that he ever uttered these words: 'Under the circumstances which he had described, to have continued to maintain the annexation would have been an act which he could only describe in terms which had been applied by a high authority to a different subject, as an act of "force, fraud, and folly."'

The cool treatment to which Mr. Kimber White and the Loyalist deputation (who proceeded to London to protest against the retrocession) were subjected by the Liberal Government, and particularly by Lord Kimberley, calls for brief mention. That Lord Kimberley should keep Mr. White waiting for a week before receiving him, anyone who knows his Downing Street can understand; but, when received, for Mr. White to

be informed by that nobleman that 'he was too pronounced' was impolitic, to say the least. Thoughtless utterances such as these sink deep into the hearts of colonists, and were at that time calculated, in addition to the treatment they received, to turn loyal Imperialists into red-hot Republicans. As a matter of fact, this and similar later mistakes succeeded in many instances in accomplishing this effect, and to them may be attributed much of the trouble of to-day. The memory of these bitter days survived when serious efforts were made to revive the drooping cause of Imperialism, but few remained faithful through the hour of trial; in fact, it was almost a wonder that a single loyal subject remained in the whole of South Africa.

Of course, Paul Kruger and his followers were by no means displeased with this phase of the situation. While not prepared to give equal rights until he was sure of his burghers' predominance, his policy was to encourage the Republican as against the Imperial idea in South Africa, and to embitter the English as much as possible against their own Government. What powerful allies he had in Downing Street in the Africander Bond, and in our weak and swaying Governors, we have yet to relate.

Curious as it may seem, our great danger in South Africa did not lie so much in the Boers as in the Machiavellian policy, so skilfully planned by Kruger and elaborated by Dr. Leyds, of driving those British into their arms who were being prepared to accept a Republic on any terms rather than again approach an ungrateful Mother Country.

With the huge Secret Service Fund, certain Free State politicians, the organization of the Africander Bond, and men like even Rhodes and Sivewright appearing as the high-priests of Africander predominance, can it be wondered at that the Loyalists knew scarcely where

to turn? But the silent sentinels of the Empire were watching—those men whom we never hear of, whom the press knows not—waiting and watching, unswerving in their devotion to Queen and country, convinced that England at last 'would to herself be true.' They checked this foul conspiracy, and laid the seeds in 1894 which will grow into a tree of liberty in the new century.

CHAPTER IV

THE INTERREGNUM

THE conversion of the South African Republic into a British dependency took place on April 12, 1877, and the British flag was hoisted at Pretoria on Her Majesty's birthday, May 24, in the presence of a large number of townspeople and Dutch farmers from the neighbouring districts. As usual, a review of the troops then in the capital took place in honour of the occasion, and their evolutions were witnessed with the greatest interest by the farmers assembled, to whom the spectacle of a thousand red-coats going through a sham fight was a novelty. Not the slightest disturbance or intimation that the proceedings were objectionable occurred, and the general impression was that the action of Sir T. Shepstone was hailed as a satisfactory solution of a difficult and embarrassing situation.

The address to the farmers issued by the Administrator, couched in friendly terms, was well received both by Boers and British, and had its conditions been accurately observed, there can be little doubt that it would have consolidated British power in the Transvaal.

The relief of the burghers from commando duty was calculated to popularize the change of Government, the more so because the Boers had but recently returned *to their homes* from the fruitless expedition

against Secocoeni, and having had enough of the hardships incidental to a campaign, were anxious for a period of rest.

It was a politic move on the part of Sir T. Shepstone to impress upon the farmers that they were the bees to make honey, whilst the trouble of guarding the hives would in future rest upon the British soldier. It was also shown that he was in earnest when he set to work to reduce their old enemy to submission, without calling upon them to yield personal service, or to be commandeered for provisions, waggons, or cattle, without being well paid for their services. That was an experience which had not been their forefathers' lot or their own for many scores of years. It was one of the immediate fruits of the annexation which the respectable and industrious farmer could appreciate; but there was a class which did not take quite the same view. They had been accustomed to regard wars with the Kaffir tribes as a sure means of getting servants—more accurately, slaves—cattle, and other loot, at a minimum of cost to themselves either in blood or money. When their quarrel with the aborigines was left in the hands of the British Government, and brought to a close without their help, they lost the chance of plunder, and longed for the good old times to come back again, when each man was a law unto himself, subject to no restraint from more or less sympathetic neighbours. By these people—and numerically they formed a considerable proportion of the inhabitants of the rural districts—the new system was regarded as trenching on the rights of men who had 'made the land clean' by their ruthless destruction of native life. That was a germ of serious discontent in the minds of the people, and it was not lost sight of by certain influential men among them who had their own axes to grind. Of these first and foremost stood Paul Kruger.

We have alluded to his scandalous attempt to blackmail the then Colonial Secretary, Mr. Osborn, which succeeded at the time. The refusal to increase his salary resulted in his resignation as member of the Executive. Paul Kruger knew his value, and if the Government did not, so much the worse for the Government. In this calculation he was perfectly right, for instead of being a friend he became a powerful enemy, and it was not long before his inimical influence began to be felt.

The great mistake in our policy was the failure to give the people representatives, which the Boers said implied that if the promise of Great Britain could be broken in one respect it might also be altered in the other matters contained in the manifesto issued at the time of the annexation. That that was a fatal error was self-evident to all who knew the character of the people.

Had Sir T. Shepstone possessed the courage to call the old Volksraad together to ratify the annexation, there can be no reasonable doubt that it would have been sanctioned. Ways and means would have been found to quiet opposition.

The failure to re-establish those representative institutions which were promised gave a handle to the agitators, of which they made prompt and effective use, to the discomfiture of those who hoped and expected that the advent of British authority would bring about the regeneration of the country. Before Sir T. Shepstone had the opportunity of reconstructing the body politic, the state of affairs in Natal and amongst the Zulu tribes became so threatening that it was deemed wise to recall him and make use of his great influence with the natives to bring about a satisfactory termination of the impending trouble. At considerable personal risk he undertook the duty, and for a time

was successful in averting the danger threatening the colony of Natal. The British Government in the meanwhile took the false step of appointing Colonel Owen Lanyon as Administrator of the Transvaal, a proceeding which was no more relished by the Europeans than by the Boer population. The policy of that gallant officer contrasted strongly with the milder system pursued by his predecessor, and the burghers regarded his appointment as an indication that they were to be ruled as a conquered people, without having a voice in the administration of the affairs of their country. Their tacit acquiescence in the annexation had speedily developed into discontent, with the result that the change effected by this procedure merely fanned the embers of the agitation, already gathering strength among the farming population, who regarded themselves as the backbone of the political system.

The Transvaal Executive, becoming aware of the growing discontent, and recognising the danger which was likely to arise therefrom, made a futile and fatuous endeavour to avert the consequences arising out of the breach of faith by nominating a Council endowed with legislative functions. This foolish scheme was devised either by Sir Garnet Wolseley or with his sanction, and it excited a feeling of despair amongst the better informed, because it provided the agitators with a powerful weapon against the local government.

Whatever were the merits of Sir Garnet Wolseley at that time as a military man, it was clear that he had not the necessary qualifications for administering with success the domestic affairs of a people who had become suspicious of the motives and intentions of the British Government. The silly manufacture of a baker's dozen of kinglets for the settlement of Zululand after the war confirms one's poor opinion of his merits as a civil administrator. As

regards Colonel Lanyon, there was a personal dislike to him, not merely because it was thought that he had been sent to ride roughshod over the people, but for the singular reason that, owing to his swarthy complexion, he was thought to have black blood running in his veins! Amongst the old back-veldt Boers it was the common opinion that the Administrator was not a pure-bred white man, and it was violently contended that a 'bastaard' had been put over them by Great Britain as a sign of degradation. The Grond-Wet, their constitution, expressly stipulates that there shall be no equality between the white and coloured races, and the appointment of a dark-complexioned man as Chief Magistrate was an offence which was not to be tolerated by the Boers. Among themselves they are not so fastidious, for there are many families holding good positions, wealthy farmers, who are not altogether free from 'a dash of the tar-brush.' And, again, it had been formally resolved by the Volksraad that a member of that body must be at least four removes from the miscegenation of his forefathers before he is fitted for legislative duties. Without any evidence but the colour of his skin, and, of course, without a shadow of reason, Colonel Lanyon was looked upon as barred from the lawful exercise of authority, and the spirit of rebellion became more and more rampant.

The fact that the country was gradually becoming more prosperous under British administration weighed nothing with the Boers, and only served to confirm them in the belief that the merit of bringing about prosperity rested with themselves, and was not in the slightest degree attributable to the better and more honest administration of the affairs of the country. The consequence was that, as the people grew richer—principally through the expenditure for the keep of the troops sent by the British Government to subdue their

native enemies—they became clamorous to the point of rebellion for the recognition of their independence. Although this state of things was known to the Government, it was apparently thought of little consequence. The Boers had been unable to subdue a Kaffir chief (Secocoeni), and it was not thought possible that they would have the audacity to oppose Her Majesty's forces, so that their preparations were looked upon with good-natured contempt as being merely a childish display of spleen.

The first overt act of a rebellious character took place in the town of Middelburg, where a considerable number of Boers insisted upon a store-keeper supplying them with powder, caps, and lead, although they had not the requisite permit to make such purchases. The store-keeper complained to the Landdrost, and made an affidavit as to the conduct of some eighteen or twenty Boers who had acted illegally in taking all his available ammunition without producing the permit required by the law, passed and in operation years before the annexation took place. A report being made to the Government by the Landdrost upon the subject, he was instructed to issue summonses against the men whose names were known, and on the appointed day they answered to the charge. The accused secured the legal assistance of Dr. Jorissen as counsel on their behalf; but in the end they were found guilty, and a fine of £5 was imposed upon each offender against the law regulating the sale of ammunition. As a precautionary measure the Government ordered a squadron of the 6th Dragoon Guards to proceed to Middelburg, and they remained there for a short time after the trial was concluded.

It is pretty clear that at that time the party which took possession of the ammunition (which, it may be observed, was paid for at once) was acting prematurely,

as nothing was allowed to transpire for some months as to the ultimate objects of the Boers.

The military authorities, in fact, refused to believe that there was any danger—a belief unfortunately shared by the majority of the military officers who were in South Africa at that time. They would neither profit by warnings nor take the advice of men who had lifelong experience of the people with whom they had to deal; and the natural result has been disaster, which the admitted bravery, courage, and endurance of the men under their command could not retrieve. In the future settlement of the affairs of the Transvaal and Free State, it may be most earnestly hoped that a military administrator will not be permanently appointed. It will doubtless be necessary in the first instance, and for a few months, that military authority shall prevail in the conquered territories; but when the country has become settled, the government should be vested either in a colonial of proved loyalty, or in a Civil Servant of the Crown who has shown himself to be possessed of the qualities of courage and justice, and at the same time a courteous regard for the opinions of those whose local experience entitles them to be heard with deference. If that had been done, and the authorities at home had been trustful of their representatives, South Africa, instead of being the grave of reputations, would have been the source of great honour to the Proconsuls of Great Britain, and of immeasurable advantage to the people.

There are hopeful signs that the case of Sir Bartle Frere will prove the last one of a great administrator and good man being sacrificed to the clamour of ignorant and prejudiced cliques, banded together in that rebellious spirit which has so persistently been fanned amongst the Dutch population of South Africa. (See *Appendix G.*)

The present High Commissioner and Governor of the Cape Colony is a worthy successor to Sir Bartle Frere, and has shown clearly enough that men of the right calibre are still to be found in Great Britain, equal to any duty, however difficult of performance. So far, he has the almost unique experience of a Governor of the Cape being backed up by the British Government, which is especially gratifying, as he has been virulently assailed by a section of the British and colonial press.

Towards the end of 1880 acts of rebellion took the place of secret treason, and these soon resulted in the war of 'independence.'

CHAPTER V

THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE

It is scarcely possible in a work of this nature to narrate events consecutively, and we must plead guilty of occasional discursiveness. Unfortunately the Transvaal newspapers published before, during, and after the rebellion of the Boers are not available, and the writers have to depend for much of the following upon their memory and their intimate connection with the events which they attempt to narrate. The story of the war, as well as what preceded and succeeded it, has been frequently told; but there are many important points in connection with it which are here stated for the first time, and which may prove of particular value at the present time.

A mass meeting of the Boers was fixed to take place at Paardekraal on December 10, 1880, and as soon as it became known the Administrator issued an admonitory proclamation forbidding the meeting, and calling upon the well-disposed to stay away. At that time there were but few peaceable persons left among the Boer population, and no notice was taken of the proclamation. This is not to be wondered at when previous documents of the same nature had been treated with contempt, and no action had been taken to vindicate the authority or powers of the Government. The people assembled *in great force, being,* for the most part, armed,

and vows were made and stones cast by each individual, pledging all to strive for freedom from the British rule. This ceremony was performed with due solemnity, and on December 16, the anniversary of their fight and victory over the Zulu chief Dingaan, near Bushman's River in Natal, the first public act of rebellion was enacted by the proclamation of a Republican Government, with headquarters at Heidelberg. At the same time and place the reins of government were assumed by a triumvirate consisting of Mr. S. J. P. Kruger, P. J. Joubert, Commandant-General, and M. W. Pretorius, a former President of the Republic. To these three persons, assisted by Dr. Jorissen and Mr. E. Bok, and a few old Volksraad members, was entrusted the direction of affairs. Mr. Kruger had managed his part well, and he at once became the head-centre of the rebellion, the foremost man among his compatriots. It was not long before acts of hostility took place, the first shot being fired at Potchefstroom, where a small body of troops had been quartered, armed with a couple of light fieldpieces. The origin of the action was to be found in the resistance of a man named Bezuidenhout to the execution of a warrant authorizing the sale of a waggon belonging to him, on account of his refusal to pay taxes, which was one of the methods adopted by the Boers to show their contempt for the British Government. The Boers took his part, and on the police being called out to keep order one of them fired a shot, wounding a policeman. That started the insurrection.

On the 19th the onslaught of the burghers' force upon Colonel Anstruther took place at Bronkhorstspruit, about forty miles from the capital, on the road from Lydenburg to Pretoria. The British soldiers were shot down in scores, being for the most part practically *unarmed and* straggling, little dreaming that a wily

enemy was lying in ambush among the rocks and trees of an adjacent hill. The commanding officer, Colonel Anstruther, had been warned, when he left Middelburg, that he would be passing through an enemy's country; but, as is too frequently the case with British military officers, he ridiculed the idea of being stopped *en route*, and did not take the slightest precaution. The consequence was that when the Boers attacked they had it all their own way, as only comparatively few of the 94th were armed, their rifles being on the baggage-wagons, and the ammunition still in the screwed-down boxes. The Boers, under Franz Joubert, were skilfully posted among the boulders and thorn-trees on the hillside commanding the road, and upon Colonel Anstruther refusing to surrender—a fact which was intimated to the Boers by the messenger putting his horse to gallop—a murderous fusillade was opened, which placed a large proportion of the officers and men *hors de combat*, and threw the whole baggage train into confusion. Fighting continued only for a few minutes. The news was brought into Pretoria the next morning by Conductor Egerton, who had obtained permission from the Boer Commandant to come to Pretoria for medical assistance for the wounded. He managed to secure the regimental flag about his person, and it was subsequently placed in charge of the 21st Fusiliers, in garrison in Pretoria. The Government despatched Dr. J. N. Crow to the assistance of the wounded prisoners, and he subsequently accompanied them to Heidelberg, where the Boers were in undisturbed possession.

Dr. Crow, as we have already stated, went to Heidelberg in charge of the wounded British troops, and it might have been supposed that he would have been treated with respect and consideration on account of his cloth *and mission of* mercy; but he had to put up

with many indignities, and on one occasion he was assaulted by a young Boer, who slashed him with a long wagon whip, a bare apology from the triumvirate, Paul Kruger, M. W. Pretorius, and P. J. Joubert, being the only redress he received for the insult, whilst no punishment was inflicted on the aggressor.

One instance of undaunted pluck on the part of a woman deserves incidental record. It was during the attack upon the 94th that Mrs. Smith, the wife of the bandmaster, received a wound of a rather serious character, notwithstanding which she devoted herself to the assistance of the wounded soldiers, and many of the poor fellows who were disabled that day owe their lives to her self-sacrificing unselfishness and courage. The honour of a military funeral was accorded to her upon her demise a few years ago, and no one has more nobly deserved such a recognition.

Bronkhorstspruit was not a fight, but a cold-blooded massacre of British troops upon territory regarded as British, and it might have been thought that this would have exacted stern reprisals; but the home Government was too *magnanimous* for that, and the blood of our soldiers called aloud until these days for retribution. The news, brought, as mentioned before, by Conductor Egerton, who had walked the distance of over forty miles, the Boers having refused to give him a horse, to Pretoria, was the first intimation that hostilities had broken out. It speedily spread, and a considerable degree of alarm was manifested when it was known as a fact that some 600 Boers, fully armed and flushed with victory, were within a day's ride of the town. Meetings were hastily called, and the military authorities were invoked to take the necessary steps for defending the town.. At the earnest request of the townspeople martial law was proclaimed, and the male inhabitants almost to a man enrolled themselves either as volunteers

or as a civil guard. The volunteers were armed with rifles which had seen their best days, and were formed into companies under their own officers and Major Le Mesurier, of the Royal Engineers.

The opinion of the military authorities was that the town was not capable of being defended by so small a garrison, and the women and children were established in tents, waggons, and bungalows at the camp, whilst the volunteers were quartered in a laager between the convent and the gaol. These volunteers were at once employed in preparing defences, and a large party were engaged in digging a trench round the Dutch Reformed Church in Church Square. After it was completed and a couple of mitrailleuses mounted, it was decided by the military authorities that it was not tenable, and the trench was filled up. The next thing done was to enclose the space between the convent buildings and the gaol, both of which exist to the present day. A double plank wall was erected, with a space of 18 inches between, which was filled up with the earth dug out of the trench at the foot of the wall. This made a fairly good protection against the bullets of the enemy, while on the other side casks filled with soil, with sand-bags to the height of about 5 feet, constituted our western defences. The space thus enclosed afforded sufficient room for a camp of about 600 men, with commissariat offices and an exercising-ground, and so long as the weather was fine no great inconvenience was felt by the volunteers in their unaccustomed quarters. The convent was used in part as a hospital for sick women, the men who were wounded or sick being accommodated at the main camp, with Dr. Skeene as chief medical officer. Upon the whole the two camps were remarkably healthy. Very few deaths occurred from the diseases usually experienced when large numbers are cooped up in a limited area. We had, however, no occasion for

the defences we had made, as the Boers refrained from attacking the town, although on two or three occasions some of their scouts audaciously ventured so far in as the portion now known as Sunnyside; but a shell from the gun mounted on Time Ball Hill sufficed to send them off helter-skelter.

The first warlike incident which took place about Pretoria was a foraging expedition to a farm belonging to H. Schoeman a few miles from the town. The party was led by Mr. Surveyor Anderson, and succeeded in driving off a considerable number of cattle and about 800 sheep, which were safely brought into town. They were not destined to remain there long, for the late owner came in, and, protesting his *loyalty*, managed to bamboozle the military authorities into restitution. This result gave great dissatisfaction, and damped the spirits of the volunteers very seriously. The seizure of cattle and live stock is a universal feature of Boer warfare, and the only way of bringing the enemy to book was to deprive him of his cattle. We hear a good deal nowadays of fighting the Boer with Boer tactics and beating him at that, and possibly our military men have learned a lesson from the enemy. Anyhow, it is satisfactory to note that, notwithstanding the yelping of the Africander press, when captures of live stock or wagons have been made, no prayer for restitution has been listened to by the military authorities as in the past. After that time we never had another chance of replenishing our larder, and regretted bitterly, when we came down to half-rations, that our military officers had been so fatuously generous. Mr. Hendrik Schoeman has since shown no sense of gratitude; he is one of the most violent exponents of race hatred in the Transvaal, and in his lack of veracity and gratitude for favours received he is indeed a typical Boer.

The little fight at Swartkopjes was the first engage-

ment breaking the monotony of life in the convent laager. The detachment engaged upon that occasion was partly military and partly 'Our Boys,' a mounted corps of young fellows formed in Pretoria. For all of these this was their baptism of fire, and right well they came through the ceremony. It was here that the first exhibition of Boer treachery was made by the holding up the white flag as a decoy to our men. The symbol of surrender was used to trick the British into leaving cover, when a fierce fusillade was opened upon them, and the sergeant who was sent forward to parley was wounded severely by the Boer bullets. The trick was repeated again a little later, but as the order was given by the officer in command for the men to keep cover, no harm came of it, and firing was resumed on both sides. The result of the action was that the kopje was stormed and about fourteen prisoners taken, whilst the wagons belonging to the Boers were blown up.

The Boer Commandant, old Hans Botha, was taken prisoner after he had received five wounds from bullets; he was brought to the military hospital, and received much kindness. When asked, after he had recovered, if he had any complaints to make, he said the only thing he objected to was the frequency of the washings he had to undergo.

In the next skirmish at Red House Kraal the Boers, after firing upon it and again wounding one or two of our men, captured the British ambulance, in which were some wounded. The military authorities demanded the restoration of the ambulance, but its captors would not yield unless the fourteen prisoners taken at Swartkopjes were exchanged. This was done, and the ambulance was brought into camp, but it was found that two of its occupants, who had been wounded a second time *whilst in the* ambulance, were in a most

dangerous condition, and, notwithstanding all the care that was bestowed upon them, they eventually died, victims to Boer treachery and neglect.

We took very few prisoners after the first encounter with the rebels, for there did not seem to be any very ardent wish on the part of the military to come to close quarters with the besiegers, although, according to all accounts, the troops and armed civilians in the camp far exceeded in number the besieging force. In point of fact, it came to be believed that the Pretoria garrison was restrained from action by some secret influence, otherwise it is difficult to account for the inactivity which prevailed during the three months that the investment continued. Lieutenant-General Bellairs could hardly be regarded as wanting in stamina or experience, seeing that he had obtained the V.C. for an act of bravery, and Colonel Gildea, the second in command, was an officer not wanting in distinction. In the course of the siege several sorties were made, but in no instance with adequate success.

In a second attack upon Red House Kraal, just beyond Six Mile Spruit, some hundreds of troops were sent forward to attack the main Boer laager. The soldiers and volunteers were conveyed by mule-wagon to within a mile of the point of attack during the early hours of a brilliant moonlight night. The noise of the wagons and the objurgations of the mule-drivers were sufficient in the calm and stillness of the night to awaken the Seven Sleepers. Arrived at the crest of the hill overlooking the position to be taken, a mounted detachment of the volunteers was sent forward to a house in the valley below; there they found the Boer outpost vacated, and returned to report, burdened with blankets and pillows as the spoils of war, but without a prisoner. An advance was made to the supposed Laager *by Nourse's* Horse, and firing speedily became brisk.

With the dawn could be seen a scattered force of Boers, under cover of the mimosa-trees, sheltering the main camp, which was under the other side of a low hill. Notwithstanding the heavy and continuous firing, but few casualties occurred on our side, until Colonel Gildea was wounded, and General Bellairs gave orders to retire, greatly to the disgust of the unmounted volunteer force, who had not the chance of firing a shot. During this brush with the enemy two wagon-loads of soldiers — about fifty men — never left the wagons, but as they were in the line of fire they did not escape scatheless, one being so severely wounded as to succumb shortly after returning to camp, whilst another had a broken limb. As we had a couple of 9-pounder guns in action, and as there was no great disparity between the number of the Boers and our forces, much discontent was felt by the volunteers at the retreat, and harsh comments were passed upon the military leader who had planned the operations.

At Elandsfontein similar mismanagement took place. A squadron of Nourse's Horse had gained their way, inch by inch, on the ridges until the Boer laager was discovered within easy distance of cannon-shot. Captain Nourse sent messengers twice or thrice to General Bellairs, asking him to send a gun to his assistance, but it was refused, and the exertions of Nourse and 'Our Boys' were fruitless. Captain Sanctuary, who was posted on a kopje with a small detachment of mounted men, was more than once ordered to evacuate it; but knowing the importance of the position, he refused to do so until he got peremptory orders. He had scarcely reached the plain below when the position was taken up by the Boers, who were thus enabled to threaten our retreat on Pretoria. We had left camp at about 2 a.m. in wagons, and arrived at Elandsfontein, where the Boers were encamped, at daybreak. About

fifty men of the Volunteer Rifle Corps were ordered to take up a position on a low hill commanding Quagga's Poort, and to make such preparations for defence as circumstances permitted. The men were unprovided with tools, or even food, and had to 'lug out' the half-embedded stones upon the hillside with their bare fingers, in order to construct a breastwork upon the exposed sides of the hill. Whilst engaged in this, a party of 200 Boers suddenly arrived at the Poort, and discovering that the hill was already occupied, after a hurried discussion, fortunately decided to join their friends who were fighting about one and a half miles away. On their arrival at the scene of action the firing was very heavy for a short time, and was punctuated by occasional booms from the 9-pounder. Very soon the order was given to retire, and, covered by the guns, the retreat was safely effected, although the wounded had occasion to remember the day from the bruises inflicted by the jolting of the mule-wagons, which were driven over ant-heaps and stones by the nearest route to the camp, utterly regardless of the suffering humanity with which they were laden.

These and two or three other little skirmishes were all the serious diversions that we had when in camp. There were also some frivolities, such as concerts and theatrical performances and the weekly excitement caused by the publication of the *News of the Camp*, which was edited by the clever monologue entertainer, the late Charles Duval. That publication was far too much under censorship to be of much value as a record of events in which the military authorities played a prominent part.

Camp gossip supplied the place of authentic news as to what was going on in the outer world, and the most extravagant romances formed staple sustenance for the *quidnuncs*. The approach of relief for the garrison

formed the chief burden of the stories in circulation. Colley was reported to be within striking distance several times, and so circumstantial were some of the stories that people began to believe there was something in them. Towards the end of February, 1881, a rumour suddenly arose that events were not going on so well in Natal as was hoped, but still no one seemed to believe that there had been disaster. As usual, the Dutch Boers who were in camp, and who were regarded as loyal, were the first to get news of British reverses, and the disheartening rumours that filled the air were undoubtedly founded on news which had mysteriously reached them. A few days later a despatch was received from the Boer Commandant telling of the tragedy of Majuba, and further stating that negotiations for the conclusion of a peace were being carried on in Natal. This news was further confirmed a day or two after by the advent of a couple of British officers who brought despatches for Sir O. Lanyon and General Bellairs, giving particulars as to the position of affairs.

It is difficult to give an adequate idea of the wrath and indignation felt by the people at this fearful news. Men swore, and heartfelt curses fell upon Mr. Gladstone and the craven British Ministry of which he was the head. Women raved and shed tears of sorrow, humiliation, and disgust, that all the sacrifices they had made, all the hardships that they and their children had endured with cheerfulness, should have been entirely wasted. For the sake of their loyalty and country they would willingly have undergone privations for another three months if that disgrace could have been averted (see Appendix G). But cries and tears availed nothing, and they had the additional pang of seeing Boers riding through the grass-grown streets of Pretoria with soldiers' coats for saddle-cloths, and armed with guns taken *from our slain* countrymen. The feelings

of these poor people on their betrayal could only be expressed, emblematically, by the public burning of Mr. Gladstone's effigy upon the Church Square in Pretoria, by indignant orations, and other futile means of expressing popular sentiment. The British residents were powerless to adopt stronger measures, and were obliged to make the best of the situation. One very remarkable and, we believe, unique manifestation of popular sentiment took place on August 2, 1881, when the majority of the English inhabitants of Pretoria assembled to witness the burial of their beloved Union Jack, which hitherto had been regarded as the champion of the distressed, and a stanch protector of the rights and liberties of the British race wherever threatened. The pusillanimous betrayal of all traditions, of national honour, and of the rights of Englishmen, this base withdrawal of the statements made not only by the British authorities in the Transvaal, but by Mr. Gladstone himself, was a crowning infamy which could not be passed over without some kind of remonstrance from the victims of Ministerial treachery. The solemn burial of the British flag was decided upon as being likely to live in the remembrance of those who had been betrayed and sold by the Government over which Mr. Gladstone was chief. The time chosen for the display of indignant popular feeling was when the Convention was being signed by Her Majesty's Commissioner, Sir Hercules Robinson (afterwards Lord Rosmead), Sir Evelyn Wood, and Sir H. de Villiers, at present Chief Justice of the Cape Colony; and the representatives of the burghers—S. J. P. Kruger, P. J. Joubert, and M. W. Pretorius, the rebel triumvirate. The signing of the Convention took place in a room in the Government House (Ulundi House), and the grave was dug in the corner of an erf which was in full view of the window of the room where the abomination was com-

pleted. The mournful procession started from the Church Square, Pretoria, and wended its way through the streets until its destination was reached. The flag was enclosed in a coffin and carried on a wagonette draped with black. About 600 British subjects and 200 Kaffirs under the Chief *Z*waartbooi followed the disgraced flag to its tomb. The natives of the Transvaal were as completely betrayed as the whites, and felt the degradation of being handed over to the Boers, as they expressed it, 'like a bit of tobacco,' considering themselves as equally entitled to join the protest as the Britons. Arrived at the grave, the coffin containing the flag was lowered with due solemnity into the receptacle prepared for it, and a tombstone was placed at the head of it on which was the following inscription:

'In Loving Memory
of the
BRITISH FLAG IN THE TRANSVAAL,
who departed this life
on August 2, 1881,
in his fifth year.

"In other climes none know thee but to love thee."

"Resurgam."'

An eloquent funeral oration was delivered by Mr. John Munro, which met with hearty acceptance by the hundreds assembled to witness the obsequies, and the last rites having been observed, the crowd dispersed in an orderly and serious manner. During the following night, however, the grave was rifled and the tombstone taken away by some persons unknown. The coffin was found next morning elevated upon a flagstaff, but inquiry proved vain in discovering the culprit. It has been *asserted that* Colonel Gildea, who was in

command of the troops stationed at Pretoria, 'knew something about the matter,' because a relation of his has, since the death of that officer, asserted that the flag was in his possession. Be that as it may, the tombstone was found and taken care of religiously, and there is reason to believe that it is even now in safe keeping in Pretoria. Some years after the retrocession it was seen by the present writer in the possession of the late Mr. Jones. After his death, his property being dispersed, the historic tombstone was lost sight of. But it probably still is in existence, and the prophecy conveyed in the word 'Resurgam' will soon receive its fulfilment by the establishment of British supremacy under the old flag throughout South Africa.

In our brief account of the siege of Pretoria we have taken no notice of the beleaguered towns and villages in other parts of the country. The small garrisons of British troops and Loyalists who fled to the military stations for protection exhibited an admirable degree of endurance and courage.

The small fort at Lydenburg was invested by a Boer host acting under the advice of the notorious Fenian, Aylward, but the little garrison held out until the declaration of peace. It was reported, on very excellent authority, that the defence was mainly attributable to the courage of Mrs. Long, the wife of Lieut. Long, who was in command of the detachment of the 94th at that place. When the men lost heart, her voice encouraged and stimulated them to further exertions, and her indomitable spirit surmounted all the difficulties and hardships attendant upon the defence of the fort, ill-provided though it was with means of holding out successfully for three weary months. Mention is due also in terms of the highest admiration of the name of the Rev. Father Walsh, who united in himself the best features of a servant of God and the qualities of a good and

faithful soldier. He has since passed away, and was followed to his grave at Kimberley by a large gathering of persons of all grades of society and shades of religious opinion.

During the siege of Lydenburg the murder of Mr. Green took place under circumstances of gross treachery, which yet requires expiation. The present writer endeavoured in vain to bring about the punishment of his murderers after the conclusion of peace.

At Potchefstroom Captain Marshall Clark and Captain Raaf took possession of the Landdrost's Court, and did all they could to put it in a state of defence from the Boer attack which followed. Shortly afterwards Captain Falls was shot dead, while several others were wounded; and when it was discovered that the Boers were preparing to set the thatched roof of the building on fire, Captain Clark decided that resistance would be useless, and he and his companions surrendered, and were the first prisoners of war.

In the meantime Colonel Winsloe had hastily constructed a fort, 25 yards square, which was destined to afford shelter for him and his small company of soldiers, with the additional burden of several ladies and children who sought protection under the British flag. He and his force successfully defied the efforts of the Boer forces from the end of December to the middle of March in the following year. They were reduced to a diet of half-rotten maize before they were induced to surrender to the treacherous Cronje, and even then they marched out with the honours of war. This is the man who was in command of the Boer forces around Kimberley, and previously about Mafeking, who withheld from Colonel Winsloe the fact of an armistice having been agreed upon with a view to the re-establishment of peace, and who refused to permit the revictualling of the fort with a week's provisions,

although he was fully aware that that was one of the conditions of the armistice. It was he who behaved so disgracefully at Potchefstroom as to render it necessary for Sir Evelyn Wood to reoccupy the town and demand the surrender of the two guns which had been given up by Colonel Winsloe. This Cronje is the same man who guaranteed the lives of Dr. Jameson and his companions in the ill-fated and mischievous Raid, and who tried subsequently to read fraudulent conditions into the terms of surrender, though he was happily foiled by his inability to put into writing the ambiguity which he evidently thought might nullify a conditional surrender. This same Cronje refused at Potchefstroom to permit sick and dying women to leave the fort, and compelled the prisoners of war in his hands to work in the trenches he was digging around the brave little garrison he hoped to capture. He connived at the shooting, under the pretext of their being spies, of Dr. Waite, Van der Linden, Carolus, and others, though he knew that they had done nothing to merit death. And this same Cronje was accorded military honour and courtesy when he in turn had to surrender to Lord Roberts!

There is no proof that Mr. Kruger and the other chiefs of the movement had any complicity in these outrages; but, on the other hand, there is no evidence that they endeavoured to restrain the burghers in their inhuman practices. Of these there was an abundance.

A most horrible murder of a mason named Malcolm took place at Mulder's Drift, where the victim was kicked to death, and in order to save appearances a bullet was put through his head.

But the most scandalous business was the treacherous killing of Captain Elliot, who was provided with a safe conduct to the Free State, together with his com-

panion, Captain Lambert. Those who have read Rider Haggard's story of 'Jess' will find in those pages an incident founded upon the treachery shown to these officers. Captain Elliot was driven into the Vaal River, and there killed by a volley fired by the men who were charged with his safe conduct over the border. His companion fortunately escaped unwounded by swimming across the flooded river to the Free State. A short time afterwards the body of Captain Elliot was recovered, and temporarily interred on the bank of the Vaal River. Eventually his remains were brought to Pretoria, and used as evidence upon the trial of his murderers, and finally found a resting-place in the military cemetery there.

CHAPTER VI

THE RETROCESSION

MR. PAUL KRUGER having become the principal in the rebellion against Her Majesty's authority in the Transvaal, notwithstanding the oath of allegiance which he took as salaried member of the Executive of which Sir T. Shepstone was the chief, was acknowledged by the Peace Commission as the proper person to deal with in the negotiations for the cessation of hostilities which followed upon the disastrous battle of Majuba. The other members of the Boer triumvirate played but a subordinate part in that transaction, although the victory was gained by the Boer forces under General Joubert, who had, at all events, not added the crime of perjury to treason. Neither he nor Mr. Pretorius, whose level-headed and native gentleness fitted him for the part of mediator, had much voice in the settlement which was concluded. The fact of the matter was that the home Government was tired of the war, and Mr. Gladstone, who had gone back upon his own specific declarations with regard to the cession of the Transvaal to the Boers, had a sudden qualm of conscience as to the 'blood-guiltiness' of the action he had countenanced.

There can be little doubt that explicit instructions had been issued to the military authorities to cease from further hostilities, and to negotiate for peace at almost

any price. It was nothing that the Boers were rebels against the Queen, or that they had invaded British territory, had slain the Queen's troops and had harassed the Queen's subjects in Natal. Mr. Gladstone was so anxious to come to a settlement, that no condition was made that the Boers should retire within their own borders before making arrangements for the cessation of war. The preliminaries for a settlement were arranged and signed at a farm some fourteen miles within the Natal border, under the shade of the Majuba mountain, where the luckless Sir George Colley was shot whilst holding up his handkerchief as a sign of surrender.*

One of the conditions included in the terms of the armistice was that all persons who had been guilty of usages contrary to the customs of civilized war should as speedily as possible be brought to trial by the British authorities, who remained in possession until the Convention of Pretoria had been ratified by the Volksraad, the Boer leaders giving their full assistance to secure the punishment of the guilty. How inadequately this condition was fulfilled may be gathered from the records of the High Court at Pretoria. The *Transvaal Argus* at that time was under the control of the present writer, and as no steps appeared to be contemplated by the British authorities to bring certain alleged murderers to justice, he published in every issue of the paper the clause in the armistice relating to the punishment of persons guilty of contravening the usages of war, by the commission of murders upon British subjects. After some weeks this persistency was rewarded by the assurance of the Attorney-General (Mr. Morcom) that steps had been taken to

* His ivory-handled pistol is at present in the possession of the late General Smit's family at Pretoria.

bring certain persons to trial, who were alleged to be *particeps criminis* in the murder of Captain Elliot. The trial eventually took place before Chief Justice de Wet and a Boer jury, with the result that the prisoners were acquitted. Another case was tried with a similar result, when the Attorney-General of the Transvaal came to the conclusion that it was useless to continue the prosecution of other accused persons by juries ignorant of the usages of civilized war, and who, moreover, regarded the killing of an Englishman, whom they looked upon as an enemy, as perfectly legitimate under any circumstances. That that feeling has not died out amongst the majority of the ignorant and prejudiced burghers may be illustrated by an incident of which the writer has personal knowledge. A back-country Boer was lamenting the scarcity of horses, and the difficulty which the poorer class found in obtaining them, and he concluded with the hope that there would be war with the English, as they had beautiful animals, and he and his little son Piet, who could already shoot nicely, would be able to get them from the rooineks by the simple process of shooting their owners. Upon it being suggested that war was not usually made for the purpose of obtaining horseflesh from the enemy, and that killing a man for the sake of his beast was something like murder, the reply was, 'But he is only an Englishman,' which was held by the Boer to clinch the argument. With such views in their minds the Boers obviously look upon the life of an Englishman as being of the same value as that of a native, which is really next to nothing. This is illustrated by the following occurrence:

One of the Boer prisoners of war now enjoying enforced idleness at St. Helena has two sons, youths about fourteen to sixteen years old. These two promising youths were out shooting in the Zoutpansburg

district one day, when they encountered two Kaffir girls, who fled at their approach. The boys called upon them to stop, but as they did not do so they were summarily shot, one girl being killed outright, and the other severely wounded. Although attention was called to this brutality by the *Transvaal Advertiser*, not the slightest notice was taken by the authorities, it being allowed to pass as the usual 'accident.'

As another illustration, we cite the following incident:

A near connection of the President's family was arrested, during the Annexation period, upon the charge of having murdered a Kaffir herd by placing the unfortunate boy's head between his knees and twisting his body in such a manner as to dislocate his neck, thus causing instant death. The accused was tried, and a Boer jury found him guilty of a common assault, and a few months' imprisonment was all the punishment he received for his cruelty.

These instances of brutality serve to show that Boer ideas are very little advanced from the Stone Age period, and that they have yet to learn the lesson that impunity in the past will not shield them from the consequences of unlawful acts in the near future. And to accomplish that, the reign of wholesale corruption and general demoralization established under the Krugerian autocracy must at once and for ever be eliminated from their system of government.

As a result of the armistice, a Royal Commission was appointed to draw up a Convention between Her Majesty and the Transvaal Republic, and that document was signed at Pretoria under the circumstances to which we have alluded. It was ratified by a special session of the Volksraad at almost the last hour, and with expressions of opinion which promised but little for the *honourable observance* of its conditions. It

was not long after the formal and solemn agreement was entered into that renewed efforts were made to inflame the minds of the burghers, and petitions were got up praying for other terms, and specially directed towards the abolition of the suzerainty of Her Majesty over the Transvaal. It was decided to send a deputation to London to press the British Ministry for better terms, it being held that the burghers had not been conquered by the British, but the reverse, and that they as victors had the right to dictate terms. Barely two years after the Convention of Pretoria was signed, a deputation, consisting of Paul Kruger, Rev. S. J. du Toit, one of the founders of the Africander Bond, and General Smit, was deputed to interview the Imperial Government, with the object of getting the Convention set aside, and the country more fully placed beyond the sphere of British influence. On this occasion they were assisted by that brilliant political adventurer, Mr. Ewald Esselen, who used all his energies and his dialectic skill in the endeavour to completely isolate the Transvaal as regards its connection with England. To a certain extent they were successful with the British Government, and a new Convention was signed in February, 1884, generally known as the Convention of London. By this document formal mention of the suzerainty which in the previous Convention formed an important section of the preamble was omitted, but the section which gave Her Majesty the right to control the conclusion of treaties with foreign States was maintained. An unfortunate reliance upon the good faith of the Government of the Transvaal prompted the Colonial Secretary, Lord Derby, and the Government to consent to the making of treaties with the Orange Free State without their being subject to the supervision or approval of *Her Majesty,* as in the case of treaties with foreign

Powers. It was probably thought that as the Orange Free State was on friendly terms with the adjacent British colonies, conducting its business mainly through the agency of mercantile firms in the maritime towns, and believing that under the judicious government of their President, Sir John Brand, the burghers would have learned the value of their connection, there was little or no chance of unfriendly action on their part or on the part of the Government of that State.

It soon became apparent, after the death of Sir John Brand, and the election of Mr. Reitz as his successor, that the freedom from criticism with regard to political arrangements with the Free State, so earnestly pressed for by the Transvaal delegates, was not to remain unutilized. Delegations of members of both Republican Volksraads were appointed and met at Potchefstroom, where an agreement was drawn up which prepared the way for what was called the 'closer union' of the two Republics. At that time, however, the Free State burghers were scarcely prepared to throw in their lot with the sister Republic, and the people had to be educated, and to a great extent corrupted, by the unscrupulous agents whom the Kruger Government has made a speciality of employing in its political campaigns both in Europe and South Africa.

After the Jameson Raid the efforts of the secret spies of Pretoria were redoubled, and that unfortunate occurrence proved a most useful argument, as it was alleged that the design of Great Britain was to deprive both the Republics of their 'independence.' It became an easy matter to work upon the feelings of the Boers who represented the people in the Volksraad at Bloemfontein, that a common danger existed which could only be averted by the united strength of the two peoples. It was in vain that Mr. Fraser, who formerly occupied the responsible position of Chairman of the

Volksraad, pointed out the fatal results that would follow closer union with the Transvaal. The Transvaal party triumphed, and the Free State became politically one with the more northern Republic. The unwise and mischievous concession made by Lord Derby has borne the inevitable fruits of conciliation when put in practice with people like the South African Boers: it has landed Great Britain in a struggle for supremacy in South Africa which might have been avoided without difficulty had a definite and firm policy been adopted with regard to the Transvaal at an earlier stage in the development of South African history.

All this played into the hands of Mr. Kruger, and enabled him to obtain what at one time was the summit of his ambition, namely, the Presidency. It is scarcely necessary to observe that the chief object in promoting the closer union with the Free State was soon not limited to the attainment of the Presidency of the South African Republic only, but grew eventually to that of a Great South African Republic extending from Cape Town to the Zambesi. The dream was not altogether wild, for it is an unquestionable fact that no inconsiderable portion of the Dutch population in the Cape Colony sympathized with Mr. Kruger and his schemes, notwithstanding the benefits they derived from their status as British citizens. In point of fact, evidence can be adduced to show that for years antecedent to the miserable Jameson fiasco agents were employed to weaken the loyalty of the Dutch colonials, and, indeed, went so far as to secure a promise of co-operation in any movement that might have the effect of throwing over the rule of Great Britain.

The great obstacle to the fulfilment of these far-reaching designs has been Mr. Rhodes. He has *earned* for himself the hearty hatred of the two

Presidents, and not less, in later years, of the political party represented by the Africander Bond: he quite deserves it at their hands. Since Mr. Rhodes has become a power to be reckoned with, his general influence has been used in the right direction, namely, to the maintenance of the imperial paramountcy in South Africa against all comers, whether from the Republican States or foreign nations pretending to have special interests in this subcontinent. It is easily understandable that President Kruger likes him not, not only because he believes that he instigated the invasion of the Transvaal from the west, but because he has effectually closed all the doors to the further expansion of Boer territory.

The result of the deliberations we have alluded to at Bloemfontein was the formulation of a scheme by which the Free State was practically pledged to espouse the cause of the Transvaal in the event of a war with a *foreign* nation.

Despite the arguments of the more enlightened members of the Free State Volksraad, who pointed out the dangers of the course they were asked to approve, the majority of the Raad ratified the alliance, which now undisguisedly meant an endeavour to subvert the paramount position of Great Britain in South Africa. The arming of the burghers of the Free State with the latest modern weapons and ammunition was enthusiastically begun, and large sums of money were voted for carrying on the work. It can scarcely admit of doubt that, in addition to the amount openly voted for the purchase of arms by the Free State, considerable aid was given by the Transvaal in the supply of warlike stores out of its own overflowing arsenals to insure the arming of the burghers with weapons and ammunition of one description, so as to avoid the difficulties which a sudden stoppage of supplies from

outside might bring about. It cannot be omitted in this connection to record the assistance given by the Cape Ministry to the designs of the Boer Government. Up to almost the last moment before war was declared rifles and ammunition were permitted to pass through the Custom Houses of the Cape Colony direct to Bloemfontein, on the order of the Free State Government, for the purpose of arming against the only possible adversary—Great Britain.

The Premier of the Cape Colony considers that he was bound to grant permits because of the Customs Convention existing between the Cape and the Free State. He does not appear to have called the attention of the High Commissioner to the fact, nor to have asked the Free State the reason why it was arming so heavily. But Mr. Schreiner doubtless views with a sympathetic eye the vagaries of a certain class of his compatriots, which may be due to the fact that he is less than half an Englishman by birth. In one respect the Prime Minister of the Colony may be likened to his prototype Mr. Gladstone, in the great facility with which he can bamboozle himself and those who follow him, making the worse appear the better cause. That is the only excuse that can be made for the assistance he has given the rebellious Republics to enable them to challenge the supremacy of Her Majesty in South Africa.

It will not be difficult to conceive that Mr. Kruger, secure of the support of the Free State (with a complacent and sympathetic Bond Ministry in Cape Town), furnished with enormous stores of warlike ammunition, and his capital defended by a chain of fortresses, should have imagined himself strong enough to hurl defiance at the representative of the power of the great Empire over which Her Majesty rules. These preparations were not to be made in vain and rendered innocuous

by concessions to the demands of the British Government, and so the hour had arrived when Mr. Kruger thought that it was possible for him to drive the English into the sea, and carry out the idea of the great Dutch Republic of which he would be the first President. There was not much madness in this belief, for the strength of the military force in the Cape Colony and Natal was quite inadequate to protect their frontiers. The known disloyalty of a large number of Dutch farmers, who were British subjects, in the northern and western districts of the Cape Colony had been worked upon so satisfactorily that several districts were formally annexed, with little opposition, to the Free State on the outbreak of the war. The same process took place in Natal, and the Boer forces were able to penetrate within forty miles of Pietermaritzburg before their advance seaward was definitely checked.

For a short time President Kruger and his Free State colleague, President Steyn, have enlarged the border of their Republics by the annexation of British territory; but as we write the process of driving back the enemy has auspiciously commenced, and President Kruger's ambition will soon have 'o'erleapt itself,' and the progress of the British flag will not be stayed until it is unfurled under the statue of Liberty which crowns the cupola of the public buildings at Pretoria. President Kruger's work of a lifetime will thus have been brought to a conclusion, and the scheming and wily autocrat who has for his own purposes sacrificed his country and abused the magnanimity of Great Britain will have the opportunity of lamenting the loss of a position which, but for its flagrant abuse, might have been one reflecting glory upon the last days of his life.

CHAPTER VII

THE COMING OF KRUGER

THE foregoing pages show the causes which led primarily to Africander predominance in South Africa; and in drawing the curtain upon that regrettable portion of British history, we turn to the chief actor in the new drama, whose quaint and inscrutable personality has played such an important part in the history of our times.

Stephanus Johannes Paulus Kruger, to give him his full name, is a man of whom much has been written, and many attempts made to gauge his character, but in most instances without full success. He is a man who uses language, in the main, for what has been described as its most useful purpose, to 'disguise one's thoughts.' It is apparent that but for the circumstances which have attracted such a large population to the Transvaal, his name would be unknown outside his native land. If the gold-fields have done nothing else, they have revealed to us a phase of human character which, in Paul Kruger's person, repays a close investigation.

The early history of his family has been a matter of some dispute; suffice it to say it was of German origin. The founder of the South African branch was a certain Jacob Kruger, who was in the employ of the Dutch East India Company, and the President is representative of some of the best blood which flowed into the Cape Colony from oversea. The families of Cloete,

Steenkamp, and Steyn have intermarried with his ancestors. He is thus a typical specimen of the Boer, an example of the commingling of different races, resulting in the formation of something totally distinct from any one of those from which he sprang.

Many tales are told of the President's early life, the majority of which are of a fictitious nature. The story of his prowess as a runner and his phenomenal feats of strength may have had some foundation in fact, but 'Oom Paul' is somewhat of a humorist, and can draw the long-bow on this subject himself.

The following, a typical story, of his capacity as an inventor may be given: The President (as he says) was outspanned with his wife and family by the banks of a river, when some elephants came down in the cool of the evening to drink. One of them, while engaged in quenching his thirst, had his trunk seized by a crocodile. The sagacious animal immediately withdrew from the water, the crocodile maintaining its hold. Two elephants belonging to the troop formed up, the one on the right, the other on the left, of the attacked animal, and proceeded until they came to a spot where two trees had grown close together. The one elephant then pulled the nearest tree towards him, and his fellow the parallel one, while the wounded elephant deposited the crocodile between the trunks. The trees swung together, causing the crocodile to release its hold, and its was left to do the best it could for itself!

The old man smiled when he had told the tale, but another of the party capped it by a shooting yarn, as follow: 'The family were on trek, and had been very unfortunate in the pursuit of game, which was scarce; in fact, they were without meat, and the father decided to have a look round by himself. The shades of evening were falling when he secured a fat buck, and promptly returned home. Amid the murmurs of con-

gratulation from the party were naturally many inquiries as to how he had shot it. He explained that the buck was just going over a rise into a dip, when he fired and bowled it over. To his surprise, he found that the bullet had entered the hoof, passed right through the leg, then through the back and head, and emerged at the right eye.' The narrator of the tale then explained the moral to the President. He said, 'I asked my father when next he told the story to bring the places where he shot the buck a little nearer together.' The President admitted he had been fairly scored off. Much of the humour of the narrative is lost through the translation into English; in Dutch it appeals irresistibly to an audience.

Another good story told of President Kruger at a later period is the following: In the early days of the gold-fields the Transvaal Government generously granted four stands, or plots of ground, to the various religious communities for the erection of places of worship, with one single exception, the Jewish community, which only received two stands. This caused a great deal of dissatisfaction amongst the Israelites, who, as is their wont, immediately sent over a deputation to interview the President, to inquire why they had been treated so shabbily compared with the other denominations. The President, smoking as usual, listened stolidly to their complaint; then, after a long pause, gave his reason, saying: 'You people believe in only half the Bible, the others believe in the whole of it; when you do the same I will give you the other two stands!'

Of Mr. Kruger's youthful days we have not many records. With all his faults, he is not given to boasting, and to all the attempts which have been made to draw him on this subject he has presented an inscrutable front. This is certain: his early life was one of hardship *and* danger, and his continual combats with the natives

gave him that contempt for everything except sheer force which has been so exemplified in his policy.

Elected a Sub-Veldcornet at the age of seventeen, he became a Veldcornet, a position of considerable importance among the Boers, at the early age of twenty years. There is no doubt that even at that period he was marked among his fellows as the coming man.

The Boers have not many masters in diplomatic cunning of a kind, and that Kruger should have been selected so early in life for a high position showed that he possessed exceptional ability in that respect.

From the very first, in the different disputes which arose between the burghers, he took the stronger side; and whilst striving to make it yet stronger, he was content to take second place until the time was ripe for him to aspire to the Presidential chair. Mr. Kruger is also a keen business man, and he has not lost the opportunities which his position afforded him for improving his financial position. At the present time he is far on the road to being a millionaire, while some of his family, notably Frikkie Eloff, are not far behind him. This greed of wealth and the desire for personal aggrandisement greatly mar the finer aspects of his remarkable character. He has proved himself to be the most skilful of opportunists, continually turning the various difficulties of his country and of his political opponents to his personal advantage. Like Napoleon, he would, if he deemed it necessary, drive his artillery over the bodies of the wounded.

In 1860 President Pretorius left for the Free State on six months' leave of absence, and during this term accepted the Presidency of that Republic. The Transvaal at that time was torn with faction, and the President hoped that, by joining the Presidencies in his own person, he could use the better influence of the Free State towards settling the disputes of his unruly country-

men. But the interested parties across the Vaal found a way out of the prudent policy of Pretorius by asserting that the Constitution agreed to in 1857 prevented the holding of two offices by the State President, and he was thereupon forced to resign. But not for long; the two parties in the State resolved themselves under two heads—Stephanus Schoeman and Paul Kruger; and Kruger was determined that Schoeman should not hold the reins of office. The consequence was that the two parties came to blows at Pretoria, somewhere in the northern part of the town, which now rejoices in the name of Bloed Street. The Schoeman party were driven on to Potchefstroom, when ex-President Pretorius appeared as mediator, and persuaded both parties to adjust their grievances before a special court, to be presided over by one of the Natal judges if possible.

An explanation of the desire to submit to the adjudication of an English judge will perhaps be found in the following anecdote, although it may be that the incident occurred at a later date.

There are only two instances on record of Englishmen having been offered the Presidencies of the two Republics—the Free State and the Transvaal—the one when Mr. Reitz offered to retire in favour of Sir George Grey; and the second when a deputation of Boers from the Transvaal invited one of the Natal judges, the late Sir Lushington Phillips, to assume the reins of office. The latter gentleman, the prince of good fellows and sportsmen, used to tell the story and express the opinion that if he had accepted the post Mr. Kruger would have had very little occasion to exercise his anti-British proclivities. This is the same Sir Lushington Phillips of whom one of our greatest Generals said, 'I would sooner have your calm brain at my command than two regiments of dragoons.' However, to our story: At that *time Phillips* was a great friend of Piet Uys, the mighty

hunter; and through his acquaintance with this family, which is a very prosperous one in the south-eastern corner of the Transvaal, he became known far and wide throughout the country as 'een oprechte Engelsman' (a true Englishman); and the fact of his having saved Uys from the attack of a tiger—or leopard, to be accurate—added still more to his popularity. He was therefore not taken by surprise when one morning a deputation, headed by the Irish-American, Aylward, waited on him and offered him the Presidency of the Transvaal. The genial knight replied that the only condition on which he would accept the position would be that they provided him with a body-guard of 600 men, who were to be at their post night and day. The Boers answered that they were very sorry, but the country's finances would not permit this, and asked if he could not do with a less number. Sir Lushington then explained that he had a warm temper, and there would probably be many differences between them; then he would require to use force, so that his accepting their offer would be useless. On the return of the deputation, Aylward, who was slightly crippled, suggested that he was eligible for the position; but the slim Boers replied (they knew their man), 'We never inspan a lame ox in a team.'

To resume, Schoeman was obdurate, and, having again tried to cause trouble, his forces were finally dispersed, and his downfall completed by the joint efforts of Pretorius and Kruger.

The Presidential election then took place, for which the ex-President Pretorius and a Mr. van Rensburg were candidates. Owing to some dispute as to the manner in which the votes were recorded (a favourite device for upsetting elections in the Transvaal), trouble again occurred, and a battle ensued on January 5, 1864, in which Kruger, as usual, gained the victory. Matters

were then patched up once more by Pretorius, and the Republic entered upon a period of comparative quietude.

The question which arises in reading this page of Transvaal history is, Why did not Kruger at that period assume the Presidency of the Republic? The reason is a very simple one. At that time Kruger was Commandant-General, and in that capacity had the control of the people. Pretorius was an older man than he, and the argument which the Boers and Kruger himself would doubtless apply was, We have a man who has served us well as President, and another who suits us as Commandant-General. Why disturb them in the positions for which they are qualified in such a way that we shall be deprived of the services of one of them? These were the reasons which actuated so many of the old burghers in voting at a later period so repeatedly for Kruger in preference to Joubert. When remonstrated with, they always replied, 'If we dismiss Kruger, we lose a President who has served us well; and in gaining a new President we lose our Commandant-General: and who is to take his place? No; let him' (Joubert) 'wait until the President gets too old or death removes him.' To these well-known prejudices of the Boers is due the long tenure of office which Pretorius and Kruger enjoyed; and although Pretorius was severely criticised on account of the negotiations which led up to what is called 'the Keate award'—a matter of territorial adjustment, in which the English for once got the better in the deal—which led to his resignation, yet if he had desired he could have been re-elected again. But he was a patriotic and a far-seeing man, and realized that the recent discovery of the Diamond Fields and the advancement of civilization required that a man with European training should become Chief Magistrate of *the land.* This resulted in the election, in 1872, of

the Rev. Thomas François Burgers to the position of President.

Of all the voortrekkers there are none whose career and character fill one with more kindly regard than ex-President Pretorius. From the foregoing lines it will be seen how anxious he was at all times to prevent that dreadful scourge to any country, civil war; how he arrested its progress again and again, and how his character was so much esteemed that he was respectively President at different periods in each of the two Republics. He is one of the few Boers who could never be characterized as anti-English, and prior to the war the writer urged Mr. G. E. Esselen (not to be confounded with the political adventurer Mr. Ewald Esselen, his brother), whose consistent devotion to the progressive cause in South Africa has always been so marked, to get the ex-President to make a last appeal to his countrymen, to grant that measure of equal rights which could yet have saved them from destruction. We do not know if he did so, but what is certain is that a few weeks before the war began Pretorius waited on the President and begged him to give way, saying war would involve the certain loss of independence, to which the President replied 'he must fight; if he gave way, the reim (rope) was fast round his neck.'*

* His kindness showed itself on the occasion of the demise of the *Transvaal Advertiser*, a paper which had been for nearly sixteen years consistent in its loyalty to British interests (see Appendix J), when he approached the late editor, saying, 'I hear you have nothing to do; well, come and help write my book for me, and I will pay you well for your assistance.' (It may be mentioned in this connection that the ex-President had been for some time collecting the materials for a book, which, if ever published, should be of great interest as a truthful record of the days when he acted as President of the two Republics.) There is no doubt, had the generous offer been accepted, that the Transvaal Government would have found means to stop the miserable pension that it so grudgingly awarded him. In fact, the fear that he might

Both Kruger and Pretorius had agreed to join hands in supporting the new President, Burgers (see his vindication, p. 30 *et seq.* of Chapter III., 'The Annexation Discussed'); but there were evidences that Kruger chafed under the new régime. It was too progressive for him, and he also felt that, Pretorius being out of the way, the time was nearly ripe for his ambition to be gratified as head of the State. As the country's difficulties increased, he began to intrigue against President Burgers, who regarded him at that period as the most serious of his opponents. Constantly feeling the pulse of the people, he kept just a little behind public opinion, which increased his influence when the time came to strike. Then came the annexation, and here we have the turning-point in Kruger's career. Would greed of wealth, the desire for personal aggrandisement, or pure patriotism, carry the day? The pocket is a very tender spot with Mr. Kruger, and there is no doubt that Sir Theophilus Shepstone was fully aware of this, for he gave him an office and a salary. Later on Kruger felt that he was not receiving sufficient emolument, and so resigned under the circumstances we have already described, throwing his lot in with the anti-English party, which was fast assuming strength and importance, owing to the failure of the British Government to carry out the promise made on the annexation, by the re-establishment of the Legislature to which the Boers had been accustomed prior to that event. A few sovereigns grudged and a handful of red-tape given, and the price?—possibly a continent.

The first deputation, consisting of Kruger and Joubert (see Appendix A), left for London one month after the

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expose the Government led them to bring pressure to bear on him not to publish anything bearing on their methods in the past; and, in fact, so afraid was President Kruger of this that he indirectly *threatened to stop his* pension if he published his reminiscences.

annexation, and Messrs. Kruger and Jorissen were certainly not anxious for the retrocession of the country at that time. Of Joubert's feelings there can be no doubt; he was dead against the annexation from the first, and cannot be accused of inconsistency. At the same time, it was not to the apparent interest of the Boers to have the country left in its old state to Boer management. The British Government had to do its work; the Zulu menace had yet to be removed, Secocoeni conquered, and the finances of the country put on a satisfactory basis. The moment had not arrived for a bold admission of the aims of Kruger and Co.

But the spark of rebellion was flickering, always ready to burst into a flame by an appeal to those racial animosities which form the backbone of Krugerism. To preserve this vital spark it was decided to send to England a second deputation, with an even stronger petition. This time the deputation went a step further than their powers seemed to have justified. Finding the Ministry still firm, they approached those members of the Opposition who they hoped might be willing to support them. Unfortunately, their efforts fell on no unfruitful soil, and Englishmen, whose lives could otherwise claim nothing but respect, were found willing to openly support the cause of England's enemy.

The Zulu War and the Secocoeni campaign had become things of the past, and our troops were returning home; and yet one obstacle remained to the realization of Boer hopes. This was the endeavour of Sir Bartle Frere, in 1880, to pass through the Cape Parliament the confederation scheme of South Africa. Kruger and his colleagues were equal to the occasion; they well knew that if federation was accomplished their case was well-nigh hopeless. To obviate this the triumvirate set forth on a fresh mission to Cape Town.

The Africander party was aroused by the old battle-cry of 'oppression'; the scheme fell through, and Sir Bartle Frere found his recall awaiting him as the consequence (see Appendix G).

Mr. Kruger has brought to a fine art his habit of using everyone who is necessary to his plans, and throwing him over if he is unlikely again to be of use. He dealt with Messrs. J. B. Robinson, Leo Weinthal, and J. H. Hofmeyer, Sir Henry de Villiers, Dr. Jorissen, Chief Justice Kotze, and hundreds of others in this way, establishing without a doubt that nothing but blind obedience could ensure his continued support.

Having successfully used the Bond, he could throw it over or draw it to him as he desired. He had the potent charm of racial connection and racial hatred to conjure with, and he quickly realized the power he possessed, and how to use it when required. His efforts in opposing the confederation scheme had revealed to him his strength; he could treat the strongest opponents as ninepins so long as he retained the faith in him of the great body of Dutch Boers.

Mr. Kruger does not appear to have shone in connection with the war of 1881; he was always engaged on urgent business in the Rustenburg district or elsewhere when the most severe fighting was taking place. In his own mind there were doubts as to whether, after all, the fighting would be successful, but he was determined to risk battle on the strength of the support which he had been promised by British subjects who were pushing his cause across the water.* Besides, he had

* An English burgher was shown at the time, by Kruger's brother, a document signed by a member of the British Government, undoubtedly sent during the war, assuring the Boers that if they held out the retrocession was certain. It is of course impossible to obtain the document now, and it is useless to court a denial by mentioning the name of the person in question. We are *prepared, nevertheless,* to vouch for the truth of this statement.

promises of support from the Cape Colony and the Free State; in fact, many Free Staters were in the field at the time of the armistice.

Mr. Kruger made his presence felt the moment peace negotiations were on the tapis, and he was instrumental in procuring the signing of a protocol, defining the terms of peace, although Joubert had practically agreed with Sir Evelyn Wood verbally. This point was of immense importance to Kruger, as it then only became a question of time for the full retrocession of the country. Without this document a subsequent hitch might have upset his plans.

The 1881 Convention was not quite to Mr. Kruger's liking, but he looked upon it as a stepping-stone; and Mr. Gladstone assured the Transvaal Government that it might be revised at some future time should it be found not to work well. Mr. Kruger took the hint, and made it his business to see that it did not work. He succeeded so well that his emissaries managed to appropriate a portion of Zululand, which afterwards was known as the New Republic. This raid he has seen fit to forget, and he was foiled in his efforts on the western border by the Rev. John Mackenzie* and the

* The Rev. Mr. Mackenzie's name is held in high esteem by the Loyalists of South Africa, for he alone made possible the projects of Mr. Rhodes at a later date, although that gentleman did all in his power at that time to frustrate his efforts. We take the liberty of quoting Sir Charles Warren's remarks on the subject, in the November (1899) number of the *Contemporary Review*, which describe so graphically the brilliant services Mr. Mackenzie rendered. He says:

'Fortunately, there was one man in South Africa who had sufficient ability, personal weight, and knowledge of the subject to bring before the public both in South Africa and Great Britain the true position into which the British Government had drifted, and the deplorable condition into which the British colonists had been forced, and who was untiring in his efforts on behalf of the Empire.

loyal native tribes of what is now British Bechuanaland.

'It is not too much to say that the Empire is indebted to John Mackenzie, the Kuruman missionary, the successor of Moffat and Livingstone, for stemming single-handed the tide of the "giving-up" policy, and bringing round public opinion to a sense of the duties of the Empire as the paramount Power. The history of these times and the account of the action taken by John Mackenzie have yet to be written; in Britain's days of difficulty men have always risen fitted for the occasion, and on no more momentous occasion was a true son of Britain required than in the dark days of South Africa, the years 1881 to 1884. He was not merely a missionary speaking for the South African natives—as such he could have had little effect on public opinion; but he took a high aim as a true Imperialist, and asked for fair play *for all*, British, Dutch, and natives. His was no local cry of "Africa for the Africander," nor was it a narrow-minded proposal to tread down the Dutch under the British; but he took the broad view that all who were fitted for the position were fellow-subjects of Great Britain, and he lectured on the matter in the Cape Colony to Dutch and English, Boers and British Africanders, and won the hearing and suffrages of many.

'Owing to John Mackenzie's efforts, and the support given to him by many conspicuous leaders, Liberal and Conservative, by little and little the "giving-up" policy was abandoned, and the same statesman, who in one year declined to listen to any proposal for the exercise of British influence where a gunboat could not go, in the following year came round to the view that the Empire required an active interference with an imperial force in the heart of South Africa.

'The Boers had overflowed into the native territories east and west of the Transvaal, and were fast absorbing them spite of all agreements, urged on, as each High Commissioner has pointed out, by the tacit approval, if not the direct sanction, of the Transvaal Government.

'When the expedition arrived at Cape Town in November, 1884, the loyal folk, British and Dutch, woke up from their lethargy and discontent. Their enthusiasm was unbounded; they added three regiments of volunteers, and assisted in the successful termination of the expedition by which the Boer filibusters were turned back into the Transvaal without fighting. Loyal people now felt that they could look the malcontent Boer in the face, and say that the *British Government* was doing its duty; but they were in advance

In 1883 Mr. Kruger, who had been acting as President under the triumvirate, was elected State President by a large majority over General Joubert, and Dr. Jorissen was despatched in the early part of the year for the

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of their politicians, who were at the back of the Boer majority, and during the work of the expedition, and for some years afterwards, the Ministry acted, to say the best, in a half-hearted manner, and looked askance at imperial interference. The drift of the views they held, or at least that they expressed, may be gathered from the remarks of some of the leading Englishmen in the Cape Assembly debate, July 16, 1884, on the Bechuanaland annexation question. There were some honourable exceptions—to wit, Mr. Leonard and Sir Thomas Scanlan. Mr. Upington, the Prime Minister, said: "The government of South Africa should be in the hands of the people of South Africa, and every possible effort should be made to prevent outside (*i.e.*, British) influence from affecting the government of South Africa." Mr. Sprigg was utterly opposed to a British protectorate in South Africa; it had not been a success in the past, and was not likely to be a success in the future. Mr. Rhodes, the leader of the Opposition, *said that the imperial factor which he had warned the House against in the previous year had now been introduced into Bechuanaland*, and he believed it their duty to act immediately and remove the imperial factor on the border of the Transvaal, which must lead to danger in South Africa. Mr. Barry said that the sole object of the Imperial Government in Bechuanaland was to protect the natives, but this was not for the good of South Africa.

'Thus closes another scene in this history. When the curtain draws up again, everything has changed. Even while the Bechuanaland Expedition was being carried out in 1884-85 a new European Power had gained a footing in the country, and a German protectorate was established in Damaraland and Namaqualand. This at once forced the pace of the British Government, already on the move forwards, and of the British in South Africa, and no longer was there any question of retrocession or giving up. The chances of rivalry with another Power spurred on British traders and merchants to secure the trade routes to the north and to look towards Mashonaland and Matabeleland, with which the Bechuanaland Expedition had already entered into communication, and soon the opening up of the country to the Zambesi, the pushing of British enterprise to the north, and the opening up of gold-fields there, became household words.'

purpose of ascertaining the feeling of the English Government on the subject of a new Convention. Jorissen's report being favourable, a deputation, consisting of Messrs. Kruger, S. J. du Toit, and N. J. Smit, proceeded to London (we have already briefly alluded to this visit in its bearing on the Orange Free State). Unfortunately for them, they arrived at a time when the efforts of the Rev. Mr. Mackenzie had succeeded to a certain extent in rousing public opinion against further concessions to the Boers. It seems incredible, considering this, that Lord Derby should have given way to them so much as he did, and by his actions have left the question of the suzerainty in a state of ambiguity. It was probably due to the public feeling which had been roused that a still greater abandonment did not take place, and that the shadowy control of foreign relations was retained by the British Government. At least it insured a re-adjustment of the western boundaries of the Transvaal.

The deputation had succeeded in its main objects, and left London for a *grand tour* on the Continent in the hope of assuring diplomatic support should difficulties arise in the future. At the Hague they were naturally made the heroes of the hour, and after visiting Antwerp, Rotterdam, and Paris they were received by the Emperor William I., and banqueted at Berlin. On this occasion an unreported incident occurred, which must have been somewhat disturbing to the equanimity of the late General Smit. The General was describing in glowing terms the way in which the burghers had shot down the English during the war, when Bismarck, who had been listening to the conversation, said to the person whom Smit was addressing: 'Ask him (the General) if he knows what would have happened to himself and friends had Disraeli *been in power.*' Smit replied: 'No.' 'Well,' said

Bismarck, 'I will tell you. You would have been hanged on the tallest tree in the Transvaal long ago.' This naturally cast somewhat of a damper on the recital of daring exploits, which were not to the taste of the 'honest broker' who never lost a chance of showing his respect for Lord Beaconsfield.

The deputation went to Lisbon, with an escort of Dutch financiers, and there Mr. Kruger formed those valuable connections which have been so useful to him in his juggle with Delagoa Bay. He succeeded in obtaining a new commercial treaty, which had the object of defeating Colonel McMurdo, the holder of the Delagoa Railway Concession. This treaty has been often referred to by the President as part of the independence of the country, and it has some intimate connection with the Netherlands Railway Concession. What was the cost of obtaining these useful arrangements will probably never transpire, but the Portuguese have not been in the habit of carrying through Mr. Kruger's little deals for nothing.

The last and not the least result of the expedition was that the services of Dr. Leyds were secured, so that it will be seen Mr. Kruger accomplished a good deal of business in the course of his trip.

In spite of the new Convention, the Boers still pursued their old game of freebooting on the western border, and assured, as they were at this time, of the moral support of the Cape Ministry (which was then, as it is now, a mere tool of the Bond), they had still hopes that their plans for the annexation of Bechuanaland might be successful. The idea was to form a new Republic, which would be amalgamated later on with the Transvaal. In this they were frustrated, thanks to the Warren expedition, but at a heavy cost to the Imperial Government.

It will be useful here to dwell a moment on the foundation of the Africander Bond, the logical sequence of the

retrocession, which inaugurated a new departure in Cape Colony politics. The Rev. S. J. du Toit is spoken of as the author of the movement, which found its origin at the Paarl. The objects of the Bond, as modestly set forth in its constitution, could not be described as treasonable on the face of it; but the dividing line was a narrow one when its actual policy is considered (see Appendix F). The agitation on the confederation scheme of Sir Bartle Frere had shown the wire-pullers in the colony what a powerful instrument they had in the large Dutch population of the Cape. That, with the power which responsible government had given them, was sufficient to make or unmake the politicians of the country, and pull the strings at Government House. The Bond brought into prominence Mr. J. H. Hofmeyr, who has been named 'the king-maker' of South Africa. To give this gentleman his due, his ideas of Bond interests are contained in the words 'Africander predominance'; that is his policy, and he has been at no pains to conceal it since he became the acknowledged leader of the Dutch party. The difference between him and Paul Kruger is merely a question of term; with the one it is 'Africander predominance' under the British flag, or, in other words, the winning side; with the other, 'Africander predominance' under the Dutch banner. With this distinction, it has been Mr. Kruger's aim to use on his own behalf the influence of the Bond whenever necessary, and he was successful in this until the strong personality of Mr. Rhodes intervened, changing the course of things. In spite of this, and up to the formation of the Chartered Company, Kruger looked upon Rhodes as a republican, and in a stormy interview between himself and Joubert on the subject of the company, both he and Leyds declared that 'Rhodes was all right,' whereas Joubert insisted that he was their most dangerous enemy.

Mr. Theo. Schreiner has most clearly shown in his recent letter to the *Cape Times*, which has been so freely quoted, that Mr. Reitz (State Secretary of the Transvaal), one of the founders of the Bond in the Free State, was imbued with the Dutch republican idea, and there is no doubt that at the present time a majority of the Bond are in favour of it. 'Blood is thicker than water,' and notwithstanding all protestations it is absurd to suppose that this is not the case of the African Dutch. Mr. Kruger knew it, and whatever Mr. Hofmeyr's intentions might have been, the President felt that he always had 'the Bond' at his back in any difference with the Imperial Government.

The establishment of this huge political organization insured the success of Africander dominion throughout South Africa for a space of nearly twenty years; it has barred the way to Government House, and the efforts of the Loyalists to destroy these barriers in the past may be compared to 'the breaking of the waves upon a rock-bound coast.' In Mr. Hofmeyr the Africander party have a man of conspicuous ability, holding his followers under a discipline worthy of Kruger. If a Ministry displeased, he would take pencil and paper and sketch out a new one, sounding his men privately as to their views. Then suddenly the scene would change and an entirely new set of puppets appear to dance to the Africander tune.

Mr. Schnadhorst had an unrivalled reputation for party organization in England, but he could have learnt many lessons from Mr. Hofmeyr. He has made practically all prominent Cape politicians dance to the tune he piped. The men who would not respond are few and far between, and, like Diogenes in his famous search, we seek for them almost in vain in the political circles of the Cape Colony.

It was necessary to digress somewhat, in order to

muster the forces which Mr. Kruger had now at his command. He could reckon on the support of three-fourths of Dutch South Africa when a still greater good —or was it ill?—fortune befell him. This was the discovery of the gold-fields.

If Mr. Kruger had been a man like Pretorius, indifferent to personal gain, he would have said, 'Let us suppress this discovery, for it will involve the loss of our independence' (in other words, Boer predominance). But he was not. The old laws, from this very fear, expressly forbade the search for gold; but they had been allowed to lapse through disuse. President Kruger can find no excuse for his policy in this particular. Whether he could have carried it out is perhaps a doubtful point; he certainly never tried. Mr. Johannes Elardus Erasmus (now deceased), a wealthy farmer, whose homestead near the Halfway House will be well remembered by old coach-travellers between Pretoria and Johannesburg, a leading member of the Volksraad and a far-sighted man, appealed to the President on this very subject. His son tells the story how his father represented that the increased population would be a continual source of danger; if they were once admitted to the country, they would become entitled to the rights of citizenship, and the end would be that the old burghers would find themselves in the minority. The President pointed to the state of the finances, but Mr. Erasmus offered him a free loan of £10,000 without interest if he would promise not to throw the fields open. The President refused, saying he would contrive to make it all right. 'Ik zal een plan maak'—'I shall arrange about that.' How significant these words seem in view of later events!

The President had made up his mind to 'sow the *wind and reap* the whirlwind,' if necessary, and from

that day he practically laid down the main lines of his policy, from which he has not deviated one inch. He had one piece of friendly advice from the late President Brand, which was, 'If you wish to govern the strangers successfully, make friends of them'; but Kruger had his own plan cut and dried, and good or bad advice was equally thrown away on him.

What was briefly the policy which he outlined for himself?

1. The independence of the country was to be safeguarded by the gradual restriction of the franchise law, so that the irksomeness of its conditions would prevent the desire of burghership. These restrictions were to be imposed from time to time, so as not to attract too much attention in their earlier stages.

2. The encouragement of the gold-fields until a certain point was reached, when the State and family party had become sufficiently wealthy and powerful to dispense with them. Then to seek, by the granting of concessions, to so hamper the industry that fresh capital would be difficult to obtain, and the net consequence would be a diminution of British immigration.

3. To encourage Continental immigration, and to interest foreigners in the concession system; thus to secure the sympathy of foreign Powers as a further protective barrier.

4. To endeavour at the same time to alienate the British from the Mother Country by pledging the Africander Bond and their allies to an insistence on the policy of non-intervention on the part of the Imperial Government.

5. When this plan had succeeded (Clause 4)—a proof of which would be the commandeering of the British population as conscripts, without vote or pay, in the republican service—to gradually draft them in as burghers on the completion of their term of military

service, and by this means steadily incorporate the majority of the Uitlander population, the proof of military service being sufficient evidence of trustworthiness from the Krugerian point of view.

6. Should the capitalists kick against the conditions mentioned in Clause 2, to rely on the cry of 'Labour *versus* Capital,' and the denunciation of the Compound system. (The Boers always quote the Compound system which Mr. Rhodes has instituted at Kimberley to stop diamond-stealing, which prevents all access to the mines, and confines all trade to the company, as a proof of what would happen should the capitalists obtain a say in the Government.)

Granted once the success of the commandeering policy, the jump to a United Dutch Republican South Africa was comparatively easy.

This policy was not at once adopted *in toto* by the President, but it is the policy which has governed his actions from 1885 to 1899; the only reason for its failure being the action of the Loyalists in 1894. Before he threw open the new gold-fields he had settled the policy he would adopt, which was to limit strictly political ambitions on the part of the new population. Many of the latter ideas found birth in the inventive genius of Dr. Leyds, who had great faith in foreign intervention, and was unequalled in his ability to carry out (and sometimes perhaps initiate) the tortuous diplomacy of his master.

Mr. Kruger had later on Mr. Reitz as his brother President in the Free State, than whom there is no more rabid republican in South Africa. It is true that he once offered to retire in favour of Sir George Grey, who was then in Australia; but this was only on account of his great antipathy to President Brand, whom he had persuaded to retire with him from the Presidential *contest* should Sir George Grey accept the invitation,

of which there was not the slightest chance. On this ground Mr. Reitz has been paraded in some circles as being at one time a quasi-Imperialist. He played upon those lines until the Free State Railway was built for him by the Cape Colony on special terms, but directly the Free State took it over he showed his hand. To anyone who doubts this we commend the perusal of a little book of rhymes which Mr. Reitz composed many years ago. They are published in Dutch, and the spirit of ardent republicanism breathes through the whole of them.

We have endeavoured to show the rise of Krugerism as differentiated from Africander predominance and imperialism, and it is necessary to keep the subtle distinctions between the first two policies steadily in view. The use of the word 'independence' from the Boer side does not convey its meaning to the casual observer of South African politics. It means their national desire to remain a race by themselves, refusing to amalgamate, and only allowing absorption into their ranks. It has been Kruger's life policy to delay the final struggle until the burghers and Dutch Africanders should have by increase and absorption become sufficiently strong to govern the whole of South Africa.

CHAPTER VIII

BOERS, CAPITALISTS, AND CHARTEREDS

THE preceding chapter brought us up to the discovery of the gold-fields. The flotation of the Sheba mine, and the fabulous reports from Barberton, soon attracted a large population to the country. The State revenue rose by leaps and bounds, and the boom became an accomplished fact.

Prior to this many Kimberley financial firms had opened business in the Transvaal, chief amongst whom were Messrs. Isaac Lewis and Samuel Marks, composing the firm of Lewis and Marks. With these gentlemen was associated Mr. Alois Hugo Nelmapius. Mr. Nelmapius was a man of much ability, and 'Nelly,' as he was affectionately called by his friends, was a welcome guest at the Presidency. Mr. Nelmapius has now been dead some years, but the result of his work has survived him. It is true that he did not live to reap the reward which seemed already his, for his death occurred at a moment when his large speculations in ground required careful attention. The collapse of the land-boom a short time previous to his decease resulted in his embarrassment, and prevented his nobler ambitions for the improvement of agriculture being carried out at his farm Irene.

He was the prince of concession-hunters in the Transvaal, his only rival at that period being a Mr.

W. E. Hollard, an attorney, who boasted that he could get a concession for anything from the Government. On one occasion he proved his words in this respect. In the course of conversation a friend mentioned to him that there might be some opening for a Match Concession. A few days afterwards, to his surprise, Hollard turned up with the concession in black and white, but apparently no business resulted.

These were times when the millionaires of to-day were in their swaddling clothes financially, and many schemes were resorted to by them to gain their present position. On one occasion, when Orientals, Shebas, and other stocks had a big drop in London, the wires were down to Barberton, so that the news was sent through by relays of horses. Public messages had to go by coach, and a certain well-known speculator distinguished himself by cutting the springs, which delayed things sufficiently for himself and friends to take advantage of the market. All kinds of tricks were resorted to in the mad struggle for wealth, and the most respectable firms of to-day would never then turn up their nose at a good fat concession. At this stage Mr. Nelmapius scored his biggest success in securing the concession for what is now known as the Hatherley Distillery. This is the temple where are distilled those nectars which goad the Kaffirs of the reef to deeds of derring-do, and it would certainly have paid the present concessionaires, who have large mining interests, far better never to have started it could they have secured instead a concession for 'total prohibition.'

The argument which Nelmapius used with the President was that, the country being a poor one, manufacturers could not establish themselves, and so render the country independent of external commerce, unless they received special advantages. This

argument found a ready listener in the President, whose wealth and interests were daily becoming bigger.

A bold attempt was made at this time to get what was known as the Bridge Concession, conveying the sole right of erecting bridges across the Vaal River, and involving heavy tolls. The fear of the farmers' opposition prevented this from going through. An eminent English ship-owner was, it was alleged, amongst the interested parties.

In all these transactions it is exceedingly difficult to pin Mr. Kruger down in any corrupt action. There is no doubt that some division of interests between the family existed, but that, of course, is a secret between themselves. Numerous instances of a more or less suspicious nature occurred. The following will serve as an illustration: a Mr. McCorkindale happened to die, a gentleman who did much to open up the Transvaal in the Lake Chrissie or New Scotland districts, and who held contracts with the Government entitling him to a large tract of country, which the Government thought fit to dispute. The Volksraad passed a resolution on the matter, with the object of overriding the High Court, as in the Doms case, local legal opinion being then that the Volksraad was the highest authority. This view was subsequently reconsidered by Chief Justice Kotze, and resulted in the crisis which led to his arbitrary dismissal. The executors of McCorkindale succeeded in getting a portion of their rights recognised, and obtained transfer of certain farms. It is significant, however, that subsequent to these arrangements, Mr. Kruger came into possession of a large number of farms in *the New Scotland district of the Transvaal* at a nominal figure, and these are, no doubt, still registered in his name.

On all sides the pilfering and peculation increased.

We do not hear much of this period of Transvaal history to-day. Yet at this period Capitalists and certain officials alike were tarred with the same brush. Many of the working men and the respectable middle and farming classes were alive to the dangers involved in reckless bribery and corruption. The *Transvaal Advertiser* poured out its daily remonstrances, and many a penny could honest John Keith, the proprietor, have made had he cared to stray from the path of duty. At Barberton a political organization was formed, and the local paper, edited by the late A. H. Manson, having indulged in some straight speaking, brought upon itself the usual penalty of a prosecution. Under the existing corruption nothing could be done; the mist of gold had dazzled all eyes, and the policy of the President was firmly established.

Shortly after the Rand Gold-fields had been brought into working order, Mr. Jan Eloff, a relation of the President, was appointed Mining Commissioner. He was soon spoken of as the secret partner in a firm which has at the present time developed a very great interest in the carrying through of reform. With the then Minister of Mines any deal could be got through if properly engineered. The President himself had fathered the idea that if the officials in the mining offices did not get rich it was their own fault. It was a case for him of spoiling the Philistines, but he forgot that he was at the same time spoiling the country.

In the early part of 1888 there used to work in a small office with living-room attached, at the back of what is now known as Bureau Street, Pretoria, a man and his wife. Quiet and secluded, they were busily engaged in perfecting those plans which led to the very large holding which German firms have in Transvaal concessions. The lady was as indefatigable as her

husband; no clerks were employed to deal with the important correspondence. They had no small share in producing the present state of things in the Transvaal. In Mr. Lippert's fertile brain originated the idea for the Dynamite Concession, and with that concentration which marks Teutonic intention, he set himself the task of getting it, and he succeeded. The Cement and many other monopolies also fell to his share, and his friendly connection with the Dutch railway company would show that he had the ear of the German holders in that concern. To the President, this means of consolidating the German influence, which was so useful to him later on, was not to be neglected; it involved friendship, and perchance something more, on the part of the German Government. Mr. FitzPatrick, alluding to the Dynamite Concession, says, in 'The Transvaal from Within,' the concessionaire himself has admitted 'that had he foreseen to what proportions this monopoly would eventually grow he would not have had the audacity to apply for it.' This plausible explanation must be incorrect, as at the time the matter was before the Volksraad a representative of a firm which was largely interested said to the writer, 'If we only get this through, the firm's fortune is made; all interested will become millionaires,' showing that they foresaw the enormous increase which was bound to take place in the consumption of dynamite. Mr. Wolmarans and Mr. Eloff are said to have been 'in the swim'; the one was the President's private secretary, the other a member of the Executive. Though many attempts were made to elicit facts through the progressive press, no one has so far broken silence.

At a later period the concession was cancelled by the Volksraad; the President acknowledged he had been misled and deceived by the company. But something

was behind this move; the President would never have agreed to withdraw the licence which was given unless he had had some ulterior motive. Suffice it to say that at a later date the monopoly was re-created, in such a way as to make it apparently a Government or State monopoly; the object of this was purely and simply to evade the conditions of the London Convention! To go into the dry legal aspect of this point is not our object, but certain clauses in that Convention prevent any 'undue preference' in trade as against British subjects; the first concession was an undoubted evasion of this, and Mr. Advocate Wessels' opinion on the subject, as published at the time, was conclusive. But the President was equal to the occasion. The British Agent at Pretoria, Sir Jacobus de Wet, was very active in his efforts to finally scotch the concession; unfortunately, the fact that 'Nobels' Trust' were intriguing with Lippert secretly, while openly they had deluded the Chamber of Mines by professing to work with them, prevented the success of his plans.

The effects of the monopoly with regard to the mining industry are well known. What is not known is that it constituted a serious injustice to the Roburite Company, a company owned by British subjects, holding a patent in the Transvaal which was granted in the interim between the cancellation of the dynamite concession and the granting of the State monopoly. The Government forbade this company to manufacture its explosive! As legal opinion was that the nominal Government control of the monopoly would affect the decision of the High Court, the company had no recourse but to appeal to the Imperial Government, which merely made mild representations on the subject, and these were, of course, ignored by the Transvaal executive.

Had the Chamber of Mines taken over this patent

from the patentees and pushed the matter, they would have had a formidable weapon as against the dynamite monopoly, but the fact that the explosive was more suitable for coal than gold probably prevented the experiment being tried.

The Selati Railway concession, in which Mr. Barend Vorster, M.E.V., figured as the agent of Belgian financiers, was an audacious conspiracy; by this the State was robbed of half a million of money, and there is nothing to show for it to-day, as the railway was never completed owing to the actions at law instituted by the Railway Commissioner, Mr. J. S. Smit, who had not been consulted when matters were arranged in the first instance. Valuable watches and costly carriages were lavishly distributed amongst the members of the Volksraad who had either given or promised their support to the application. So far had that scandal become public that the President was compelled to take some notice of it, and he justified the members of the Legislature who had received 'presents' upon the assumption that they were not accepted as inducements to cast their votes in any way contrary to their conscience.

The Netherlands Railway, with its sink of iniquity, has been fully exposed, but a few lines on the subject of its conception may be apropos. There was a good deal of competition for this concession when it was granted, an American syndicate and several Pretoria people representing London houses being in the running. Their terms were infinitely preferable to those of the Hollander applicants, and at one time it looked as if Mr. Kruger would pass by the friends to whom he had promised to give the concession. At this time a Hollander gentleman made his appearance in Pretoria; he brought with him a credit of about £10,000, a goodly sum in those days; this, coupled with the fact that the *President's policy* and Dr. Leyds' influence were on

their side, gained them the day. The question is, What part did the £10,000 play in the matter? It was traced into the hands of a German missionary, who passed it on to ——. The Netherlands South African Railway Company is controlled entirely by Hollanders and Germans; it forms the *imperium in imperio* of the Transvaal. Delicate negotiations, financial and diplomatic, have at times been carried through by its aid, and with the Dynamite Company it forms that mysterious link in the Transvaal Government's foreign intrigue which all attempts have hitherto failed to pierce. When (as he frequently did) Mr. Kruger alluded to these monopolies as being the corner-stones of his independence, he referred to certain guarantees which his Government received in connection with them from a foreign Power or Powers. Baron von Marschall's references to German interests after the Raid, which were published in the German White Book (see Appendix D), give us some clue to the nature of the undertaking which probably existed, although the Boers look more to France to-day, and it will be surprising if some effort is not yet made, on account of these pledges, to prevent England taking over the country. The man who has striven, year in and year out, to expose the Railway Concession abuses is Mr. R. K. Loveday, the member for Barberton, one of the Loyalists who were betrayed by the retrocession, and who in desperation threw his country over; we can only regret that events have deprived the Empire of his services.

The Barberton boom had come and gone, and the Witwatersrand boom was upon us. This was the boom of booms—a time which will never be revived in the Transvaal, when money flooded the streets, and the very office boys had pockets full of sovereigns! A humorous incident occurred to a friend at the time.

He was standing at the bar of a hotel in a little country dorp, when a farmer came up to him and said, 'Waar is Mynheer Syndikaat? Ik wil hem zien—de kerel wat zoo byang geld het.' (Where is Mr. Syndicate? I want to see him—the man who has so much money.) The farmer had heard so much of syndicates and companies that he evidently thought they were very important personages.

Soon mediocrities became millionaires, the presence of 'side' began to make itself felt, and we began to emerge from the mining camp to the society stage. Our capitalists became more careful in handling Government deals. The greatest secrecy was now observed in these matters, though nothing good was ever refused; and a new element appeared in the shape of down-country friends, who wished to share in the good things. A late Minister of the Cape Colony is a type of this class, and his connection with concessions was later the subject of very severe criticism on the part of a Progressive member of the Second Volksraad. We are afraid his scheme for electrical tramways at Johannesburg will not go through in the form he anticipated. This gentleman, whose capacity for sitting on the fence has made him the admiration of his many rivals in this country, has had a finger in a good many Transvaal pies; it was largely by the aid of this valuable connection that he was successful in getting through the Cape and Free State Railway extension to the Transvaal, which anticipated the Delagoa Railway. This was a pill which had to be gilded before the Government would swallow it, and it was said that a sum of £50,000 was passed through the National Bank in this connection.

A deal in which the late Barney Barnato figured to the discomfiture of the Kruger family occurred at this time, and was described in the *Transvaal Observer*, then

edited by Mr. Eugene Marais, 'a young man who did sterling work for the Progressive cause,' and who succeeded Mr. F. R. Statham on that paper. Mr. F. Eloff was the holder with another person of the Vaal River Water Concession, and it can be easily understood that Mr. Barnato, who was heavily interested in the Johannesburg Waterworks Company, did not wish this concession to hang over his head. A big price was asked for it; so that the only thing for Barnato to try was a legal juggle. Eloff was duly informed that terms could be arranged, and a meeting of the interested parties took place *at the Presidency*. A document was there signed to the effect that the concession was to be ceded to Mr. Barnato, and that he was by a certain date to bring out a company with a specified capital, in which Messrs. Eloff and Co. were to receive certain shares and sums of money. The agreement, singular to state, only bound Mr. Barnato to bring out a company, but not necessarily to guarantee its flotation. The astute Barney duly brought the company out with a first-class directorate, but needless to say there were no subscribers! Eloff was furious; but he could do nothing, as Barnato had fulfilled his part of the contract. He had at the same time succeeded in closing the inconvenient concession, which is the reason why the Vaal River Water Scheme has sunk into abeyance.

As the Cape people had been very successful in obtaining their railway extension, Natal became alarmed at the possibility of losing its traffic to Charlestown, which is on the border. A delegate, therefore—Mr. Binns—paid a semi-official visit to Pretoria to feel the way; he was, however, told that nothing could be done *until responsible government had been granted to Natal*. At a later date, when this was accomplished, the colony got its railway. This is another proof of the President's unswerving policy. Railway interests,

commercial interests, race interests, must all be used to secure the ultimate success of his plans, but under no circumstance could deals take place through the Imperial Government.

Hardly a day passed but news reached the community of some fresh scandal, some new folly, committed by the Government. The late Mr. Jan F. Celliers, the former proprietor of the *Volksstem* newspaper, Mr. Paul Marè, and Mr. Loveday, were most assiduous in exposing and condemning these abuses, and yet their efforts were as 'chaff before the wind.'

The writer had the pleasure of journeying to Johannesburg with Mr. Celliers shortly before his decease, and in passing the long lines of battery houses and the busy signs of industry, some premonition of the future seemed to weigh upon him. With a deep feeling of sorrow, he said, in pursuing the conversation, 'What will the end of it be? To what miseries are the Government condemning the unhappy people of this country!'

A scandal which he was most successful in exposing was the one known as the Stands Scandal, an affair which created a good deal of excitement at the time; but publicity had no effect, and the matter was glossed over as usual. These are the details: The Government during the first boom had sold a large number of stands in Johannesburg, which had been abandoned owing to the bad times which ensued later on. Shortly afterwards these stands became very valuable. The mining officials and their friends were not likely to let such splendid chances pass by, so they arranged to make application at nominal prices for the stands through the Mining Commissioner—to Mr. Christian Joubert, the Minister of Mines. In a big deal like this everyone had to stand in who knew about it, which having been successfully accomplished, all interested received their stands. On

account of the large number of vultures, the proverbial honour was wanting, or perhaps some disappointed applicant gave it away; anyhow, the whole thing gradually leaked out, with results given above.

Nothing could excel the unblushing effrontery with which this organized robbery was carried on, and the effects upon the youthful population, not to speak of their elders, can be more easily imagined than described. Bribery and corruption were fast eating into the vitals of the country, and a new morality became the order of the day. It is this which has given Johannesburg such a bad reputation, totally undeserved so far as its industrial population is concerned. To their credit, be it said, Englishmen did not bulk largely among this class of needy adventurers.

A particularly ugly scandal was the one connected with the Street Contracts in Pretoria, where some £160,000 was disbursed, a large proportion of which is still unvouched for, and with practically nothing to show for it. But as a curious coincidence, Mr. J. S. Smit, the Landdrost, now Railway Commissioner, and Mr. Botha, the Street Inspector, both became possessed of fine new houses, of a very superior design, on the completion of the contractors' work.

At one time Mr. Kruger promised his son Kaspar, who lived in the Rustenburg district, and was not getting his share of the 'loaves and fishes,' that he, too, should have a chance. For this purpose a syndicate composed of burghers was formed, with one or two leading financial spirits thrown in; and it was arranged to put in an application to build a line between Krugersdorp and Klerksdorp at £10,000 per mile, which would be granted by the Executive. Unfortunately for the syndicate, before this could be completed a dispute arose between Mr. Solomon Gillingham, a member, and the engineer employed,

as to the latter's share of the plunder. As both parties refused to give way, the engineer severed his connection with the syndicate, the consequence being that he used certain influences with the late General Smit and Mr. J. S. Smit, the Railway Commissioner, and succeeded in upsetting the plans. On the appointed day the President brought the application before the Executive, and stated that he had decided to grant the request, and give the old burghers, who so far had got nothing, a chance to build the line at the price mentioned—£10,000 per mile. When the discussion was over, General Smit rose and said that 'he was always willing to give the old burghers preference, but not to the extent of £200,000, as he held a tender in his hand at the rate of £8,000 per mile, which he submitted should be accepted.' The President saw the game was up, and, furious with rage, he said: 'Well, if the burghers cannot get it, nobody shall have it,' and he had his way; the Netherlands Railway built it for the Government account.

On various different occasions the family party, when trying for a big *coup*, have been disappointed in this manner, their grasping nature overreaching itself. Though successful in many minor events, they did not, as a matter of fact, get anything really big for some years. At last, after many disappointments—not only in connection with the Bewaarplaatsen (grounds adjoining the Rand mines, over which the companies hold surface rights only, and which, on account of its proved value, had been applied for three deep by the adventurer class—see Appendix C), but also with the building of the Natal Railway, where they were upset by the *Press*, Mr. J. B. Robinson's paper, and many other schemes—Mr. Hendrik Schoeman and his friends succeeded in getting the Petersburg Railway Concession. Intending visitors to the Transvaal cannot do better than

visit Mr. Schoeman's new dam and house, costing thousands of pounds, completed as soon as the railway had been granted.

The only justification which can be found for Englishmen who used means which are universally condemned in the Mother Country is that without something of the kind it was really impossible to carry through any business in Pretoria. The crowd of lawyers, agents, and Government sharks (the Third Volksraad, with their chairman, Mr. Julius Keizer, who held their sittings in Mr. Paul Nel the attorney's office), was so keen that, directly a genuine attempt was made to obtain, in a perfectly straightforward manner, Government assistance, Government fixed a price, and that price had first to be paid.

A fresh factor arose in the acquisition of Matabeleland. The rumour of Mr. Rhodes' intentions was conveyed to General Joubert, the *friend* of Lobengula, and caused considerable anxiety to the Government. The net result of this was the purchase of large quantities of ammunition, and an order for 10,000,000 cartridges was partially placed with Messrs. Kynoch and Co., of Birmingham.

General Joubert was much exasperated at the prospect of the Transvaal being closed in on the north; but Kruger, who knew the country, did not think much of its possibilities, and thought that if he obtained Swazieland as a *quid pro quo* he would be doing better business. The consequence was the 1890 Conference at Fourteen Streams, when President Kruger met Sir Henry Loch and Mr. Rhodes.

There is no doubt that a certain policy was then agreed upon in connection with Swazieland, though the matter was to be discussed again when the northern extension had been assented to by the Raad.

This was a very ticklish time for Mr. Rhodes' trans-

African scheme. General Joubert was dead against it, and to his determined opposition must be traced the delay in carrying through the Convention abandoning all claims to the north on the part of the Transvaal. At one time things looked black, but the soothing influence of Mr. Hofmeyr, who journeyed up to calm his friends and reassure them that Swazieland should yet be theirs, patched matters up.

On the question of expediency, it was perhaps policy to abandon the Swazies, but on moral grounds it was indefensible. The argument which was used in favour of it was that Umbandine, the King of the Swazies, had given concessions to Boer agents for everything worth having in the country. As a matter of fact, most of these concessions were invalid, and would never have held water in an English court of law, but the majority of them were ratified by a special Court held in Swazieland. Another, but a worse, argument was that England was bound to have trouble with the Transvaal sooner or later, when she could take the country back again.

It is not to be supposed that the Swazies gave in without a struggle. They sent a deputation to England, under the leadership of Mr. Attorney Hulett, which did good work, but could get no satisfaction from the Colonial Secretary, who was already pledged to abandon the country. The only man to do anything for them was Sir E. Ashmead-Bartlett, M.P. (Silomo), who brought the betrayal of the Swazie nation prominently before Parliament. The net consequence of the visit has been the killing-off in the present war, by natives alleged to be in the pay of the Boers, of some of the native members of the deputation, as also such of the headmen as were friends of England. For the time, anyhow, the last of the British native allies were handed over to the tender mercies of Krugerism.

The signing of the Swazieland Convention was made the subject of a great demonstration when Lord Loch visited Pretoria. The Government buildings were fitted up as reception-rooms, and seated under a canopy, Lord and Lady Loch received the inhabitants of Pretoria. The loving-cup was passed round, and all seemed peace and joy and contentment.

But the Joubert party were not at all disposed to allow the occupation of Charterland to take place without a strong protest. Acting under a certain concession granted over Banjailand, a big strip of Mashonaland, they arranged to trek there, and found a new Republic. Mr. Rhodes was naturally active in his opposition, which eventually produced a proclamation from President Kruger forbidding the movement, so that it collapsed.

The one idea of the President in obtaining the control of Swazieland was that the Swazies held territorial rights over a portion of Amatongaland which borders on the sea, and includes the so-called harbour of Kosi Bay. His ambition to obtain a seaport was the reason why the northern policy of Mr. Rhodes obtained his support; but for this he would never have assented to it. How his ambition was defeated will form the subject of another chapter.

Still, the terms of the Convention were not altogether to Mr. Kruger's liking, and he therefore declined *in toto* to enter into the Customs Union, even with the bait of a right of way through Swazieland and a ten miles square site for a port. The fact that Mr. Rhodes had tried to bounce him into joining the union, and the feeling that owing to the influence of that gentleman he was fast losing grip of the Africander Bond, were matters of concern to him. With all his doubts, he still looked on Mr. Rhodes as republican at heart; the man who had at all times denounced the imperial factor,

and expressed contempt for mere parish-pump politics, he felt was yet sound on the main issue. But here he was mistaken; the success of the northern policy, the interest and support it received from the highest sources, showed Mr. Rhodes that only under the British flag could his plans succeed, and from that moment his policy changed: the step from a 'young burgher' of the South African Republic to Premier of a United South Africa was not such a great one. Only on one occasion, in 1894, did Mr. Rhodes fall back from his set purpose, and that backsliding was fatal to his subsequent endeavours.

Signs were not wanting that the Uitlanders were greatly dissatisfied with the Government. In 1890, on the occasion of the President's visit to Johannesburg, the Transvaal flag was torn down, and the house of Captain von Brandis, where the President was staying, besieged by an angry crowd, who wished to make known their opinion as to the way in which the Government was treating them. A Mr. Rogaly, who is at present with Thorneycroft's Mounted Infantry, was accused of pulling down the flag, and he was arrested with others and thrown into gaol, bail being refused. The British agent, Mr. Ralph Williams, an excellent specimen of the true English gentleman, and as such so entirely unfitted for the handling of diplomatic questions, was much annoyed at this summary treatment of British subjects. He was supposed to have sent the President an ultimatum on the subject, which the latter promptly telegraphed to Cape Town for confirmation. It has never been ascertained whether there was truth in this rumour, but it is a fact that shortly afterwards Mr. Williams left Pretoria for Gibraltar, and Mr. Hofmeyr made his usual visit to Pretoria at this juncture.

Uitlander grievances had so far not formed a subject of practical politics, but 'coming events cast their

shadows before.' The first real attempt at organizing any political body was made in 1892, when many of the thinking men of Johannesburg, outside the capitalist class, banded themselves together into what was known as the National Union. The objects of this body, as set forth in its constitution, were: (1) The maintenance of the independence of the Republic, and (2) the obtaining of a reasonable share in the government of the country. This programme proves that this body was formed on purely republican lines, so that it appealed to the progressive minority among the Boers. This section acknowledged the leadership of General Joubert, and the moving spirit of the party was Ewald Esselen, formerly one of the judges and subsequently State Attorney of the Transvaal, a remarkably fascinating man, whom everyone liked outside of politics, in which he subsequently cut a very sorry figure. As the Presidential election was coming off shortly, to be followed by many elections for the Volksraad, it was resolved that a determined effort should be made to get a Progressive Government into power. To this end thousands of pounds were subscribed by the more enlightened of the capitalist class, who had long feared the grasping tactics of the Kruger party. Mr. Kruger's election fund was also swelled, the foreigners and the Jews putting their money on him. Everything turned on the change of President; and Mr. Kruger was able to secure a nominal majority at the polls, which was turned into a reality by the action of Mr. Schalk Burger, a Joubertite (one of the Commission to inquire into the election), who ratted, and voted for the return of Kruger. The Joubertites were frantic with rage; one of them, subsequently a member of the Second Volksraad, said in the writer's presence he would willingly pay £1,000 to the man who would shoot the President. They implored Joubert

to refuse to submit, and to fight it out if necessary; but the General, who was as weak as water, decided that, however great the sacrifice, he could not consent to divide the country on the issue. A stronger man would have hazarded a *coup d'état*, but Slim Piet was no match for his old rival, whose motto is to get home by any means, fair or foul.

This practically closed the chapter of constitutional attempts for good government in the Transvaal; had the efforts of the Uitlanders been successful, and the new population given some small share in the government, the tide might still have set in for a republican South Africa. As yet the majority of English people had not recovered from the cruel blow which the 'great betrayal' of 1881 had struck, and their last thought would have been to appeal to the Imperial Government for redress.

Lord Randolph Churchill's visit to the Transvaal and Rhodesia gave some of the Boer papers a welcome opening to take his lordship and the Chartered Company to task.

1893 saw the first Matabele War. The fate of Lobengula was the cause of some anxiety in negrophilistic circles; not only among the English, but more especially among the Boers. General Joubert's friendly letter to Lobengula has often been quoted, and the chief had always thought that at a pinch he could rely to some extent upon Transvaal assistance. When war became a certainty, he promptly despatched messengers to his Transvaal friends. This resulted in the formation of a syndicate called the Six Syndicate, of which the late Henning Pretorius was chairman. Its object was to render him any assistance in their power, if at the same time they could assure for themselves a sufficient *quid pro quo*. They advised him first of all to make no defence to the armed forces of the Chartered Company, but let them march into the

country unopposed, adding that Commandant Pretorius and another member of the syndicate would proceed at once to Matabeleland for the purpose of negotiating between the opposing parties. When these gentlemen had left Pretoria on their mission, a wire was despatched to the High Commissioner, Sir Henry Loch, stating that war was unnecessary, and that the gentlemen above mentioned were on their way to arrange matters with Lobengula. They were promptly informed that on crossing the frontier they would be arrested, as a state of war existed between Her Majesty's Government and the Matabele chief, and they were forbidden any sort of communication. Commandant Pretorius, next in rank to General Joubert in command of the forces of the Transvaal, nevertheless did cross the border safely, and was met by messengers from Lobengula, stating that he was unable to keep back his young bloods. It was therefore evident that intervention was hopeless, so the party returned to the Transvaal without accomplishing anything.

The Six Syndicate in South Africa, as Mr. Labouchere in England, thus failed to stop the course of events, and with its failure practically ended the attempt to stay the British advance towards Northern Africa.

CHAPTER IX

THE APPEAL TO CÆSAR

DURING all these years abuses were heaped on abuses by the so-called Government of the Transvaal. It would lead too far to cope in any way exhaustively with them; but a few more demand mention, because they show the condition the country was in and the unblushing way in which those in authority acted. We call to mind a case in which the question of the validity of a promise of shares in a valuable gold-mine to an official in consideration of his using his influence with the Government was actually brought before the High Court. Mr. Montagu White, the representative of the Transvaal in London, was the plaintiff in the case, and a large mining company was involved in the defence. Unfortunately the only question which the Court had to decide was whether there was a valid contract or not, and as the evidence produced bore solely upon that fact, judgment was given in favour of the plaintiff. It was stated at the time that certain high-placed officials were greatly advantaged by this decision, as some 17,000 shares were said to have been divided, of which Mr. White's own share amounted to 800 only. The arrangement was made when the market value of the share was near par, but when the action was brought for specific performance the price had advanced to £5 or £6 per share.

It is to be presumed that the Transvaal Government selected Mr. White as the best man they could get for the important post of delegate to Great Britain; and no doubt his record was satisfactory as compared with that of some of the other officials.

But what about the higher politics of Messrs. Kruger and Leyds? Were these gentlemen sitting still while the more farcical part of the comedy was being played? No; the foundations were being laid to strengthen the power of Krugerism with a secrecy and despatch which augured well for future success. And meantime Cæsar slept!

The National Bank and Mint was floated under the ægis of Mr. Lippert, and how important this institution was to the success of republican designs we can see to-day. What use would have been the gold stolen from the Transvaal mines without a mint to coin it? The bank also became the channel through which payments of a secret nature could be made, and financial business arranged where other agencies would have failed. These transactions took place both in Europe and Africa. Its officers were of a different stamp to those in the Government, and its secrets have been well preserved. Many of the directors of the bank have been able and honest men, but as burghers of the Transvaal they had, unless they resigned, no option but to follow that country's policy, even if they saw through the secret intrigues, of which they may have been unwilling tools. As a matter of fact, there was but one policy and one reason for all the secret preparation—viz., to satisfy the personal ambition of Mr. Kruger.

The opposition and hatred to everything English continued to manifest itself in the debates of the Volksraad, more especially on the subject of the franchise, which year after year had been the subject of such restrictions as Kruger had determined to adopt to secure the realization of his aims.

Deputations from the unenfranchised were received by the President with obloquy, and members of the Raad invited the Uitlanders to fight for the right to vote if they wanted it; but the Government took very great care to see they were kept without arms.

Expostulation had no effect, though as a remedy the Uitlanders were informed they could naturalize and become burghers of the second class, who within a reasonable period could vote for the Second Volksraad, an emasculate institution, which was without power of any kind, being entirely subservient to the First Volksraad.

The governorship of Sir Hercules Robinson at the Cape—the knowledge that he was unfavourable to intervention of any kind in the Republic—deterred the British population from making representations to him. Still, cases of individual injustice were often reported to the High Commissioner, unfortunately without much result. The little country villages were all very well to live in if you buried your independence, and winked at all abuses, because ways and means were always found of disarming criticism.

There were exceptions, of course, to the general run of dishonesty. All the officials were not venal; there were a good few honest men among them, mostly Africanders from the Free State and Cape Colony. But the opposition even among them to every English influence acted as a dead wall. The preference to Hollanders and foreigners over the British on every occasion; the vast immigration of undesirable foreign aliens, which was purposely encouraged in every way by the Government; their exclusive employment on the Netherlands Railway, in the dynamite factory, and the Government offices, even to the exclusion of Africanders, showed that the policy of the Government was to strengthen its position by the restriction of

British immigration, and the increase of the foreign population to the utmost limit which the country could support. Year by year the British preponderance was slowly but surely diminished. In 1890 four-fifths of the alien population were British; in 1894 it is doubtful if three-fourths represented the correct proportion. The Government encouraged the influential men of the foreign communities by granting them concessions, favours, and lucrative positions in the Government employ, thus establishing a bond between themselves and the different sections. A large proportion of these people were men who had been through a military training in the countries of their birth, and everything was done to get the *leaders* to become burghers of the Transvaal; the rank and file did not matter—they would follow as a matter of course. Ways and means could always be devised in the Transvaal of modifying the franchise laws to suit any extraordinary case, and where the non-burgher was a desirable person, he got his rights for some imaginary service without waiting for many years, which was the lot of the unfortunate Britisher who took the oath of allegiance. The one obstacle in the way of completing this idea of foreign preponderance was the superiority of the British as a mining and commercial community. Could the foreign capitalists have substituted foreign miners with equally good results, no doubt they would have done so, and this would have very much simplified the problem for Mr. Kruger.

So much has been written on the franchise question and the industrial grievances that it is unnecessary to enter into it at length. Suffice it to say that the President's policy in this particular can be traced as follows:

1. Old Grond-Wet: The possession of property or residence for one year qualified for the franchise.

2. 1882: In spite of the President's statement to the

Royal Commission that no difference would be made between persons of mature age and the old burghers as regards the franchise, it was raised to five years' residence. Proof: the Veldcornets' books, and very bad proof, too, in some instances.

3. 1890: This law was very cleverly drawn up to escape undue attention. It provides that 'all persons naturalized previous to the law come in under the old privileges—that the right of vote for a Second Raad now created would be given; but it was necessary to be eligible for ten years for election to the Second Raad before one could aspire to the higher privilege of voting for the First Volksraad.' This made the term of probation fourteen years.

4. 1891-93: Minor alterations were made in the law; but it was not substantially altered, being deemed a sufficient barrier. A serious condition, however, was put in in 1893, it being necessary to get the assent by vote of the First Volksraad before one could become a full burgher.

5. Law 3 of 1894: This was the finishing touch. It provided that the would-be burgher, after serving fourteen years' apprenticeship, and being at least forty years of age, would only be entitled to register a vote for the First Volksraad, provided a majority of the burghers in his ward signified their assent in writing to his obtaining it. In addition, the law disfranchised all children born of Uitlanders in the country, the law being retrospective in this particular.

The only reason which can be given for the passing of these laws, and particularly the last of them, was the fact that petitions signed in one case by some 13,000 aliens had alarmed the President, who played upon the prejudices of the members of the Raad, the majority of whom were in sympathy with his Uitlander policy.

The last changes in the franchise were particularly

exasperating, and coming at a time of comparative political calm, they had the effect of alienating the whole British community from the Government. Their basis was found in the bitter hatred and detestation for everything British, and their existence thus became a continued menace to the peace of South Africa. The Government said: Join us on our own terms, and we will treat you better later on. Fight for us and we may perhaps relent. But you must prove that you are so reformed as to be anti-English and sound on the subject of the destruction of British supremacy in South Africa, and the firm establishment of Boer predominance. Join with us, lose your individuality and nationality, become absorbed, and you will find no difficulty with our laws. Refuse, and take the consequences. These were the Boer arguments, and in some cases they found adherents, more especially in the country districts, where it meant much whether a man was a burgher or not. The same applied to the store-keepers and merchants, who could not expect to get a share of the Government favours, unless they became burghers of the Republic.

The deceptive calm with which the community regarded the passing of the latter franchise laws decided the President to execute his final *coup*, the employment of British subjects as mercenary troops, and to decide by this test whether they should be specially admitted to the Republic, or not.

Although the Uitlanders were heavily taxed indirectly, no murmur of discontent was heard. Their petitions on the subject of the franchise had been ignored and treated with scorn. They seemed to have but one god, and that god was Mammon. Would they surely fight when their idol was threatened with destruction?

Rather than risk it, better to throw them a bone, to Africanderize them and make them part of the fighting

machine which was to dominate Africa. The scheme was perfect, but it came just a little too late.

It seems as if Providence, which in earlier time barred the way of Napoleon, had destined Paul Kruger to find that scheming and hypocrisy, without the greatness of the former, could not save him from a similar fate. Pretoria had the honour of raising the standard of opposition; even as her sons in 1881 had held in check the Boer forces, so in 1894 they frustrated the plans which threatened to culminate at a later date in disaster to the Mother Country. They cried a halt to the policy of 'Africa for the Africanders,' and had England then responded, the South African question would have been settled, perhaps without a blow.

A Republic, 'broad based upon the people's will,' a franchise obtained, not through the clemency of Kruger, but through the determination of the British Government to see right and justice done, would then have formed an impassable barrier to Krugerian ambitions. A settlement upon these lines would have bound the Uitlanders fast to the Imperial Government in a new bond of union, if coupled with a determination to reverse the policy of the Transvaal Government, and to make the people of the country feel that their so-called enemies were their best friends. A prompt elimination of the agents of corruption should have secured their true independence, with a policy of friendship for and the assistance of England. Once this was accomplished a plan of confederation would have been speedily adopted by the different States and colonies, satisfying the voortrekker and strengthening the Empire.

A little cloud crossed the horizon—a cloud of loyalty that refused to die away. Perchance some father in the dear Motherland had impressed those lessons of patriotism on his child, in the old abbeys and cathedrals which teem with incentives to a love of

one's country, and that little seed was destined to bear rich fruit. England might fail, but her sentinels must watch, and wait, and pray, and believe that, whatever happened, the land where justice rules would surely not turn a deaf ear in this hour of need.

The hope was faint, and it did not find expression in the homes of the rich. The capitalists were busy preparing for a boom which would eclipse all others, that boom which collapsed on the failure of the Jameson Raid. The Government officials, busily filling their pockets, saw it not; what had they to fear? was not all the wealth and influence on their side? The Imperial factor was dead; the Africander Bond and Mr. Rhodes in the past had done their best to kill that idea. What could a few poor Loyalists do? What they did, and how they did it, it is our duty to relate. Those efforts have not been accorded the doubtful blessings of publicity; the incidents have been suppressed in the glamour of the Raid. It was a little business, with no press to boom it across the sea, with no Court of Appeal but to Her Majesty's High Commissioner. No funds behind it, only the loyal hearts of the British working men and women, with a few professional men, and the Loyalists of Johannesburg, who saw eye to eye with Pretoria, that nothing could be wrung from Kruger except by *force*.

That is why we made our appeal to Cæsar. Where else could we turn for help?

To-day the papers are full of South Africa; recently no incident, however trifling, is unreported across the water. In 1894 the way was barred, Reuter's was the only news agency; Leo Weinthal, at that time President Kruger's very good friend, was their representative. Not a word reached Europe which was not tainted with the views of the Boer Government. Special correspondents were few and far between, cables were costly,

and yet the voice of the people was so distinct and so clear that the President trembled, and his advisers ·ught assistance from the capitalists—those whom they now despise—to weaken the chastening hand of the Empire.

We related in the early part of this book how certain Kaffir tribes in the Northern Zoutpansburg had proved themselves unwilling to be subject to the Boer Government; how President, then Commandant, Kruger was forced to retire before them at Schoemansdal, practically abandoning to the natives the whole of the country north of Marabastadt. During the English occupation these tribes came peaceably under control, and during the war the head chief, Magato, did all he could to protect the English in his district, who were in laager close to his kraal, with the result the Boers wisely left them undisturbed. He also offered assistance to the British authorities. This fact alone was sufficient to secure the doom of his tribe at a later period. Among the minor chiefs was one named Malaboch, whose tribe inhabited a range of hills in the north-west of the Transvaal.

News reached Pretoria at the beginning of 1894 that this chief refused to pay his taxes. What the chief alleged was that he objected to paying them twice, once to Mr. Vorster, the Native Commissioner, and again to the Government.

Be that as it may, the Executive (the Boer Cabinet) resolved to put into operation the scheme of commandeering the Uitlanders, or, to be correct, the British subjects, as nearly all other nationalities were absolved by treaty, and *the American Government refused to recognise the right of any Government to commandeer its citizens.* To commandeer as the Boers apply the law means to insist on free military service being rendered by everybody; it also authorizes the levy of

supplies, to be furnished without remuneration, both in goods and money; the only English equivalent of this practice is highway robbery.

The Government refused to entertain the idea of a paid volunteer corps being formed, although they had over a million sterling in the Treasury.

With a cleverness born of long practice in deceit, they stated that British subjects had been abandoned by their Government, as the 1881 Convention expressly provided for the registration of British subjects then in the country, which would prevent them being commandeered, whereas it was put forward that those who failed to comply with the condition, and subsequent immigrants, had been abandoned, and came under the commando law. The supreme cunning of this policy can be at once perceived; nothing better could be devised to break down the pride of the Britisher, that last vestige of self-respect which he possessed in South Africa. Like sheep led to the slaughter, they were ordered to submit to this fresh degradation, which would effectually wipe out the last spark of nationality, and make them the serfs of the Boers, to be absorbed by them at their sweet will. *The policy which made of the French Huguenots Dutchmen was being applied to the British; in one case it had been a success, why not in the other?*

Nothing can persuade the careful observer that this move was the thought of a day; it was the culmination of a policy which spelt danger in big letters to every loyal Englishman.

To the Loyalists of Pretoria the intentions of the Government were no secret. The magnates of the Rand had no time to bother with the *haute politique;* they were busy with the *haute finance.* Let Kruger do as he liked so long as they were making money, but let anyone beware who interfered with their plans on this

score. What did they want with the franchise? Other hearts were still sore from the time of the 'great betrayal,' and for very pride's sake would have seen 'the bolt' successful rather than give a warning to the country which had deserted them.

Meantime the Veldcornet issued notices right and left: single men, married men, all, except men who could buy themselves off with substitutes at a cost of £75 or £100, poor people even who could hardly rake sufficient together to keep up the home during absence, were all swept into the net. Goods, money, and horses were requisitioned, for the Boers war on the cheap, and in many instances the Veldcornets or their assistants carried out their instructions in a cruel and brutal manner, more particularly as regards coloured British subjects. A protest would now and then secure some slight exemption in towns, but in the country districts no mercy was shown to the unfortunate Englishmen. The Executive awaited the result of compulsory enlistment in Pretoria before raising the strength of their forces by commandeering thousands from Johannesburg, so that the conquest of the whole of the northern tribes, including Magato, might be accomplished. Besides, such a course freed a number of burghers from military service, on which they are by no means keen, unless it is against the *verdomde rooinek*. This was necessary, as many of the Progressive burghers strongly objected to fight for nothing, and *Land en Volk*, the Joubert party's organ, fought hard for payment.

Unfortunately, President Kruger, with remarkable foresight, had secured the services of Mr. Esselen as State Attorney at the beginning of the year, beguiling him with specious arguments to attempt the cleansing of the Augean stable, of which he (the President) alone was the founder. He chuckled when the bird was

caught, for now he could put his plans into execution without risk of interruption from the Progressive party, which then did not possess his confidence, while by playing on the race hatred which was always lying dormant in his new Attorney-General he felt he could turn his foe into an ally, who would serve his turn, to be discarded when no longer useful.

Orders to join the commando were served on May 16, and the distress caused to poor people who received them was deplorable; on all sides could be seen the misery caused to the wives and children, soon to be left without protectors or means of support. To whom were they to turn for bread when the bread-winner was away? And what if he never returned? The Transvaal Government do not provide for the widows and orphans of Englishmen who have died fighting their battles. Public feeling was aroused, and it was arranged that the Veldcornet himself should preside at a public meeting to consider the question, and request the Government at any rate to pay the men ordered to the front. A deputation that waited on the Government was severely censured, and told in the straightest terms that the Government would brook no opposition to its policy. The Raad, duly instructed, also resolved by twenty-one votes to three to confirm the action of the Government. The Africander section, who at first had seemed prepared to assist the movement openly, withdrew from giving public support. What other loophole remained now? Men on every side implored the leading Uitlanders for assistance, and it was decided to hold another meeting, which took place on the stoep of the Government buildings, the tenour of the speeches being that no man should go to the front as a pressed man unless he was an enfranchised burgher of the country. Mr. Reno, one of the commandeered men, came forward, and boldly stated that he for one had

determined not to go on the Government terms, a statement causing a great deal of umbrage to the Government supporters, who tried hard to make a disturbance. One of them, Mr. Hendrik Schoeman, turned to Mr. Reno, saying: 'I will make you go to the front if I tie you up with my own hands and throw you on the wagon.' But his remarks were drowned in the hooting of the crowd, which had not relished being called rebels by the same gentleman a few minutes before. Over a thousand persons were present, and it was announced that the same evening a debate would take place on the subject 'Is the Commandeering Justifiable?' at the ordinary meeting of the Pretoria Debating Society, an influential association which held its meetings in the Presbyterian Church. The assembly was a record one; the church was packed, and hundreds were turned away.

An ominous silence filled the room when the Rev. James Gray, the chairman, rose to address his audience. In stern and uncompromising terms he exposed the iniquity of the Government in forcing free men, British subjects, born under the British flag, to act as the unpaid soldiers of a Government which denied them the smallest of the liberties valued by independent races. To compel men to abandon their families to fight in a cause which they knew nothing of, and against a native chief who, from all they heard, was the aggrieved party, not the aggressor, was an indignity not to be tolerated. Many speeches were made, one or two Government supporters trying to make out a case, in which they signally failed. Towards the close of the meeting two men spoke whose names deserve to be recorded in letters of gold wherever the English language is spoken, for the quiet yet brilliant work which they have done for British interests in the Transvaal. The one was the Rev. W. J. Underwood, the Wesleyan minister at Pretoria,

and Mr. E. Dusting, afterwards the secretary of the Uitlanders' Association. Probably none of our readers have heard of these gentlemen, the one a minister of the Gospel, striving hard to do his duty, though his way was not the way of many of his flock, who had obligations to the Government; the other a working jeweller. But the Empire had need of them, and the hour found the men.

At the close of the meeting many of the commandeered remained behind, and forty of them resolved not to answer to the roll-call. In doing this they exposed themselves to heavy fines, to be followed by imprisonment. But worse was to follow: the Government, much exercised at the turn things were taking, instituted one of those secret boycotts for which the Transvaal has made itself so famous. No one knew whence the message came. But an employer would request his employé who had pledged himself to resist not to do so, under pain of losing his situation. Men who were in business were approached, and assured, if they did not follow suit, their business or their partners (if they had any) would suffer. Others were informed that a substitute could be got cheap, and assured that it was far better to avail themselves of this means of escape than go against the Government. To those who stood firm the suggestion of Government appointments was made. Some names for unspecified reasons were taken off the list, and others who were Government supporters substituted. Private and personal influences were used on all sides to prevent the mandate being disobeyed.

As a result of the exertions of the Government and a striking testimony to the pressure and terrorism which was brought to bear, only three of the men who were at the meeting in the Presbyterian Church stood out to the end.

Meantime a committee, composed of the Revs. Messrs. Underwood, Gray, and Woofenden, and Messrs. Dusting, Roberts, Hess, A. E. Smith, Falconer, and others, was formed to lay the case before the British Resident, the first public appeal to the British Government for ten long years.

They assembled at the British Residency on May 18, 1894, and were received with a courtesy by Sir Jacobus de Wet which augured well for the future. A son of South Africa, a strong Loyalist, who had fathomed the mysteries of Krugerism during his term of office, he did not pause to inquire if those assembled were men of wealth or men of influence; he knew their cause was a just one, and he received them with a determination to assist with all his power in removing the disabilities of his fellow-citizens.

The subject was thoroughly discussed with Sir Jacobus, who assured the deputation that many private people had been to see him, and their anxiety was so great that he had telegraphed to the Administrator, General Sir William Cameron, acting during Sir Henry Loch's absence in England, and had received a reply saying that Advocate Searle's opinion was that the Transvaal Government were within their legal rights in insisting on the commandeering of British subjects. This opinion was totally different to the one entertained by Advocates Leonard and Wessels, the leaders of the Transvaal Bar, and it seems extraordinary in a situation such as this that the Administrator did not consult the very highest legal opinion, more especially as other Governments had on so many occasions insisted on the exemption of their subjects from forced military service by foreign powers. Sir Jacobus said, however, that he was so convinced of the justice of our case that he was prepared to make fresh representations on our behalf, and with his assistance a telegram was drafted to Cape

Town, with the request that it should be forwarded immediately to the Home Government. The exact words fail us now, but they constituted an earnest appeal to the Mother Country not to again desert her subjects at a very critical moment.

What madness possessed British Ministers to ignore the cry for a remedy of our disabilities? Alas! the Little Englanders were in power, with only one Big Englander amongst them, Lord Rosebery, and our fear that he would be 'Harcourted' was correct. Our one hope was centred in Her Majesty the Queen, but our cries were too faint to reach the throne; had she known, is it not possible that the bloodshed of to-day might never have occurred?

What were the legal aspects of the case? For this the musty tomes which guard the secrets of international law must be taken down, and patient research will reveal the fact that never in the history of the world has it been a custom to compel the subjects of a friendly State to fight against their will another country's battles. The principle that without citizenship no obligation to military service is incurred is as old as the hills, and no fine reading between the lines of Conventions could alter the Grond-Wet of the world's liberty. But the Boers were content to sink beneath the ancients, and rank with barbarians in pursuing a policy which appeared to have the tacit approval of Her Majesty's Government. Had we not felt that we had a sympathetic man in Sir Jacobus de Wet, the die might have been cast and the Republic accepted on any terms; but for him, we venture to say, such would have been the case, with results which we leave others to evolve.

The reports of the meetings and the visit to the British Agency had created much excitement in Pretoria and Johannesburg, and efforts were made by the Government to discourage the movement. The

Government organs, the *Press*, the *Volksstem*, *Standard and Diggers' News*, and the *Transvaal Mining Argus*, and others, were duly primed, and daily hurled venom and invective at those who would not bow the knee to Baal.

Great pressure was brought to bear by certain members of the churches to which the clergymen on the committee belonged, the consequence of which was that the Rev. James Gray and the Rev. Mr. Woofenden had with great reluctance to sever their connection with it. The Rev. Mr. Underwood refused to do so under any consideration, although we believe the consequences to him were serious; he certainly left for England shortly after. The excitement increased when it was known that warrants were being taken out for the arrest of the Revs. Messrs. Underwood and Woofenden and one of the authors of this book. The warrants were actually signed, but were never issued, perhaps for the reason that an enterprising journalist, Mr. F. J. Dormer, of the *Star*, had cabled to the *Pall Mall Gazette* that the arrest was an accomplished fact, he having been told, we believe by the State Attorney, that the arrests would be effected a few moments before he despatched the wire. Urgent messages reached the three gentlemen to destroy any incriminating papers without delay, but they had none to destroy, except perhaps indiscreet letters from sympathizers in Johannesburg. We feel sure that it would have been a joy to these gentlemen to become the martyrs of this tyranny, but the subtle cunning of the Krugerites argued that it would be better diplomacy to keep the warrants hanging over their heads—especially as news of what was going on had reached England.

The committee worked day and night at their self-appointed task. Letters were written home to newspapers and members of Parliament to try and interest

them in our cause, but with faint results. Time was flying; the commandos would soon be leaving, when it would be too late, perhaps. Urgently-worded cables were despatched to the British Government, with but little effect. Never, surely, had Englishmen, in defiance of the expressed opinion of the British Government's representative on the spot, been treated in such a manner. The last excuse was that nothing could be done till the arrival of the High Commissioner, Sir Henry Loch, who was fast nearing South Africa on his return from England, whence his departure had been accelerated by the news of the commandeering.

However, on June 13 the following letter was telegraphed to the British Agent by the Administrator, Sir W. G. Cameron:

'I have the honour to acquaint you that I have been in consultation with Her Majesty's Government respecting the commandeering of British subjects now being carried on in the South African Republic.

'The question has been very carefully considered with a view to meeting, as far as possible, the difficulties of the situation, and in a friendly spirit towards the Government and people of the South African Republic.

'I desire, therefore, that you will invite the attention of the Government of the South African Republic to the subject, with a view to a withdrawal of the military obligations which have been imposed on British subjects who are acknowledged to be aliens, and are treated as such in all other respects.

'This privilege of exemption appears to have been already acknowledged by the Government of the South African Republic, for in his despatch to Sir Henry Barkly, dated October 20, 1876, etc., the late President Burgers expressed himself as follows:

'"I can confidently state, however, that express and decided orders were issued to commanding officers to call out only citizens of the State, and not to exact any personal military service from foreigners unless they had by law become *bonâ-fide* subjects of the Republic, and had claimed and exercised their rights as citizens; and I may add that this Government is not only desirous to observe the rules of hospitality followed by all civilized States in respect to any stranger who may for a time become resident in the Republic,

but it would also strongly suppress any attempt of its officials to commit a breach of such rules."

'Nothing can be clearer or more satisfactory than the despatch of President Burgers, and I enclose, for convenience of reference, a copy of the full text.

'By Article 29, sub-section E, of the original draft of the Pretoria Convention, British subjects were exempted from all military service whatever, and *this stipulation was accepted by Dr. Jorissen* on behalf of the Transvaal delegates in the Conference of July 15, 1881. (See p. 98 of C 3,219, being Part 2 of the Parliamentary paper containing the reports of the Royal Commissioners.) This engagement was not apparently embodied in the Convention subsequently signed, but it may fully be accepted as a declaration of policy.'

'I may also point out that during the American Civil War British subjects were, on the representation of Her Majesty's Government, exempted by the United States Government from compulsory military service.

'In view, therefore, of these considerations and of the past attitude of the Government of the South African Republic, as well as of their action in exempting subjects of several foreign Governments under treaty, Her Majesty's Government hope that the Government of the South African Republic will now agree to similar exemptions in favour of our people.

'I shall be glad, therefore, if you will as soon as possible press for this in courteous terms. For this purpose you should call on the State Secretary, and after explaining to him the object of your visit, you should read him this despatch, and leave a copy with him if desired to do so.'

On June 15 Mr. Buxton, Under-Secretary for the Colonies, replying to a question in the House of Commons, said that Sir William Cameron had been instructed to *press President Kruger courteously* to exempt British subjects from service. This reply effectually prevented any good resulting from the despatch. Mr. Esselen the State Attorney's interpretation of it was, 'You can commandeer British subjects, but please don't.'

On June 22 Mr. Buxton informed the House that the Transvaal Government had sent no reply to their *request re* non-commandeering of British subjects. But

the British Government on the previous day—June 21—must have received its reply indirectly, for on that day the Transvaal Government arrested the commandeered men, and sent them away as prisoners to the front. On June 22 they arrested and imprisoned in Pretoria Gaol for refusing to go to the front a British subject, who was first thrashed by the Acting Veldcornet, Mr. Alphonse Meintjes. Such was the Transvaal's answer, which would have caused war with any other country but England.

Day after day we waited on the British Agent, who still counselled patience, and said the British Government must interfere. Negotiations were opened with some members of the National Union, who promised every support, which was loyally rendered. They despatched an urgent cable to Lord Rosebery, stating 'that bloodshed would ensue unless the existing state of affairs was remedied.' This seemed to awaken the sluggish conscience of the Ministry.

Their weakness and the terrorism of Pretoria had somewhat damped the hopes of the Britishers who had promised not to serve, for only three were steadfast. The night before the commandos left another young fellow (they were mainly young fellows) was persuaded to resist, and on the same day a loyal Cape Colonist, by name Van Rooyen, decided, in spite of the opposition of his friends and family, that he also would not be coerced; he remained firm, notwithstanding every temptation from Government officials, many of whom were his relatives. Then three others decided at the last moment that they would not serve, and thus the cause was won. Seven men were determined not to go to the front, one of whom had, prior to taking any part in the movement, sent in a legal objection to his enlistment, which his advocates advised him not to withdraw. When the list was called by the Veldcornet, the seven men refused

to go, handing in a written refusal; the burghers then formed up ready to leave. But it must for ever be a matter of regret that in spite of many bitter reproaches a large number of Englishmen submitted, afraid of the boycott of Pretoria.

The sun was sinking behind the Magaliesberg Hills as the commando slowly wound its way through the crowded streets, and thence out on to the veld. At intervals could be seen the bereaved mother, with little children clinging to her skirts, bewailing the departure of the bread-winner; a scene of sorrow such as would touch the hardest heart. Behind came carts and carriages carrying the wealthier portion of the community, who had come to bid a last farewell to those they loved.

The *Transvaal Advertiser* was filled with accounts of the sufferings of the destitute left behind by the commando. Cases such as the following were to be daily read about: 'Mrs. Elliot, who resides near the Presidency, had the bread-winner of herself and three little children commandeered, and would have starved by this time were it not that two or three friends supplied her wants.' The suffering was not confined entirely to the British; the Hollanders had to go, of course, and one, a poor fellow, a burgher named Van der Westhuizen, committed suicide at the first resting-place in the Thorns, owing to the fact that his family were left unprovided for preying on his mind. Happily the Uitlanders filled the breach, and relieved as far as possible all cases of destitution without distinction, while the Transvaal Government stood looking on in sullen apathy.

The men who had refused to go to the front were still at large, and a very strong feeling existed that a position should be taken up where water was obtainable, the spot provisioned, and held by a *number of men* who would fight if necessary to prevent

the Government securing the men as prisoners. At a meeting of the Secret Committee in Johannesburg held some time after, it was announced that nearly 5,000 men were available, and that it was thought many of the Krugersdorp burghers would join in a struggle for a pure Republic. A careful examination of facts led to the conclusion that armed resistance would be futile, as at the outside we could only command 500 to 1,000 rifles, and most of these would have had to be obtained by violating the gunsmiths' stores, as the movement had no funds behind it. The artillery camp and magazine were strongly guarded every night, and an attack on them would have to be made with revolvers and sticks, which would have resulted in failure, with a heavy sacrifice of life, as the defenders were armed with breechloaders and held a strong position. These plans were only known to very few, the inner circle of the movement, and we do not believe one word of their actual plans reached the ears of the Government.

At last on June 16 it was rumoured that the State Attorney intended taking action against those British subjects who had refused to go to the front, and a large public meeting was held for the purpose of raising funds for the defence of the prisoners. It took place in the Caledonian Hall, Pretoria, and was most enthusiastic. The Rev. Mr. Underwood made a stirring appeal to those present to support the cause, and, though most of the audience were working men, they subscribed in a few minutes a sum of over £400. The scene was one of tremendous excitement; men who had no money sent up I.O.U.'s to the platform, scribbled contributions on any piece of paper available, and not one of these drafts was dishonoured. All gave except the Government spies. Perhaps the most touching gift was an act of sacrifice on the part of a young Englishman, who was so down on his luck that he had no

money to give; so taking his dog, a favourite pointer, he insisted on its being sold then and there for what it would fetch, on behalf of the fund.

Attorneys were secured, as also the services of the Hon. J. W. Leonard, Q.C., a true Loyalist, and of Mr. Advocate J. W. Wessels (author of 'The Status of the Uitlander'), who refused to accept any fee, only too proud to be of service to their fellow-subjects.

It was decided to forestall the State Attorney by making application to the Court for a rule nisi calling on the Veldcornet, Mr. Melt Marais, to show cause why the men should be commandeered or fined for refusing commando duty. The application was heard by the full Bench, composed of the Chief Justice, J. G. Kotze, and Judges Jorissen and Morice. The eloquence of Mr. Leonard in pleading for the applicants has never been surpassed by him, while Mr. Esselen, who appeared for the Government, made a brilliant defence. Legal authorities in all languages were quoted in the original; every effort was made on both sides. The display of forensic ability called forth a tribute of praise from the Chief Justice, and the feeling in Court was that a victory had been gained, and that the commandeering would be declared illegal. Judgment was reserved. On the Sunday which intervened it was rumoured that the President was applying pressure to one of the judges; it was also stated that if an adverse judgment was given, martial law would be immediately proclaimed. On the Monday a majority judgment was given by the Chief Justice and Dr. Jorissen, Judge Morice dissenting, 'that British subjects and all aliens not exempted by treaty resident in the Transvaal over two years are liable to be called out for military service.' The application of the men, with one exception, was therefore refused. The extraordinary feature of this *judgment,* which has been the subject of much dispute

in legal circles, is the fact that Judge Jorissen assented to it, when he had, as specified in Sir William Cameron's despatch, quoted previously, agreed to exempt British subjects from being commandeered. Unfortunately, we were deprived of this argument, as the despatch was not published till long after the case had been heard. The Chief Justice may not have erred in his judgment from a local legal point of view, but it was the plain duty of Dr. Jorissen to remind his chief of the obligation he himself had entered into, which would either debar him from sitting to hear the application, or make him give judgment in favour of the applicants. His action can only be characterized as one of unjustifiable betrayal and a travesty of justice.

On June 21 the commandeered men were arrested and taken prisoners. It was with the greatest difficulty that the committee avoided active resistance being made to this act of the Government. But the Loyalists had pinned their faith on Sir Jacobus de Wet, and they knew no overt act would strengthen their case, which was now raised to higher and broader grounds.

Large numbers of ladies wearing the red, white, and blue colours escorted the prisoners to the drift on the north side of the town, and others drove some miles out to see them as far on the road as possible. At a spot called the Halfway House the last farewells were said, burning speeches were made, which even touched the hearts of the volunteer escort, under Tjaart Kruger, the President's son, so much so that they could not resist joining in the cheers which greeted the speakers' utterances. The prisoners, Messrs. Reno, Steer, Maynard, Ingle, and Clark—all honour to them—then mounted the wagon which was to convey them to their destination at the front, to be dealt with by the Krygsraad (court-martial).

The Uitlander community was at this stage practically

in a state of unarmed revolt. Men's feelings were so excited by the action of the Government that work was at a standstill. The Government refused certain cipher messages, attempts were made to ring the old changes on Free State and Cape sympathy; but Kruger had overreached himself, as he now found to his regret, and that assistance which had never before been refused was tardily forthcoming. If war had then occurred, he would have had lots of sympathy, but his overconfidence would have lost for him the material assistance he had been accustomed to receive in the past. Still, he never looked back: money and goods were commandeered, the burghers being let off lightly, while the full pound of flesh was exacted from the Uitlander. And the forces of corruption were at work vainly striving to get through a Cyanide Monopoly, which would have been as serious a blow to the mining industry as the Dynamite Concession.

A mass meeting had been arranged at Johannesburg for Saturday, June 22, when it was announced that the Governor, Sir Henry Loch, would for certain visit Pretoria within a few days. It was therefore decided to postpone it, to avoid embarrassing him. Everything was done that prudence could dictate to secure a decisive step on the part of the English Government. In view of this, all revolutionary methods were discouraged, and the Governor's visit effectually prevented any recourse to measures which might or might not have been successful, but which would have so advertised our case that, at a sacrifice of a few devoted lives, justice would have had to be done.

It was felt that the Governor must obtain for us those concessions for which we had been striving so long and so patiently; his task seemed so easy, and yet he declined.

On the Loyalist side good solid work was being done

by Mr. Henry Hess, of the *Critic*, a man who has rendered yeoman service to British interests in the Transvaal. The *Transvaal Advertiser* in Pretoria, and the *Star* in Johannesburg, were busily opposing the subsidized efforts of the Government organs. Unfortunately, the *Star* had for some time been running on the Progressive Republican tack, which somewhat minimized its influence with the majority of British subjects who were trying to steer the Imperial barque into port. On the failure of Sir Henry Loch to accomplish the removal of disabilities, it promptly veered round again to robust republicanism, leaving the *Advertiser* and the *Critic* to labour alone on the other side.

On the 22nd, as stated above, it was announced that the Governor was leaving for Pretoria, and would arrive on the 25th. The news was somewhat unexpected, as it was certain that he was not invited by the Transvaal. Little time was left for making preparation to receive him, so that the Uitlanders' case might be properly represented. Petitions were drawn up hurriedly, and the working men of Pretoria and Johannesburg soon showed by their signatures that they were unanimous in appealing for justice to Cæsar. Within three days nearly 14,000 signatures had been collected, and with time double the number would have been obtained. The British Agent could not help admitting, when he heard this, that 'the British Government must and would remedy the state of affairs existing in the Transvaal.' He had yet painfully to learn what reliance could be placed on a British Governor or a Liberal Government in regard to South Africa.

CHAPTER X

CÆSAR'S FEET OF CLAY

If our people were exasperated by the indignities to which they had been subjected, the taunts of the Raad members and the demands of the press-gang officers made them almost frantic with rage. The arrest and peremptory despatch of their fellow-subjects to the front was bad enough in itself, without the overbearing arrogance of those in power, and the callous indifference of the Home Government. What added to their feeling of hopeless impotence was the fact that everything was done, as Mr. Leonard said, 'in such a dreadfully legal way,' with all the cunning and malevolence of racial hatred and fear at the dawning resurrection of the Imperial idea.

The National Union, in despair at obtaining any redress from the Government for Uitlander grievances, followed the lead of the Uitlanders' Association in Pretoria, and resolved to make an appeal to the British Government for redress. On June 23 they passed the following resolution: 'That any mere abrogation or modification of the commando law which is not accompanied by the removal of all disabilities under which the aliens are now suffering will not be regarded as a satisfactory settlement by this Union.' That was *the point* we were aiming at; the commandeering was

the knife which we hoped would have removed the festering sore from South African politics.

At first it appeared that the High Commissioner would not visit Pretoria as the guest of the Government. It would seem that he must be that, or else he could not pay a friendly visit. In view of the very unfriendly way in which the Transvaal had acted, it was felt it would have been decidedly better for him and us not to come up if he could only do so as their guest.

There was a feeling that secret efforts were being made in Cape Town to misrepresent the Uitlanders' case.

The work of these agencies could be seen in perusing the columns of the *Bloemfontein Express*, then conducted by Carl Borckenhagen, a German Africander, which was the official organ of the Bond and the United South Africa Republican party. Its abuse and vituperation of the British Agent was of such a cruel nature that that gentleman's sons wished to take the law into their own hands, and were only restrained by their father's influence from doing so.

The High Commissioner, we believe, had already started, when the Transvaal Executive sent him a tardy invitation to be their guest. Its acceptance filled them with confidence, and envoys were despatched to meet him in the Free State, while Dr. Leyds condescended to proceed as far as Vereeniging. At the urgent request of many British subjects, Sir Jacobus de Wet also arranged to meet him to guard against attempts being made to prejudice the case of the Uitlanders before he reached Pretoria.

It seemed at that time so difficult to get the ear of a British Governor, and everyone with grievances except a British subject was welcome. The Bond had so effectually barred the way to imperial interference that the Governors could not trust themselves to sail against

the Africander tide, lest they should be wrecked on those same rocks that had been so fatal to many a soldier's reputation. Yet we who lived in the turmoil knew that the moment had come to strike, and strike hard, for British supremacy; and for this end no precaution, however trivial, was neglected.

Nominally the High Commissioner's visit was with reference to the Swazieland Convention; actually it had very little to do with it, as the arrangements previously concluded had been formally extended for six months. The Colonial Office had hurried the departure of Sir Henry Loch on the mission to Pretoria purely on account of the state of affairs in the Transvaal.

Taking everything into consideration, it is apparent that he ought never to have come to Pretoria as the guest of the Boer Government unless they agreed to stop the commandeering, which would have enabled him properly to discuss the questions of the Uitlanders' disabilities, and also the settlement of Swazieland matters.

A firm request, backed up by the arguments of the British Agent, would probably have secured the first desideratum. If, however, it had failed, the arrest of British subjects constituted surely in itself a very serious position, and assuming that war had resulted, what would have been our military position?

On the one side, we had the Transvaal, with a big native war on of its own making; with an alien population driven to the verge of rebellion, who would have enlisted to a man in any irregular corps that might be formed; with a disaffected section among the burghers, temporarily alienated from the Free State and the Cape Colony, who, although they would have sympathized with the Transvaal, would not at this time have fought on its side on the question of *Uitlander grievances*. The Boers had a few batteries

of field-guns—five or six at the outside; they had no siege-guns, no forts. They had been importing a large number of Martini rifles, and had large supplies of ammunition, which could also be manufactured at the Powder Factory. In an emergency they could perhaps have put 25,000 men in the field, including extremists from the Free State and Cape Colony. We could have easily held these with a force composed of the regulars, volunteers, and Loyalists in the country. At this time the Uitlanders would have fought to a man, and Englishmen in the Transvaal would have rallied round the flag far more so than in the Reform movement, when there was no enthusiasm shown till Jameson crossed the border, and more even than they did at the beginning of the present war. The forced enlistment of British subjects, coupled with the insults and degradations to which we were subjected, had created a degree of Loyalist enthusiasm unparalleled in the history of South Africa. With these facts well known to President Kruger, a strong diplomatist ought to have had no difficulty in securing his object. In all probability no bloodshed would have occurred; the President would have tried every diplomatic resource, and then thrown up the sponge. England has never had a clearer case of wrong to avenge; she is fighting to-day in no better or juster cause than she had at that moment.

But not only did Sir Henry Loch and the Liberal Cabinet lose their chance of the pacific solution of a serious difficulty, but they laid, through their inability to grasp the seriousness of the situation, the foundation of the terrible war which is now raging.

On June 23 the *Cape Argus* reporter wired that over 500 signatures had been obtained to the Pretoria petition, the only Uitlanders who would not sign being those 'who were forbidden to do so under pain of dis-

missal by their employers.' The terrorism was carried to such an extent that individual members of the committee were warned not to go out at night unarmed. An attempt was frustrated to tar and feather the Rev. Mr. Underwood at his residence, where his wife was dangerously ill at the time. Some five or six hundred Uitlanders, armed with every available weapon, awaited the 'tar-and-feather' party, which was to be composed of artillerymen and roughs from the Government offices. Luckily for them, the arguments of Messrs. Leyds and Esselen, who heard of the proposal in time, saved the situation, as, if fighting had once started, it could certainly not have ended there.

By twelve o'clock on June 26 the Johannesburg petition, which had only been in existence forty-eight hours, was signed by 13,614 persons.

On June 25 Sir Henry Loch arrived at Pretoria. The hour of his arrival was uncertain, and the Government were averse to giving any information on the subject. The people, not to be denied, were up as early as six o'clock in the morning. Men, women, and children, wearing red, white, and blue rosettes, and waving little Union Jacks, thronged the station, waiting the arrival of the man upon whom they relied as their deliverer. When one considers that these Loyalists were in many instances, directly or indirectly, dependent on the Boer Government for their support, the risk and the sacrifice which this welcome to the British High Commissioner involved can be imagined; for the Government had its black list, supplied and added to daily by the secret service.

It had been rumoured that attempts would be made to prevent the public assembling on the platform; probably the early hour at which they gathered prevented this being carried out. It was certain that attempts would be made to prevent the presentation of

an address. To prevent a surprise at the last moment the State Attorney was informed that we intended to present it at all risks, and he thereupon agreed to its being handed in at the Transvaal Hotel. By eight o'clock there were some 2,000 people present, who were much annoyed to find that no preparation had been made by the Government to give Sir H. Lock a fitting reception; there was not even an English flag in evidence. A large Union Jack was therefore procured and 'fastened to a whip-stick;' it was confided to a stalwart Africander, who towered above the heads of the people.

About 8.30 President Kruger arrived, escorted by the volunteer cavalry, with General Koch, and some burghers. He took up a position near the entrance to the station, and the wind, which was blowing from the south, carried the flag over the President's head. At this the burghers with their native superstition were heard to mutter, 'It is a sign—a sign! The flag keeps over the President's head!'

Soon after the train arrived bearing Sir Henry Loch and suite, who were received with tremendous cheering—such cheering as never had been heard in Pretoria before, and never will be heard again until the Union Jack runs up on the Government buildings. At least 3,000 people must by then have been present, almost entirely composed of British subjects and their sympathizers; and the way in which they sang 'God save the Queen,' spoke volumes for the depth and strength of those feelings, wrung from the bitterness of the hearts so long suppressed, and now no more to be denied. To do honour to the Governor, the horses were taken from the President's carriage, and in a moment of spontaneous excitement a Mr. Horner, a quiet man who had never taken any part in politics, seized the flag, and sprung on the box with it. The crowd lined

the streets, while the cavalry escort kept discreetly in the rear. In this way the procession entered the town, singing patriotic songs in disregard of President Kruger and Dr. Leyds, who must have experienced a very uncomfortable ride. They could not hide from themselves that this was no organized demonstration, but an exhibition of spontaneous feeling which had never been equalled in the country. In front of the Government buildings were the Volksraad members gazing with apprehension and discomfort at the procession. The carriage stopped at the Transvaal Hotel, and, amidst continuous cheering, the preliminary address of welcome to the High Commissioner was read as follows:

'We, the undersigned representatives of the British subjects in this city, wish to take this opportunity of presenting you with a preliminary address of welcome on this your second visit to Pretoria as the representative of our Queen and country; and in extending a hearty greeting, do so in the full assurance that Your Excellency will act up to the noble traditions and principles of honour and liberty which were the boast of our forefathers, and are the glorious heritage of the British nation. With these few words of welcome, which will be supplemented by an address to be submitted to Your Excellency,

'We remain,' etc.

[Signed by the members of the Uitlander Committee].*

Sir Henry Loch, in replying, said: 'I thank you sincerely for the cordial welcome extended to me on this my second visit to Pretoria. I understand that another

* For reports of speeches, etc., we are in many instances indebted to the courtesy of the *Argus* Company in placing their files at our disposal.

address will be presented to me later on in the day, and on that occasion I will refer at fuller length to the subjects therein contained (loud cheers). Again I thank you for this reception, and assure you I will remember it for many long years to come.' Three cheers were called for the Queen and her representative, and a round dozen were given. A similar ovation was then accorded Sir Jacobus de Wet. The crowd were still lingering while Sir Henry Lock was conversing with one or two friends, when probably he received a hint, which, if so, was promptly acted on. He stepped forward again, and said: 'There is one thing I wish you to do: if you respect the Queen, and myself as her representative, respect my position here. I am here as the guest of President Kruger, and by complying with my request you will assist me *in looking after your interests* and the interests of the country I represent.' Sir Henry then called for cheers for President Kruger, which invitation was, however, very half-heartedly responded to.

The latter remarks of His Excellency acted somewhat as a damper on the crowd; they had borne with, and suffered so much from, President Kruger that they could not understand the High Commissioner's diplomacy. They were not going, however, to upset his efforts now by any overt action. They took it that this message implied a sense of responsibility on the part of Her Majesty's representative, who would not act as peacemaker if peace had to be bought at the cost of sacrificing his own countrymen.

Dr. Leyds left the hotel by the back door during the reading of the address; but the President stayed over half an hour with Sir H. Loch, and was eventually accompanied to the Government Buildings by a small crowd of burghers, his coachman having gone home with the horses.

In the evening a deputation, consisting of Messrs. Sam Marks, E. F. Bourke, T. Hugo, J. W. Curlewis (all burghers), and Attorney Hull of Johannesburg (now a Reformer), called on the State President, assuring His Honour of *their firm support* and very strong disapproval of the unseemly demonstration (?) organized and led by a number of irresponsible British subjects. These irresponsible British subjects, who represented nine-tenths of the British residents of Pretoria, and had behind them the masses of Johannesburg, were with difficulty restrained from laying hands on the self-constituted deputation of Krugerite sympathisers when they left the President's presence.

As a matter of fact, their officious action was so uncalled for that Dr. Leyds, replying in the Volksraad on July 13 to Mr. Wolmarans' question *re* the alleged disturbance on the occasion of the visit of Sir Henry Loch, said: 'He believed, as previously stated, it was the intention of the crowd to give a hearty welcome to the Queen's representative, and not to insult the Transvaal Government, etc. He regretted the absence of the British flag. The matter was a serious one, and was being inquired into.'

Meantime the town was filling up with armed burghers, and the terrorism took a quieter but more practical form. Gentlemen who were supposed to be countenancing the British case were warned that they would be in serious danger if they went outside the town, and were cautioned by friends not to go out at night. On the evening of the torchlight procession the Hon. J. W. Leonard received definite information to this effect as regards himself, and sent a message by his valet to another person not to go out that evening, as he would be in danger of his life. The latter, however, ran the risk, having well armed himself.

The staff of the Governor were entertained at the

Club, and it was remarkable to see the way in which men who had a few minutes before said to their burgher friends, while taking a glass of liquor, 'This is to take the taste of the accursed English language out of my mouth,' were doing all they could by the aid of that same language to influence the opinion of the guests.

On the afternoon of the 26th the British residents of Pretoria presented the local petition to the Governor, which was a duplicate of the one presented by the Johannesburg deputation shortly afterwards. It read as follows:

'We, the undersigned loyal subjects of Her Majesty the Queen, beg respectfully to tender you on behalf of Her Majesty's subjects in the Transvaal a hearty welcome upon this the occasion of Your Excellency's second visit to Pretoria. Your Excellency's arrival at this juncture affords us the opportunity of stating with what confidence we regard your tenure of the high office of Her Majesty's chief representative in South Africa, and of stating that we respectfully look to Your Excellency to uphold the interests of all British subjects in the Transvaal in a manner consistent with the greatness of the traditions of our country, and so as to maintain and strengthen the attachment of our fellow-countrymen to their Queen. Your Excellency will hardly need to be reminded how great are the interests of Her Majesty's subjects in this country, but we would wish to emphasize for Your Excellency's consideration the peculiar difficulties which have lately manifested themselves as being incidental to our position here. Denied the franchise, and having recently been subjected to the indignity of seeing a petition presented by 13,000 residents, mainly subjects of the Queen, praying for some relaxation of the unjust franchise laws, greeted

with laughter and scorn by the Legislature; having, further, been informed by the authorities that not only we, but our children born in the country, can never hope to participate in the most precious privileges of citizenship, our wrongs have lately been accentuated by the circumstance that the Courts and the Government of this State have declared our liability to be called out at any time for the carrying out of laws in the making of which we can never have any voice, and in the enforcement of which we have no interest. We beg to assure Your Excellency that this position of affairs is to us so intolerable that the situation is fraught with the possibility of serious results, and we respectfully beg Your Excellency to bestow the gravest and most serious consideration upon it. We pass by the numerous other grievances and disabilities under which we labour in this State, being well aware that Your Excellency is fully conversant with them, in the hopes that *our reliance* upon Her Majesty's Government, whom it is your high privilege to represent in South Africa, may always be justified, and that we shall not have approached Your Excellency in vain with this bare suggestion of the gravity of the situation.

'We remain,' etc.

[The Petitioners].

Mr. E. R. Roberts, who presented the address, then made a few remarks with regard to grievances, which had at that time not been fully exposed. While pointing out the inequality of the indirect taxation, which was practically confined to articles of food used by the Uitlanders, and not the burghers, he was stopped by the High Commissioner, who made this reply to the assembled people. 'He requested all British *subjects to* observe the laws of the country in which

they lived, and *promised that he personally* as High Commissioner and that Her Majesty's Government would take into consideration any disabilities that British subjects might suffer in this country. He added that he had every confidence in the fairness and justice of His Honour the President and the Government of the Republic.' His Excellency then moved towards the crowd, and in the course of conversation asked several of them *what rifles were possessed by British subjects,* who replied that at the outside there were 500 to 1,000 available. The impression the inquiry made was, 'How long could we hold out before reinforcements came if attacked by the Boers?' (See Appendix C.)

In spite of this, it was felt that Sir Henry Loch's attitude was not as satisfactory as it had been the previous day, and it was thought agencies were at work to prevent the access to the High Commissioner of men cognisant of our cause. The whole of the secret armoury of the Government was at work, no effort being spared, and we soon had grave fears that one member at least of His Excellency's staff was being seriously prejudiced.

On the same day it was stated in Government circles that, owing to the representations of Herr von Herff, the German Consul, who was a great friend of Dr. Leyds, the German Government had become alarmed at the prospect of British interference in the Transvaal. There had been a communication between the English and German Governments concerning the peace in South Africa, and certain instructions had, in consequence, been despatched to Sir Henry Loch.

Prior to this it had confidentially and confidently been stated that the English Government were determined to mend or end the grievances of the Uitlanders. Now the Transvaal Government had apparently received assurances indirectly from 'von Herff,' and they refused

to budge an inch towards reform. The President's old excuse was trotted out, 'I could never get the burghers to consent,' and once they were satisfied that he did not mean to hold an ultimatum over their heads, the High Commissioner lost his chance of effecting anything.

A hitch had occurred, and the above is the only reasonable excuse for Sir Henry Loch's failure. Assuming that the Cabinet had modified his instructions, his proper course would seem to have been to break off negotiations at once, recognising that he could do nothing, and assuring the Uitlanders that he personally would never rest until their grievances were redressed; obtained at the same time a pledge from them that they would not commit any overt act pending the result of an appeal which would be made by him on their behalf to the Imperial Government. If such a message had been communicated privately to one of the leaders of the Loyalists, the party would have waited to see what the British Government were going to do. Sir Henry must have lost his head; all he obtained was the cessation of commandeering, which deprived us of the mainstay of our agitation, and established that false peace which was more exasperating than open and bloody battle could have been.

There really was no excuse: week in and week out our party had been drilling it into the British Government that now was the time to insist on a remedy of the existing abuses. Sir H. Loch must have known that the effort made by the Loyalists of Pretoria in the heart of the Boer camp could never be attempted by them again, that they had staked their all on its success. By acting as he did, he ruined many of them, in the same way as many were ruined by the retrocession. The Boers never forget, and the Kruger Government *never forgives.* How deeply some must have regretted

ever to have staked aught for the sake of the Empire; for even their own countrymen forsook them in some instances, afraid to be seen with the men who were marked by the Government.

The Africander Bond at the Cape, alive to the advantage to be got out of the demoralization of the English in the Transvaal, was not slow in striking. On June 26 two characteristic motions were submitted to the Cape Parliament: Mr. Botha in the Legislative Assembly proposed to censure Sir Jacobus de Wet, but he was promptly sat upon by one or two of the English members. In the Lower House Mr. Van der Walt was more successful. He begged to move as an unopposed motion, 'That this House desires to express its regret at the unseemly display of disrespect as reported in the newspapers and telegrams towards the President and Government of the Transvaal Republic by individuals representing themselves as British subjects on the occasion of the official and friendly visit of His Excellency the Governor of the colony and Her Majesty's High Commissioner.' After some discussion, it was decided that the motion could not be accepted in the form proposed. After several members had abused the High Commissioner for going to Pretoria at all, Mr. Rhodes rose amidst profound silence, and said that he thought every member of that House would approve the sentiment expressed in the motion which the honourable member claimed to be put as unopposed. 'We all feel,' continued Mr. Rhodes, 'that we are deeply sorry at the circumstances which have been stated to have occurred, and we hope that they have been greatly exaggerated. . . . Whether it be so or not, what we feel so deeply is that our fellow-countrymen should have misbehaved themselves in the manner that they are stated to have done, and especially on an occasion when our Governor

proceeded to Pretoria in order to improve the friendly relations that have always existed between Her Majesty's Government and the President of the Transvaal.' Mr. Sauer said, among other things, that he could hardly believe the High Commissioner would be so injudicious as to go to Johannesburg. 'I do not say,' he argued, 'that they are on the verge of revolution in Johannesburg, but I do say that the population of that town is in such an excited condition that the least encouragement, even if it were accidental, on the part of the High Commissioner might lead to very serious consequences, and a state of things which everybody in this country would deeply deplore.' Mr. Merriman said in the course of his speech, 'Let the residents of the Transvaal and the Government fight out their own differences' —a noble sentiment for one Englishman to harbour towards his countrymen!

Not a word of sympathy was expressed for the Uitlanders, and even the Cape Town papers were strangely silent at the time. What Mr. Rhodes' reasons were for non-interference in the Transvaal then no one will know until that gentleman writes his own *apologia*. Within six months he had changed his mind. Financial reasons can hardly have influenced him; the interests of his friends might affect him, but he is not a man who considers his personal advantage. He is nevertheless greatly to blame for not having supported the Uitlander cause firmly at that time; and, in fact, for so little sympathising with it that he objected to a vote of sympathy when the storm of indignation from Johannesburg was making itself felt, and threats were used of boycotting the Cape Railway route in favour of a colony (Natal) which had always stood by loyally when the vital principles of the Empire were at stake. This failure on the part of Mr. Rhodes was the cause of much trouble in the future; he could

have made the Liberal Government take notice, were they even ever so disinclined to help.

Meantime the National Union had invited the High Commissioner to visit Johannesburg (an invitation of which Mr. Sauer seems to have had very early intimation), where he was sure of a very hearty reception. President Kruger was, of course, opposed to his going, because he must there have formed some idea of the tremendous force behind the Reform movement. He wrote urging Sir H. Loch not to accept, 'as he was afraid a collision would occur with the burghers, for which he would not be responsible.' This was, of course, nonsense. Had Sir Henry Loch visited Johannesburg, he would have been received by 30,000 Loyalists or more, and if the police could not have controlled the few Boers who might have been there, the crowd very soon would. As a matter of fact, the visit would have so exposed the weakness of the Republic that Kruger was determined to prevent it at all costs, and it was partly on this account, we believe, that Sir Henry Loch obtained the cessation of the commandeering. The Transvaal Government had really no diplomatic standing in the matter, for the Portuguese were exempted by treaty, and as the French and Germans came under the 'most favoured nation' treatment, the British were equally entitled to it both as a friendly Power, and also under the Convention, which insured our subjects, in certain respects, equal rights to those enjoyed by other inhabitants of the country, quite apart from the points in General Cameron's despatch.

Since this was written, we have received the most important corroboration of our surmise concerning the real cause of Sir H. Loch's success in abolishing commandeering. We have the greater pleasure in referring to it, as it shows Mr. Kotze in a very good light, and

explains the difficulty which some of his friends had in reconciling his judgment on the commandeering case, from a local point of view, with the principles of international law.

'On the day when Sir Henry Loch arrived at Pretoria, Chief Justice Kotze received a note from Dr. Leyds asking him to come round to the Government Office, as the President was very anxious to see him. This was shortly after the President had left the High Commissioner. On the Chief Justice's arrival he found Messrs. Kruger and Leyds alone. Leyds was as white as a sheet, probably owing to the fright he got at the welcome to Sir H. Loch. Kruger then handed him a despatch from the acting High Commissioner, General Cameron (quoted on p. 131), which had been in the hands of the Boer Government some time before it was shown the Chief Justice. Having read the despatch, the President said that Sir H. Loch had also pressed the point, and he asked for the Chief Justice's opinion on the matter, and as to whether the decision of the High Court had not settled the question. Mr. Kotze told him that he must not confound or mix up the decision of the Court with the request of Her Majesty's Government. The decision of the Court was based on the local law, and was a judicial matter. The request of Her Majesty's Government was, however, a practical one, and to that there could be but one answer. The High Commissioner was quite within his right not merely to ask, *but to demand*, that British subjects should be placed on the same footing as those of other nationalities with whom the Transvaal had made treaties, and who had the benefit of the 'most favoured nation' clause. He also impressed upon Kruger the necessity of yielding, and showed him the incongruity of doing otherwise by asking him how he could with a good grace refuse so *reasonable* a request made by Great Britain, with

whom he had a Convention, and who had given him back the country, when he had granted by treaty exemptions to the subjects of such small countries as Holland, Belgium, and Portugal. Kruger then requested him to make that statement in the Volksraad, the Chief replying "that he would not merely say it in the Volksraad, but would proclaim it from the housetops," for it was the only right and just thing to do. The President subsequently got up and went upstairs to the First Volksraad, and the interview terminated. The next day the Chief Justice received a note from Dr. Leyds asking him by desire of the President to attend the Volksraad, which he did, and found the doors all locked. A mounted policeman (he was, however, not *then* on his charger) gave a peculiar knock on the door as it seemed, and, *mirabile dictu*, Leyds himself was the man who came to open the door of the First Volksraad. The Chief entered, and found the First and Second Volksraad members in secret session. The President explained that he had sent for Mr. Kotze, the question on the order being the request of the High Commissioner. The Chief Justice then repeated, speaking in a very earnest and decided tone, what he had already the previous day told President Kruger. The result was that the First Volksraad passed a resolution authorizing the Government to draw up a treaty on the subject with Her Majesty's Government exempting British subjects from personal military service. The treaty, however, has never yet been finally approved by the Volksraad.'

The Uitlanders' case was far stronger with the commandeering than without it, and had they known it was to be the only one of their rights to be wrung from Mr. Kruger, they would never have asked for the interference of the Home Government.

On the 28th the Hon. John Tudhope acknowledged

the receipt of Sir Henry Loch's wire postponing his visit to Johannesburg, and stated that a deputation from the English residents of the Witwatersrand would be presented to him on the following day at five o'clock. In the course of the message he says: 'British subjects in the State are much afraid that the extreme gravity of the present crisis and the necessity for giving immediate relief from the intolerable burdens that have been imposed upon them, as well as from the condition of political serfdom to which they have been reduced, has not yet been adequately realized by the Government and Volksraad of the Republic. While yet assured that in Your Excellency's hands their interests will be satisfactorily safeguarded, they would respectfully but very earnestly ask Your Excellency to use your powerful influence in obtaining for British subjects in the South African Republic immediate relief from these burdens, and a full recognition of their rights and privileges as law-abiding citizens, who have contributed so largely to the progress and prosperity of the State.'

On the 29th the deputation from Johannesburg, headed by the Hon. John Tudhope, Hon. J. W. Leonard, Q.C., Mr. St. John Carr, and others, handed in the Johannesburg petition, signed by 14,800 signatures, making a total with the Pretoria petition of over 16,000 signatures. In an eloquent speech Mr. Tudhope pointed out 'the grievances under which the Uitlanders suffered; the scornful reception of their desires by the Volksraad recently; and their being liable to military service under the Commando Law, without the slightest chance of sharing in the government of the State or the privileges of the burghers. The interference of Her Majesty's representatives *had only been asked as a last resort*, as all other representations by means of deputations, meetings, and petitions to the Volksraad had failed.' To the great surprise of the deputation,

His Excellency, in thanking them for the hearty welcome conveyed, regretted that he could not receive them in the centre of their great city; advised them *to work in a conciliatory manner with the Government for the redress of their grievances;* and informed them that the Government had acceded to his request not to commandeer British subjects in the future.'

The public thought that Sir Henry Loch's visit had only just commenced. They knew their grievances would cause lengthy discussion, and it therefore came as a great shock when they heard that he was leaving at once for Cape Town. This movement was kept very secret, but the fact that steam was being kept up on the High Commissioner's special train revealed the truth of the information.

All seemed hopeless at the moment, but the receipt of a telegram from the five commandeered men, stating that they had been turned out on the veld by the Boers without any food or means of conveyance to Pietersburg, caused one of the Loyalists to endeavour to see Sir Henry Loch, and to seize the opportunity of making a last appeal to that gentleman. Government officials passed in and out, and still the High Commissioner could not be seen. At last Sir Graham Bower appeared, and said, 'The Governor can see nobody. What is your business with him?' The gentleman in question replied it was of a private nature, and implored Sir Graham in vain to let him see Sir Henry Loch. When he at last reluctantly produced the wire, Sir Graham exclaimed, 'It is false! The Government have just informed us that the prisoners have received every attention.'

We should like to ask Sir Graham Bower why he preferred the evidence of the Boers to that of his fellow-countrymen? We shall come to the actual experiences of these men at the front later on.

As if he had not done so sufficiently, Sir Henry Loch completed our humiliation by addressing the Raads prior to his departure on the 29th. He assured them of the friendship of Her Majesty's Government; he said there were questions which arose which required give and take on both sides, but which in the end would go to strengthen the feeling of friendship between the two countries, which he hoped would ever exist. He felt he could depend upon the friendly feelings of the President when questions arose between his Government and the Transvaal.

Mr. Wolmarans, Chairman of the First Volksraad, expressed his pleasure at seeing the distinguished visitor (whose presence must at the same time have been gall and wormwood to that gentleman). He stated that it would always be the desire of the members to keep on terms of friendship with Great Britain, and he hoped relations would not be strained *for a considerable time to come.*' Yes, not until the Transvaal had completed its schemes and its armaments!

Shortly afterwards the President attended another little séance. The mining magnates, who knew which side their bread was buttered, were anxious to tender him their sympathy; while at the same time they felt rather sore about the Cyanide Monopoly business, and other little jobs which were in progress. Headed by Mr. Lionel Phillips, Chairman of the Chamber of Mines, they presented an address 'disclaiming all sympathy with the demonstration on the arrival of the High Commissioner, assuring him of their support, but pointing out certain grievances.' The President handed them a written reply, so that there should be no mistake, in the course of which he stated: 'I thank you for the kindly sentiments you express in the address, although I cannot refrain from remarking upon the expressions which reflect upon the Legislature, which expressions are

somewhat out of place in an address to me.' The able hands of Messrs. Leyds and Esselen can be traced in the latter clause of the reply, which was certainly neat.

It is our object to show that the movement for equal rights was not a capitalistic one, but that the capitalists attached themselves to it in their own despair. At that time Mr. Phillips wrote home, saying 'he did not care about the franchise,' a fact which has been thrown in his face over and over again by Dr. Leyds. But Mr. Phillips was nominally a strong supporter of the Government; he was busy making money for himself and friends, and it was not until he and his people saw that they might as well have their money at the bottom of the sea as continue to allow the Boers to make 'ducks and drakes' of the country, that they joined the Uitlander cause. As a matter of fact, our case would have been far better without them, because they furnished the Boers with a strong argument in their favour, an argument which they have always used since the mining magnates joined the agitation for constitutional rights.

On the evening of the 29th a tremendous crowd assembled to see the High Commissioner off to Cape Town. Heavy guards were, however, put on the railway-station, and this time admittance to the platform was prohibited.

CHAPTER XI

A RHODESIAN SUBSTITUTE FOR FEET OF CLAY

THERE were now four factors in South African politics, the Krugerites and the Advanced Africanders, with leanings towards Mr. Kruger; the Progressive Africanders, who looked to Mr. Rhodes for guidance; and the Loyalists.

Mr. Kruger's policy, which had been carefully screened in the past, now took more definite shape; this found expression in the President's parable at the festivities on the opening of the Netherlands Railway, when he compared the Transvaal to a child, which, if interfered with by anyone, would speedily find a champion elsewhere. Dr. Leyds had been sounding Berlin and other centres with the object of obtaining sympathy and more active support against Great Britain. In this he was successful, as many commercial advantages could be offered by the Transvaal; and the ambition of Germany to found a Colonial Empire was of the greatest assistance to him. President Kruger was thus disposed to develop his plans with less secrecy, taking great care that his diplomacy should always be plausibly correct where there was any likelihood of his actions being brought to book under the 'foreign relations clause' of the London Convention (see Appendix D).

To trace this foreign intrigue to its source, we must

go right back to the Boer protest against the annexation, where it is stated that an appeal would be made to foreign Powers, one of its after-consequences being the seizure of the Delagoa Bay Railway by the Portuguese authorities. This act was purely and simply the work of the Transvaal Government, prompted by the fear that the company, being largely English, would successfully interfere with the various schemes which the President had in view. To get the control into the hands of the Portuguese, who know the virtues of 'palm oil' almost as well as Mr. Kruger, was a matter of importance to the President, because the railway would thereby practically become an adjunct of the Netherlands South African Railway. The British Government ought, of course, to have insisted on the return of the railway to its rightful owners; but they once more trifled with their responsibilities, and allowed the matter to go to arbitration. That was upward of nine years ago, and the award of the Swiss arbitrators has not been fully published yet (1900).

Mr. Kruger cannot be accused of inconsistency. He had made up his mind as regards railway matters so far back as 1884, when he opened up those valuable connections in Lisbon, to which we have already alluded; his friends there were only too eager to assist the Republic at a time when its growing wealth gave hope of favours to come. Thanks only to the great influence which England possesses in the highest quarters of that country, the attempts at acquisition of territory, and the purchase of the railway, with certain rights at Delagoa Bay, fell through.

When our position was secured by the valued 'right of pre-emption' under the MacMahon award, and subsequently formally included in a treaty with Portugal, attempts were made to get the Great Powers to nationalize the port, and to bind themselves not to

permit any other Power to purchase or annex it. It is on this latter point that the Boers have met with more or less success, as they have foiled the many attempts made by Great Britain to obtain control of Delagoa Bay with the consent of Portugal. Whenever negotiations have been on the point of completion, the interference of one or other of the Powers has caused them to fall through.

The Boer *cum* German policy was only pursued by the wily President as a means to an end. He knew that he could only rely on Germany's assistance to a certain point, because England would outbid him if forced to do so. On one occasion, speaking to a German officer after the Raid, who was alluding to the assistance Germany was prepared to render, he said, 'It is all very well to talk about what you will do, but when the old lady says "Booh!" you are only too glad to keep quiet;' he was referring to the defined position which England took up against German sympathy after the Raid. This point was reached when the Anglo-German Treaty was concluded—a treaty which, when published, will probably meet with much criticism, its sole object apparently being to prevent Germany from interfering with our South African policy, as she receives in return many valuable considerations from us. It was, of course, a protective measure against a coalition of three Great Powers against us; but an alliance with the United States and Japan, on almost any terms, would have been esteemed preferable by British South Africans, who distrust the *bonâ-fides* of Germany. This distrust first found expression in 1894, when it became apparent that we had nursed a snake in our bosom, which had seized the first opportunity to wound its friend and protector of the past. One cannot think that the Emperor's policy, great as his ambition is, can be anti-English; but his advisers have certainly done

their utmost to thwart Britain's legitimate aspirations in South Africa.

The war has shown that England has few friends on the Continent, and it would not be surprising to learn that this unpopularity has been largely the work of Boer agents. Both before and after the Jameson Raid they have spared no pains to vilify us as a nation Dr. Leyds has openly subsidized the European press, and, we regret to admit it, a section of the English press too. So daring is he in his method that he has succeeded in 'acquiring influence' where many another would have failed; he will subsidize any writer who may have an opening in a recognised organ, and gets his views advanced at will. He has nothing to learn from Bismarck in methods, in which he stands unrivalled to-day.

Diplomacy such as ours could not expect to compete successfully with that of the Boers, which is adapted to their very special requirements, and to deal with a Kruger one must fight him with his own weapons, and those weapons are such as Englishmen of the old school would perhaps scorn to use; but without which failure is certain. To subsidize paper against paper, to make secret service meet secret service—these are the only ways which could lead to success.

'To do evil that good may come' is an axiom which will find exponents in South Africa so long as Oom Paul is a power for evil, and only with his cessation from practical politics may it be dispensed with. It is fortunate for South Africa that Mr. Rhodes, who has now come forward as the Uitlander champion, has not shrunk from adopting it.

In making this assertion, we desire to be strictly impartial, and in describing his work neither to extol his successes nor minimize his errors. To-day Mr. Rhodes is responsible for much of the trouble in South Africa;

but if wreck and ruin have occurred through the failure of his plans, it is due to him to say that he acted always with the best of intentions. The way to a warmer place than Rhodesia is said to be paved with good intentions; let us hope that, in spite of the Krugerian methods which Mr. Rhodes has used, he will not find in his old age that personal ambition has overreached itself or that the highest of motives cannot efface the memory of these expedients.

Things in the Transvaal were drifting; the Malaboch War was dragging on its weary way in spite of the congratulations of the Governor of the Cape Colony on the capture of Malaboch's kraal.

The internal condition of lawlessness went on. A glance at the newspaper files of 1894 reveals the fact that on July 5, in Johannesburg, a disturbance was caused at a fire owing to the brutality of the police, full particulars of which were published in the *Critic* at the time, and on October 8 a policeman named Van Voeren, who was interfering with a servant girl, on being remonstrated with by her mistress, a Mrs. Simpson, kicked the lady in the abdomen, and she died from the effects. In 1899 matters like these became generally known, and the Transvaal Police was the subject of vigourous comment in the English press!

To revenge themselves for the forced abandonment of commandeering, the Government made levies of large sums of money from British subjects, pretending towards the British authorities that they were general and not confined to Uitlanders. This statement was an absolute falsehood. Proposals were also made to tax the property and interests of absentees.

On July 16 a mass meeting of the Transvaal National Union was held under the chairmanship of the Hon. John Tudhope, and speeches were delivered by Messrs. Leonard, Wessels, and James Hay. Mr. Leonard's speech

was up to his usual high standard, and Mr. Wessels, who spoke as a more representative Africander than Paul Kruger himself, appealed to the capitalists not to stand aloof when their fellow-Uitlanders called on them for assistance. He concluded a telling speech with the following quotation from Byron's 'Don Juan' as applied to the waverers:

> 'A land of slaves shall ne'er be mine—
> Dash down yon cup of Samian wine!'

The resolution of which we give an extract states, 'That this meeting of the Transvaal National Union, while repudiating the unfounded charges made against the Union of seeking to undermine the independence of the Republic, hereby protests most emphatically against the recent action of the Volksraad.' It proceeds to deplore the franchise legislation of the Raad, and to urge all who value the rights of citizenship to join the Union.

The meeting created a great deal of enthusiasm, and was remarkable as showing the tendency on the part of some of the speakers to place no hope in future on imperial interference, and to strike out for a Republic entirely independent of British assistance.

The resolution passed was emphasized at a banquet given subsequently to the returned prisoners, when Mr. Leonard laid down the lines of future policy. His remarks were a source of pain to us Loyalists of Loyalists, who felt that the British Government must finally assist us, and that the only remedy lay in representation and petition, petition and representation, to the Mother Country until she listened to our prayers. That this policy was a sound one has been justified by events, but one can quite understand that a man like Mr. Leonard, who had been working year in and year out as a sturdy Imperialist, was becoming tired of the

indifference of the Home Government, and despaired of help from that source.

The different meetings which had been held, and more particularly the announcement that a big welcome was to be given to the five prisoners who were returning from the front, decided the Government to rush through the Public Meetings Act or 'Gag' Law, as it was called. This law regulated the conditions under which the public were allowed to congregate in the streets and hold meetings in halls. It expressly forbade the right of meeting in the open air, except with the consent of the Government or legal authorities. It was put through just in time to check the reception of the prisoners. Not content with this, the Government persuaded some of their wealthy friends in Johannesburg to prevent the Wanderers' Band and any sympathizers coming over. To guard against their guilty fears, the police were provided with arms, and instructions sent forbidding the coach to stop or put down any passengers near the town. In spite of this, a large number of friends in cabs and carriages went out to receive them, and escorted them up to the British Residency to shake hands with the gentleman who had done so much to obtain their release. They were formally welcomed by Sir Jacobus de Wet, who, in addressing the crowd, said 'the men had stuck up for principles, and done nothing to be ashamed of; they acted throughout like men. The Courts of the country ordered them to go to the front, and they went; they had now returned, and he was pleased to welcome them. They all knew that his position debarred him from making speeches to a great extent. He learnt that there was to be a meeting that night. It was only fair they should meet and give expression to any grievances they might have. He advised them to keep order and do nothing that could be construed

as hostile by the authorities. They should keep cool, and make their complaints in a dispassionate manner.' 'God save the Queen' was then sung, and hearty cheers given for the Queen and the British Agent.

The prisoners stated that absolutely no provision was made for them by the authorities. They were told to bear arms by Commandant Ferreira, C.M.G.! and on their refusing he offered to release them if they would take guns and go up to the laager. They declined, saying they would only go under escort. One of the Commandants then said that if they would not fight or work they should starve. The object of this was to enable the Government to report to Sir Henry Loch, then in Pretoria, that there was no objection to commandeering, as even the prisoners had consented to take up arms! But the trick did not succeed. Finally they were turned out on the veld, and peremptorily ordered to leave the place without any provision being made for their transport or food; thanks to the aid of friends, they managed to get to Pietersburg, where funds awaited them. The men were proud to relate that, in spite of many insults, they never parted with the colours—little rosettes of red, white, and blue—which they wore on leaving Pretoria.

Some days after the Pretoria commando returned from the front, the President, in addressing the men who were non-burghers, said: 'They were deserving of having the full rights of citizenship, and would receive them too. He had doubts as to whom he should trust formerly, but these men showed by their deeds that they were worthy of burgher rights, and recognising their merits, he should see they did not go unrewarded. Without altering the law, the Raad would grant burgher rights.' These honeyed words, however, tempted very few of the British subjects, who had gone under compulsion, and 'mistrusting the gifts of the Greeks' they

wisely refused to take up the burgher rights so mysteriously offered.

At the end of July Malaboch surrendered, and the war was at an end so far as he was concerned. Malaboch himself was something of a hero, and one could not help admiring him. He fought to the bitter end, and when surrounded without a chance of escape, starving and thirsty, made one last speech of defiance, then hurled himself into the camp fires in a vain effort to end his miserable existence. On his arrival in Pretoria hundreds of burghers came forward to shake hands with him, and this gave great umbrage to the authorities, who got the President to address them so as to stop it. He ordered the Rustenburg men to 'take the chief up to the gaol, and hand him over to the civil authorities, there to await the course of the law.' It seemed from this that the chief was to have a fair trial, and as there were grave doubts as to the justice of the war, Messrs. Leonard and Wessels were retained for his defence. The Government thereupon declined to have him tried, and he is still in Pretoria Gaol, which makes the inference a certainty that he was innocent, and that the Government dared not let him face the Courts of the country. A meeting in Johannesburg was addressed by the Rev. Mr. Dewdney Drew, the Rev. Mr. Appelbee, and several other English clergymen, proving that there was gross cruelty in the campaign, and that many Kaffirs had been handed over to practical slavery in the *Z*outpansburg (under the Boer indenture system, which is described in Appendix B). They passed the following resolution: 'That this meeting, representing several churches in Johannesburg, condemns the recent war with Malaboch as unjustifiable, deplores the unnecessary cruelties practised in subduing him, and urges upon the Government the duty of at once liberating all women and children of

Malaboch's tribe who are now held as slaves, and that a copy of this resolution be sent to the Transvaal Government and such other persons as the committee elected may think necessary.'

An attempt was made by the Government to obtain the names of the persons who were averse to being commandeered, which was considered a proof of enmity to the country, and a circular was sent through Dr. Leyds' office to General Joubert to be issued to the Veldcornets requesting them 'to compile immediately lists of all persons who can be considered as aliens, whether they elect to remain exempt from commando service or not, and further to state this in a column after their names upon their lists, etc.' By resolution of the Uitlanders' Association, it was resolved to make no reply to the Veldcornets with regard to the various questions asked, leaving them to form their own conclusions.

As showing the terrorism, and the strength of the boycott which the Government instituted, and the petty way in which it was carried out from a social point of view, it may be mentioned that a leading Loyalist in Pretoria who was intimately connected with sporting matters was removed at their request from the committee for the reception of the Pretoria commando. In consequence of this many British subjects withdrew their subscriptions. The same gentleman was blackballed by the Rifle Association for political reasons, Mr. J. S. Smit, the Railway Commissioner, who acted as chairman, running in several Volksraad members to sway the vote. He was also persecuted in many other ways, which for private reasons it is not expedient to divulge. Many attempts were made to vilify his private character by secret agents, fortunately unsuccessfully. On one occasion a bogus inquiry was raked up in connection with some sporting matter, in which the Assistant-

Veldcornet spared no pains to prove him guilty, and by the aid of false witnesses nearly accomplished that ruin which open measures could not attain. Similar boycotts were carried on for years, and in many cases the very friends of the Loyalists were turned against them. They were accused of every crime; in fact, all measures were exhausted until the Government was assured that they were muzzled, and would be of no danger to them. Of course, they could stop their mouths, but they could not stay their work, and that was continued unflinchingly.

In August Mr. Rhodes, accompanied by Mr. De Waal, M.L.A., made a tour of Rhodesia, and returned viâ Delagoa Bay and Pretoria to the Cape. On reaching the Portuguese elysium he found everything in a turmoil, as the native tribes were in open insurrection, threatening the town. This was ascribed by Pretoria to Mr. Rhodes, and the German papers, duly instructed, were busy attacking this gentleman. Shortly afterwards the gunboats *See-Adler* and *Condor* arrived at Delagoa Bay, and have remained within call ever since. Journeying through the disaffected country, Mr. Rhodes finally reached Pretoria on October 11, Dr. Jameson being now included in the party.

The following day Mr. Rhodes, accompanied by Mr. De Waal, and, we believe, Dr. Te Water, who was in Pretoria at the time, visited the President, when Oom Paul received a lecture from that gentleman which he will probably never forget. The version that reached the ear of the public was that Mr. Rhodes informed him he would lose his country unless he changed his mode of government, and that his strictures were so severe that the interpreter was almost afraid to translate them literally. This, however, had no effect on the President's policy; fixed he was, and

fixed he would remain; although he has had a very wholesome fear of Mr. Rhodes since then.

The Rhodesian party then visited Johannesburg, and while there Mr. Rhodes was approached by an informal deputation asking him to assist them in their struggle for equal rights in the Transvaal. It is uncertain as to whether he made any definite promises, or not. By many it was assumed that Mr. Rhodes stepped into the vortex of Transvaal politics on his own initiative, but it must in justice to him be admitted that such is not the case. He was deliberately invited, so that to have absolutely refused would have been to abandon his countrymen. With this step, any desire to rely on direct Imperial aid was definitely abandoned, and a Rhodesian substitute found for Cæsar's feet of clay.

It is from this moment that Mr. Rhodes looms large in the affairs of the Republic. Possibly he had found out that his attitude with regard to the commandeering incident was a wrong one, and that he must atone for his mistake as far as possible. Whatever the reason may have been, his motives cannot be impugned; it was his resolve to do everything alone, without Imperial aid. That became the ruin of the enterprise. The Loyalists felt that this was a wrong policy. The Republic would have to cease to exist, if force became necessary to change the nature of its government. No change could be effective which did not destroy those ambitions which were fast becoming a passion with the neo-Africander community. The pleasure of treating a race such as the British as a subject one, the feeling that while this continued they had a storehouse of wealth to draw on, was too fascinating for the Boers to be abandoned without a struggle—a struggle in which all of them would be involved. It was absurd to rely on a revolution for the substitution of general equality for white men in place of Boer tyranny, and

the only way to salvation lay in an appeal to the power of Great Britain.

In this decision of Mr. Rhodes we have the key to the subsequent action of the capitalists who were connected with the movement, a key which destroys many of the Boer arguments.

Had Mr. Rhodes not interfered in Transvaal politics, the mining magnates would never have given a hearty support to the Uitlander cause. Individuals might have done so, but the majority would have preferred a policy of submission backed up by bribery, which was encouraged by the Government, and which, while impoverishing the country, naturally played into the hands of the moneyed men so long as there were valuable interests at stake.

The enormous influence of Mr. Rhodes being thrown into the scale guided these gentlemen along the thorny path of duty, and to him alone must be given credit for their change of policy, which became apparent in 1895, and terminated in the Raid. Independent men, such as Mr. Lionel Phillips and Mr. George Farrar, who were getting tired of Boer methods, would have jibbed at some time or other, but assuredly not so soon as they did when Mr. Rhodes took his place at the helm.

The change was at once noticed in official circles, and the actions of the Chamber of Mines showed that they were gradually abandoning the old policy of cringing to the Government. Oom Paul then played his final card, and the Government organs started the ever-popular cry of 'Labour versus Capital,' advancing arguments which were sufficiently sound and plausible to produce a split among the ranks of the working men. So long as they felt the Government and the capitalists were working together, they had the feeling that this cry was false; when a change occurred, they,

ignorant of the circumstances, became in many cases suspicious of the intentions of both. This feeling still exists, because the interests of labour and capital are even more diametrically opposite in South Africa than they seem to be elsewhere. Labour is becoming conscious that ultimately its great struggle will not be with the Boers, but with the millionaires.

It was a fatal error on Mr. Rhodes' part to let the movement appear to be a capitalistic one. He could have done the whole thing much better alone, confining himself to merely letting them know that they should adopt an attitude of strict neutrality with regard to politics, closing an eye where necessary. What was required of Mr. Rhodes was financial and diplomatic support. Had he furnished the funds, the system pursued by the South African League in awakening the country to a sense of its responsibilities could then and there have been adopted, so that when the time came the men would have been found ready to go anywhere and do anything *with working-men as leaders.* A little opposition from the mining magnates might have done the cause good. In case of failure, Mr. Rhodes' connection with it would have changed nothing in his brilliant career and position, and if the leaders were sacrificed, public opinion in England would have been so much aroused as to once and for all settle the questions at issue. The Loyalists were honestly prepared to make any sacrifice provided the ultimate result was the extinction of republicanism as a basis for Africander supremacy in South Africa, whereas the mining men and their satellites, who had kept out of politics until they became fashionable, had no fixed purpose. Some were red-hot republicans, others had moderate views, and a few, it was whispered, were pro-Boer, while the minority were well-known Loyalists, who unfortunately thought they were doing right in adopting the views of

the majority. With such a heterogeneous mass nothing could be accomplished satisfactorily.

There should have been one head, and that head should have been Mr. Rhodes; the leader on the spot might have been Dr. Jameson, who would have been only too willing to resign his career in Rhodesia months before a start was made, so as to be in Johannesburg, and yet apparently unconnected in any way with the movement; and the first steps should have been taken in Pretoria.

CHAPTER XII

THE PLOT THICKENS

It is not easy for the contemporary writer properly to appreciate the character and work of a man like Mr. Rhodes. Immense ability, indomitable courage, pertinacity, and strength appeal to every Englishman, and yet these qualities have not saved Mr. Rhodes from the reproach of unscrupulousness, have not saved him from suspicion of unclean motives. We prefer to be proud of our great countryman, proud of his ambitions, proud of his patriotism. His dream of 'thinking in continents' was the outcome of an ambitious brain, but his quiet pertinacity and persistency has made that dream a reality. One thing is certain, that he has never questioned the nobility of labour. When Mr. Rudd and he went into the ice business at Kimberley, people used often to remark, 'Who is the lazy man standing in the door of the establishment smoking his pipe?' but they did not know that that same sleepy gentleman, Mr. Rhodes, had been busy all night making the ice which was to keep them cool during the day. Kimberley was not exactly a correct school for commercial morality, and many well-known men who made money there had the reputation of having made some of it out of illicit diamond-buying, which was not nearly so risky in the old days as now, and was rather a fashionable amusement at the time. But nothing

of this nature has ever been whispered to mar Mr. Rhodes' or his partner's good name. He made his money, so far as observation shows, by strict business methods and financial ability, and when he had made it, he aspired to political power to realize those schemes of which he had dreamed in his youth.

As showing the great belief which the Jews have in him as a financier, the writer remembers being present while a special telegram describing the result of the De Beers Amalgamation was being read to two of them up-country. As the promise of the future and the rise in the shares was prophesied, they shook hands with one another, for their holdings were large in the company, and, with grateful thoughts of the man who was enriching them, they both exclaimed, 'He is a wonderful man!' They had not one word of criticism of his financial methods; they would have been content to follow him blindly in any of his schemes which had not a philanthropic basis.

From pit to Parliament was an easy stride, and here Mr. Rhodes met his first fence. To pose as an advocate of Imperialism then was to court a speedy political death. The future of the Cape Colony was in the hands of the Dutch majority; to attempt to work outside them was to ensure the failure of his plans. Mr. Rhodes adopted a middle course. He became an advocate for the elimination of the Imperial factor in South Africa. This won him the confidence of the Africander Bond, who thought they saw in him a convert to their dream of a United South African Republic freed from the shackles of British supremacy, in which the English races, duly Africanderized, would lose their distinctive characteristics. It is difficult of proof in how far Mr. Rhodes was committed to an independent United South Africa, with himself as President. That was the bait which the Bond party

held out to him. Mr. Rhodes would in some measure have been justified in such a policy. The difficulty he had in persuading the Imperial authorities to assist him with his hinterland schemes, the trouble to get them to move in anything affecting their interests—these considerations must have influenced him.

He saw them let Damaraland and Northern Namaqualand pass into the hands of Germany without a murmur. He witnessed their disgraceful abandonment of the Transvaal, their anxiety to avoid responsibility, their feverish desire to escape any fresh obligations while pursuing a 'parish-pump' policy. Would this not obviously drive an ambitious man towards the republican ideal?

With great difficulty he persuaded the British Government to guard its interests in Matabeleland, and it was only due to the great hold which he had over Sir Hercules Robinson, who for some reason or other never could resist Mr. Rhodes' arguments, that he succeeded in securing the rights which subsequently led to the foundation of Rhodesia. We see his distrust in Imperial measures in his opposition to the Bechuanaland Expedition, when he must have known it to be a necessity, and the only way by which the road to the North could be kept open. Without force nothing could be done with Mr. Kruger, who would have coolly annexed the whole of the territory, and thereby effected a junction with the German African colonies. Mr. Rhodes has to thank the Rev. Mr. Mackenzie for doing what he failed in, and it is a matter of surprise that he has never acknowledged the claims of that gentleman, or accepted unconditionally the statements of his friends that he alone kept open the road to the North.

Of Mr. Rhodes and General Gordon much has been written. Perhaps it would have been far better for

both of them had they joined hands at Khartoum. Mr. Rhodes would have bought over the Mahdi in some way or other, and have started painting the map red from North to South, instead of South to North, a much more difficult task.

As a result of the weakness of the Imperial Government, Mr. Rhodes has been driven to many shifts and subterfuges which tend to mar his political record. The worst instance of this is the abandonment of the Swazies. Mr. Hofmeyr, who practically acted as Mr. Rhodes' agent, had, in exchange for a free hand in Rhodesia, promised the Boers Swazieland, and a strip of country three miles wide down to the coast through Swazieland, Zambaan's country, and Amatongaland to Kosi Bay, with a grant of ten miles square for the purpose of a harbour. But the offer of a port was conditional on their joining the Customs Union within three years of the ratification of the treaty, and the control of foreign relations by Great Britain. Mr. Kruger accepted the former and refused the latter, in the hope of securing a port and giving nothing for it.

It is difficult to find an excuse for Mr. Rhodes' deliberate sacrifice of these poor natives, who were always faithful to the British, and fought side by side with us in the Secocoeni and Zulu Wars. Strong efforts were made by the Swazie nation to prevent absorption by the Boers, and the deputation they sent home to protest came and went in vain. Mr. Rhodes' policy was seen in the fact that the whole of the press with which he had any connection in South Africa refused to entertain the idea that the Swazies had any right whatever to complain at being handed over and abandoned. As a proof of this, the only daily paper amongst the English and Dutch journals which persisted in its protest was the *Transvaal Advertiser* of Pretoria. The Boer Government had no treaties with the native

chiefs in the North, Mr. Rhodes having frustrated their efforts in that direction. We had obtained those treaties and forestalled them by an effective occupation, which justified us in refusing to entertain claims which would not have been recognised by any European Power. If a firm front had then been shown, the Boers would never have dreamt of armed interference. In fact, had each of the Banjailand trekkers been given a farm in Rhodesia, they would probably have settled down there without any demonstration.

Mr. Rhodes' argument against this is, that it was impossible to get the High Commissioner to take such a course. Here we must differ from him, as an attempt to invade the country by Mr. Kruger would have constituted a *casus belli*, and such a war must have had the support of the British public. The fact of the matter is, it was a sop to Boer susceptibilities and prejudices, while it satisfied the Bond; and that is why and how the deal was arranged.

Mr. Rhodes cannot always shrink from 'means to obtain his ends,' and that he used the Africander Bond for his purposes is the chief cause of their bitterness against him to-day. It is related of him that, at a banquet given to Bond delegates in Cape Town some years ago, Mr. Hofmeyr said to him: 'Some of our friends object to your giving those young Englishmen who have been fighting for you farms in Rhodesia; you must leave the farms for the Africanders. Rather give them money instead.' To which Mr. Rhodes replied, 'Oh, they will get the farms all the same. The Englishman prefers money to farms, and the Dutchman when he gets ground holds it.' There is a good deal of truth in this observation; but it is in distinct contradiction to the generally accepted idea of settling the English on the soil, which is now supposed to be Mr. Rhodes' great object. Assuming that it was to put them off, it

is a very good clue to the means which Mr. Rhodes was forced to adopt to preserve the balance of power in South Africa.

Many reasons have been given for the sudden conversion of Mr. Rhodes to Home Rule; as a matter of fact, he had absolutely no interest in it. He wished to make certain that there would be no opposition from the Irish party to his Chartered schemes, and there was only one way to obtain that, viz., by a liberal contribution to the party funds. This was most effective; the Home Rulers, while thinking they were being followed, were really being led in golden strings.

In 1894 Mr. Rhodes found himself the virtual head of the Africander party, Mr. Hofmeyr being away in Canada.

President Kruger had been sulking for some little time at the failure to give him that sole control of Swazieland which Mr. Hofmeyr had promised, and did not like the conditional offer of a port, which had been made provided he joined the Customs Union.

Anything which savoured of union with British institutions drove Mr. Kruger mad; and the tempting offer of a seaport (even though it would cost £10,000,000 to construct, the estimated cost of making Kosi Bay a harbour), which would have got many things from the autocrat, failed in this instance, because it only bound him faster to Great Britain.

Ever since 1890 Mr. Kruger had cunningly but secretly been locking his burghers in, and he was not going to give Mr. Rhodes a key to open the gate in the wall he had built.

Whether Mr. Rhodes feared in 1894 that his position was not quite safe in Charterland, or whether the mere thought that Mr. Hofmeyr had entrusted him with the party made him anxious to show that he was worthy of *the confidence:* from one cause or the other he made

his second great mistake in refusing to back up the case of the Uitlanders. Odd as it may sound, he may not have made himself acquainted with it. The fact is that Mr. Rhodes is very conservative, and his information on the subject of affairs in the Transvaal would probably be conveyed to him at this time from Bond sources. Messengers from the Transvaal would at the same time be placing their case before him, while the influential advocates on the other side were few and far between, and they had no one to plead their cause in Cape Town. Besides, Mr. Rhodes did not like any big deal to go through in South Africa unless he played the hand himself. At any rate, he failed to seize the opportunity which was offered.

Mr. Rhodes has a supreme contempt for individuals; he looks on humanity as a complex body, to be dealt with for the good of the majority. The charm of this cynical indifference may not be appreciated by the hangers-on of the 'Colossus,' but it does not detract from his outside popularity. An instance of this will be remembered on the occasion when one of his principal opponents, who had just before proposed a motion in the Cape House of Assembly, 'that the holding of office as Premier of the Cape Colony was incompatible with the chairmanship of De Beers and the Chartered Company,' took office under him the moment a split occurred in the Ministry. Mr. Rhodes probably referred to this gentleman when, chastening unruly spirits, he said: 'You think I cannot fill your places in the Ministry. Well, I have another hungry dog to whom I can throw a bone—So-and-so.' And, greatly to their surprise, he was right, as usual.

It is this cynicism and indifference which has been at the bottom of whatever mistakes Mr. Rhodes has made. Trusting very few, he leaves the direction of affairs which he should control himself entirely to them. He either

trusts a man in everything or not at all. Dr. Jameson is not likely to forget this for many a long day. It was thus at Johannesburg and Pitsani. Mr. Rhodes should have been at one of these places, and Dr. Jameson at the other, then that fatal mistake would not have been made.

We have already alluded to Mr. Rhodes' visit to Johannesburg, and the efforts which were made by the Reform party to get his assistance. As stated, there was a very strong republican following at the Rand, composed mainly of the American section and the 'upper ten'; this may have influenced Mr. Rhodes in carrying through the scheme without the assistance of the Imperial authorities, which would have meant in the event of war the adoption of the British flag. No doubt this plan was discussed at Groot Schuur more than once, and then abandoned. His great ambition to solve the problem himself, standing revealed as the one man in South Africa who could do it, was an additional incentive.

But the task was too great, and the strength of the Boers had been underestimated. Oom Paul was not losing sight of the fact that his policy might provoke reprisals, and he was steadily increasing his armaments and providing for the erection of the forts which became an accomplished fact after the Raid. He had his spies everywhere, and the secret service of the Republic was fast becoming the best in the world. It was thus almost impossible to keep anything secret, and the only hope of success would have been in an appeal to the Imperial Government to interfere, on the grounds that a revolution would otherwise occur in the country. This, being an open policy, if strongly supported by Mr. Rhodes would have been successful. If things went so far, the Imperial Government could *hardly refuse* to intervene, more especially as in the

event of a revolution being a certainty the Boers themselves would probably have appealed to Great Britain, if they had felt that they could not quell it themselves. If England failed again in her obvious duty, then a settlement would have been justifiable, by which the Britishers abandoned all rights as British subjects, and became Africanderized on any terms Mr. Kruger and the Bond cared to offer.

A clever move of Mr. Kruger's which Mr. Rhodes was accused of forestalling was the attempted seizure of Amatongaland by Boer emissaries, and a similar plan on the part of German subjects to annex a portion of the same territory, a sort of 'No man's land' (six minutes of a degree in breadth), which extended from Swazieland right down to Kosi Bay, between the boundaries of Amatongaland and the Portuguese territory. As a matter of fact, Mr. Rhodes had nothing to do with the matter, except that he may have stiffened the Governor (Lord Loch) on the subject. The scheme was discovered, and resulted in the Germans finding the Portuguese flag hoisted on the strip of territory in question, while Great Britain made an effective occupation of Amatongaland, and hoisted the flag in Zambaan's and Umbegesa's territory, much to the disconcerting of the Boer emissaries, who had no reason to believe their plans had been given away. The men to whom England owes the frustration of these designs are the Vicomte de Matallha and Sir Jacobus de Wet, neither of whom has received the slightest acknowledgment for the services in question, which stopped Mr. Kruger's German-*cum*-Boer designs. The President was much annoyed. He published a protest against the occupation, claiming that the cession of Swazieland gave him the right to Zambaan's land—a tributary chief of the Swazies, who held territorial rights over the ground in question.

There is no doubt that, had he made an effective occupation, his arguments would have proved somewhat difficult to refute unless we were prepared to come to ultimatum point.

Meanwhile he was keeping his eye on the Cape and Orange Free State Railways, which were actively competing against the Netherlands South African Railway. To stop this, he authorized the alteration of the tariff between the junction at Vereeniging and Johannesburg, a short distance of about forty miles (this was a breach of his verbal understanding with Sir James Sivewright), so that it became impossible to import goods by this route in competition with Delagoa Bay. The Cape Railway people thereupon adopted ox and mule transport between the junction and Johannesburg, hoping to force Mr. Kruger's hand; but he retaliated by closing the Drifts. A great deal has been made of the fact that on this question the Bond Ministry and Mr. Schreiner were prepared to go to war with the Transvaal. As a matter of fact, the position did not give the slightest cause for anxiety in Pretoria. Mr. Kruger would bluff to the end, but he was not prepared for war, and the only effect of the ultimatum, to which he promptly acceded, was to hurry on his military preparations. The Drifts were a small thing; if Uitlander grievances had been tacked on to the ultimatum, it would have been another matter. Still, it was a grateful change in British Government policy, and was the first occasion it had talked straight to the Transvaal Government since the Warren Expedition. Mr. Chamberlain was making his presence felt at the Colonial Office.

The new spirit that seemed to be awaking in England alarmed Mr. Kruger. Before it became too late he hurried on his preparations to meet eventualities. Dr. *Leyds was* despatched to Europe to patch up relations

and secure alliances if possible, while armaments were increased, and the building of forts seriously commenced. As a matter of fact, the military equipment of the Transvaal to-day may largely be traced to this impetus. The Jameson Raid really only served to justify preparations which were already begun, as a necessary condition of Mr. Kruger's policy, which involved, if and when necessary, the fighting for Boer supremacy.

Meantime things were booming in Johannesburg, and few would have thought that the time was rapidly drawing near when the long-threatened revolution would become an accomplished fact. It was known in Pretoria towards the beginning of November, 1895, that some move was taking place, but no importance was attached to it in Government circles. The mere fact that things were so good on the Share Market effectually silenced suspicion. Towards the end of that month one of the Loyalists in Pretoria was approached by the Hon. J. W. Leonard, and asked to assist. Although he had completed arrangements which involved his leaving for Europe, he promised to stay and take the loss on condition that the movement was run on a working man's basis, practically on the lines of 1894. It was pointed out that the leadership of the capitalists would be fatal, as the Government papers were already using the old arguments of 'Capital versus Labour' with telling effect, and although influence might secure a certain number of adherents, yet there would be no heart in the affair as proposed. The question of the flag was discussed, and it was mentioned that no enthusiasm could be raised in Loyalist circles in Pretoria by the hoisting of the Vierkleur (the Transvaal flag) by the Reformers. At a meeting at the Rand Club, called to finally decide if there was anything in the suggestion, the gentleman in question was informed that it was too late to change the plans

adopted, and he therefore declined to take any part in the movement, which he felt was foredoomed to failure. In this his views were absolutely correct, and if the Boers had attacked Johannesburg the men would have had no heart to fight them; they were keenly alive to their hardships, but they had no confidence in capitalist leaders. The working men were Loyalists to a man, and if there was to be a change they wanted a change of flags; they had no interest in fighting for a Republic, with perhaps Mr. J. B. Robinson as President. When Jameson crossed the border they merely felt that there was a countryman in danger, who was accompanied by Imperial officers ready to help them; they thought then the flag must be all right ultimately, and without considering for one moment the rights or wrongs of the Raid, they would have fought to the end.

The capitalists had seen what the public were like when aroused in 1894, and they openly said, 'If the public were so easily aroused then, we can do the same at any moment ourselves.' In this they were grossly deceived. They had allowed those feelings to become dormant, and they could not be awakened by *their* resuming the education at the point where it was broken down by the opposition of Mr. Kruger and themselves.

Mr. Rhodes' plan was bound to fail unless he made provision for armed Imperial assistance to fall back upon. He preferred the Jameson method, which was unjustifiable in any case, unless the troops were moved by Imperial instruction. Even if successful, it would have caused serious reflection on our want of good faith. If the Boers had been raiders, we had no business to descend to their level. Besides, the consequences of failure had not been considered. What they were we know to-day: the certain ruin for a considerable period *of the whole of* South Africa.

The gentleman above referred to made an attempt to warn Mr. Rhodes of the position in Johannesburg. Armed with a strong letter of introduction, he tried to warn Mr. Rhodes to do nothing until he had satisfied himself that the state of affairs was as represented. The small circumstances of his having to catch his boat, the train being late, and Mr. Rhodes having left his town office, prevented his seeing him. Probably his efforts would have been useless anyhow, but he blames himself to-day for not losing his steamer in the hope of saving the situation. As showing his views on the matter, one of the Reformers—Captain Donald—was bidding him good-bye, when the latter gentleman said: 'I hope that you are wrong in your opinion; but I intend to be at the storming of the fort at Pretoria, and if I fall, see that my grave's kept green;' to which he replied: 'You will never even see Pretoria.' It must have been clear to everyone on the spot; in fact, few of the Loyalist section were at all deceived in looking upon the whole plan as hopeless, on account of the want of care which had been displayed in its organization.

In the following chapter we shall endeavour to show the exact position in which Mr. Rhodes, the Imperial Government, and Mr. Chamberlain stood with regard to the Revolution and the Raid.

CHAPTER XIII

THE FALSE STEP

WE hope we have made the connection clear between 1894, 1895, and 1899. The year 1894 saw the awakening of the Imperial spirit in South Africa. This sentiment had been slumbering for thirteen long years, and now awoke to the necessity of sweeping away the tyranny of Krugerism. It is true the Loyalists failed in attaining the object in view, but their efforts were not entirely thrown away. Thinking men in South Africa became convinced that the Empire was in danger. Our representative was losing no opportunity of pointing out to the Home Government that something must be done, and that soon. The Uitlanders' Association of Pretoria spared no pains to educate the British public and Government. To avoid being dependent solely on Reuter's Agency, measures were taken to secure the representation of the leading news agencies at the capital, while every week the journalistic members of the association took it in turns to describe the course of events and the machinations of the Government. It was felt this was the only way to counteract the malicious falsehoods which Dr. Leyds was spreading through his subsidized press in Europe. Much was done in this direction by the Loyalists of Johannesburg, although the National Union could *effect little* officially, as its constitution prevented it

from attempting in any way to subvert the independence of the Republic, and its existence ceased so soon as it became apparent that it was useless to hope for the realization of the objects for which it had been formed.

That it would have been better if the leaders of the organization in Pretoria had been consulted by the heads of the Reform movement goes without saying. Admitting that they could not see their way to support a Rhodesian or a capitalistic movement, the secret would have been quite safe in their hands. But as they did not belong to the moneyed or the influential classes, and some of them were looked upon wrongly as being too headstrong, they were passed by until it became too late to adopt any plans which they might have suggested, plans which, in the opinion of the Uitlanders' Association, were vital to the success of the movement.

We do not propose to touch on the Raid at any length; the various telegrams which were published by the Select Committee show that the real failure of the movement was the neglect to seize the fort and arsenal at Pretoria, with its 10,000 rifles and ample ammunition, at the time agreed upon. While admitting that there was no enthusiasm for reform under the republican flag, which was detested by a large portion of the population, yet if a bold attempt had been made to seize the points of vantage, as well as the person of the President, things might have turned out differently. Assuming the attempt had failed and the few men involved were captured by the Boers, there was a basis for British, or even Jamesonian, interference. If successful, the revolution was achieved. The very daring of the act would have drawn men together, and the fact that they had been prepared to risk their lives would have shown the people that they were not blindly following men whose interests were mainly

those of the pocket. Everything had been prepared for this part of the programme, both within and without, and the means of carrying it into effect were within reach of the Reformers, when the unfortunate difference of opinion regarding the flag cropped up. It ought to have been ignored for the moment, and, with the means available, matters precipitated, instead of losing the opportunity. In 1894 the Secret Committee in Johannesburg had also discussed the question of the flag, and it was then pointed out that the hoisting of the Union Jack might embarrass the English Government. A Scotchman, 'one of many in the organization,' said at once, 'Well, then, let us use the Scottish flag, and when things are settled we can run up the old flag if the English Government will have it.' The trouble now was that, while one lot of men—those with little to lose of worldly goods—were eager to get to business, the other—those with means—failed to come to the scratch, chiefly because they were divided.

A celebrated adventurer from South America, asked what were the elements of a successful revolution, replied, 'I have been in twelve revolutions, nine of which succeeded and three failed. In the nine which succeeded we hanged the President first!'

In that remark lay the whole secret of success; unless Pretoria were rendered harmless, the danger was not worth risking, a fact well known to the waverers. Once the arms and the hostages had been secured, everything was simple.

In the middle of December it was known in Reform circles that affairs were unsettled in Europe, Germany being slightly alarmed, and the Venezuela negotiation causing trouble; the time to temporize had passed; now was the psychological moment to make up your mind either to sit down quietly under the burden, or to *strike and* strike home.

To try to remedy things by the mad rush over the border, which constituted a grave breach of international law, was of course a most foolish act, doubtfully justifiable by success; and the Reformers have some ground for their complaint that it placed them in an entirely false position. Nothing but serious blame can be accorded to the officer who brought with him the whole of his official correspondence and private code, which fell into the hands of the Boers, and who subsequently made affidavits certifying to the correctness of certain incriminating papers.

It is difficult to understand how Dr. Jameson could have persuaded himself to believe that Johannesburg would assist him. It was apparent before he left that Johannesburg would do nothing without a leader, and it was his play to hurry there and fill that gap.

The surrender and disarmament of Johannesburg followed, and ended this miserable chapter in South African history. The position of the Imperialist party was hopelessly compromised, and the masterly way in which the crafty old President handled his cards produced a revulsion of feeling in his favour throughout the world, which was only relieved when he, as usual, overacted the part.

It would have taken him years to perfect the realization of his scheme for a great South African Republic, while this one day almost succeeded in doing it. Suddenly he had with him the support of the whole of the extreme Africander population of South Africa, who really wanted only a little persuasion. All that Mr. Rhodes had done to stem the tide of this sentiment was thrown away, and Mr. Kruger was placed in a position which enabled him to prepare for the moment when he hoped 'to stagger humanity.'

The Raid would have been a mistake from an Imperial point of view even if it had succeeded, and it

would have served to establish a Republic bitterly anti-English as a whole. The Imperial Government would have been bound in honour to interfere in such a way as to practically proclaim a state of war against the Uitlanders, and certainly against the Raiders, and, of course, British subjects in South Africa would have looked on this as a breach of faith and another betrayal. Feelings would have run very high, and have stultified every effort at compromise, with the result of a Republic on American lines—a development which Mr. Rhodes, so his friends say, would certainly not have welcomed. Failure, although it effectually alienated Africander subjects, compromised England in the eye of the world, and made war in the immediate future a certainty, was perhaps the best that could happen.

It may be truthfully contended that war would have resulted in any case from the policy of Mr. Kruger, but it would have found us better prepared than it has to-day, when our hands have been tied for years by the actions of our countrymen. It is to be regretted that the British Government did not reply in some way or other at an earlier period to the armed menace which was being slowly and surely created by the Transvaal. The failure to do so was apparently due to Sir Hercules Robinson, who must have lost his head at the time when he most required it.

The news of this second Majuba threw the British public at home and in the colony into a ferment of rage, which unfortunately was vented on the Uitlanders, who for the most part were totally unaccountable for the course things had taken. Then suddenly the Boer-*cum*-German policy found expression in the celebrated telegram from the German Emperor. This diverted attention from everybody, even from Mr. Rhodes, who had resigned his office as Premier of the Cape Colony, and revealed the hidden meaning of

things to all. What the Loyalists had been trying to show the English people for years was laid bare in a single moment. In spite of this, the feeling was so strong against the Uitlanders that meetings which had been arranged in their support could not be held. Johannesburg was rechristened Judasburg, and the papers delighted in heaping accusations on its population which were uncalled for and painful in the extreme to those who knew the real facts of the case. The writer, in appealing to a highly placed personage for assistance on their behalf, was informed by that gentleman that he had no personal sympathy with the Uitlanders after their behaviour. When asked if this was to be taken as official, he replied, 'No; those were his personal views.' It is satisfactory to say that gentleman has changed his opinion.

Mr. Rhodes was urged to resign his Privy Councillorship, to go to England and insist on being tried by a court of justice. 'That is his only chance,' said one of his friends; 'if he does so, it will end in his being the most popular man in the British Empire, even if he spends six months in prison.' He was right, and that he was right, is shown by the feeling which was displayed when Dr. Jameson was released. It was the finest answer Mr. Rhodes could have returned to his opponents. It would have placed the British Government in a better position, and vindicated England's status as the home of justice. It is not going too far to say it might have even succeeded in restoring Mr. Rhodes at one bound to his previous honourable position, for, having paid the penalty for an offence which had every Englishman's sympathy, his vindication was certain. Probably he must have even contemplated this step when he left the Cape for England in 1896.

The unsettled condition of Matabeleland, coupled with Mr. Kruger's activity as a republican propagandist,

may of course have furnished reasons for not depriving the Empire at that time of Mr. Rhodes' services. Mr. Rhodes was probably not to blame in the matter; and since then he has indeed atoned for his mistake in being in any way a party to the Raid by minimizing Mr. Kruger's efforts as much as possible. He has spared no pains to show Krugerism to be what it is, as intolerant and barbarous a creed as that of the Mahdi. It is in no small measure due to his efforts that we are fighting to-day instead of a few years hence at greater disadvantage. Every day the Boers were growing in wealth and strength. However hard the task may be, a conflict with them a decade hence would have been an even severer test of the strength and solidarity of the British Empire than it has proved.

There was only one opportunity of avoiding the dread arbitrament of war, and that was the insistence by the English Government on reforms immediately after the Raid, for Mr. Kruger was not quite prepared then, and his plans were only half ripe.

The arrival of the Raiders in England and their subsequent trial is now ancient history. Little notice was taken at the time of the Reformers, but when it was announced that four of them had been sentenced to death, public feeling throughout the world was effectually aroused. Well-informed people knew that it was merely bluff on the part of Mr. Kruger, so that during all the time the opportunity was not lost sight of to press forward Uitlander claims. It is believed that but for the fact that 75,000 troops would have been required in the event of war resulting from our representations, which frightened Sir Hercules Robinson, something might have been done. A private meeting of some eighty to one hundred members of Parliament was held shortly afterwards in Committee Room 19 of the House of Commons, to endeavour to enlist their sympathy on

this and other questions. It was felt that some step ought to be taken, but it was subsequently decided that no move should be made to force the hands of the Government.

Shortly after the South African Association was formed in England, which has done exceedingly good work in educating the British public up to a sense of their responsibilities in South Africa.

One of the worst consequences of the Raid was the treatment of the British representative at Pretoria, Sir Jacobus de Wet. Mr. Chamberlain's South African policy did not require a scapegoat, and his action with regard to the British Agent was cruel and unnecessary. There is surely no disgrace in growing gray in the loyal service of one's country, and we will ask for the indulgence of the reader if we dwell for a moment on the merits of Sir Jacobus de Wet, which cannot be doubted by anyone who was brought into official contact with him.

It will be remembered that in a prior chapter we alluded to the departure of Mr. Ralph Williams, the British Agent at Pretoria, from South Africa. At that time Sir Jacobus de Wet (then on a visit to Europe) was Secretary of Native Affairs in the Cape Colony. Great pressure was brought to bear on him in London to accept the position of Her Majesty's Agent at Pretoria; he finally yielded, although it involved, from a financial point of view, a great sacrifice on his part.

The first matter of importance which engaged his attention was the Adendorff or Banjailand trek, a matter to which we have referred. As is well known, our relations were rather strained with the Boers at that time; in fact, the trek had already started, and the burghers were well on their way, when the British representative stayed its course.

In spite of the fact that prior to Sir Jacobus de Wet's tenure of office the abandonment of Swazieland by Great

Britain had been virtually decided on, he was much averse to such a course, and was enabled to give valuable information with reference to Transvaal methods and the way in which the annexation and the concession business in Swazieland was being worked for the benefit of the Eloff gang (we refer to F. C. Eloff, the President's son-in-law) and others, having objects in view which could not be otherwise than detrimental to English interests. He was instrumental, as has been pointed out, in securing our position in Zambaan's and Umbegesa's land, as also in Amatongaland. It was clearly proved that adventurers and concessionaires, including at least one Englishman of some standing, were endeavouring to sell certain rights and concessions which would have jeopardized England's position on the sea-board, but for the prompt action of our representative in reporting the matter.

The dynamite question was another subject which he handled with skill and ability. As far as we know, all the negotiations in connection with this important matter were left entirely in his hands. This confidence was by no means misplaced, as he succeeded in making Mr. Kruger cancel the concession.

In the same manner he called attention to the National Bank and Mint Concession, which was just as much a breach of the Convention; but as usual, he was not backed up by the invertebrate British Government, and this interference with British interests and danger to our supremacy was allowed to go through. Of his action during the commandeering of British subjects too much cannot be said, as we have shown step by step in the preceding chapters.

His personality and his birth drew towards him the Progressive Africanders, as well as the English residents, who stood by him to the last. Information was furnished to him for transmission to his Government

which they would have divulged to no one other than a man of their own blood, for whom they had the greatest respect and in whom they placed implicit trust. Through him the British Government was kept well informed in advance of any important political move (such as Kruger's Drifts policy), and he would have been invaluable in opening their eyes to the real position of things had he been in the Transvaal after the failure of the Bloemfontein negotiations. It is not too much to say that it would have been unlikely for war to have broken out, as it did, had he been on the spot and able to give Her Majesty's Government ample and reliable warning of its imminence.

Sir Jacobus de Wet was no firebrand, and he often restrained the feelings of the Uitlanders, which would only have landed them in disaster had they been put into effect, exhorting them to rely on the justice of Her Majesty's Government as the only proper and loyal policy.

It has often been wondered why Sir Hercules Robinson failed to press for reforms after the Raid, and Mr. Fitz-Patrick makes a good deal of this in his book 'The Transvaal from Within,' which so ably puts the Reformers' case. As will be remembered, the President refused to discuss reforms while Johannesburg was in arms. His conditions being satisfied by the disarmament of Johannesburg seemed to imply that the discussion would take place. Sir Hercules Robinson, being completely alarmed, would take no steps in this direction, in spite of the emphatic instructions of the Colonial Office. That was no fault on the part of Sir Jacobus de Wet, who did his utmost to persuade him that now was the time to press for reform; and, as a matter of fact, it would have been far better to have left the whole negotiations in the hands of our representative at Pretoria, for the feebleness of the High Commissioner was so

apparent to the Government that he weakened the position assumed by Sir Jacobus de Wet.

President Kruger admitted, in an interview to a reporter, that Sir Jacobus de Wet, 'while holding his post, had not only been loyal to his position, but that Johannesburg owed a great deal to him for his repeated representations, and the political prisoners a great deal more than they knew had been done on their behalf by him.' A testimonial from such a source may not prove very acceptable to-day, but at that time Mr. Kruger was rather a *persona grata* than otherwise with Mr. Chamberlain; it was about the 'How is Mrs. Kruger?' period.

The faithful few—the true Loyalists of Pretoria—had a sorrowful leave-taking when Sir Jacobus de Wet left, and they presented him with a handsome piece of silver plate and an address.

After his retirement, and in recognition of services which few other men could have rendered—services which give him a distinguished and honourable place in the history of South Africa—the Imperial Government somewhat tardily forwarded a communication thanking him for the important assistance he had rendered during his occupation of the difficult position of Her Majesty's representative at Pretoria, and awarding him *a pension of £300 per annum!*

CHAPTER XIV

THE RECKONING

THE day of reckoning had to come, and, as we have shown, the reckoning was a pretty heavy one; aggravated and made worse than it should have been by the action of Mr. Rhodes' friends. The result of their testimony has done more to damage British prestige in South Africa than the Raid itself, and has given Mr. Kruger a plausible excuse for looking on all negotiations of the British Government with suspicion. We refer to the unjustifiable innuendoes which were allowed to creep into the testimony of interested parties with reference to Mr. Chamberlain's alleged complicity in the Raid. The feeling was not so acute prior to the sitting of the Select Committee, which it was hoped would disperse all the rumours so wildly and wilfully circulated: and Mr. Schreiner expressed that hope in his evidence (Q. 3,334) by saying: 'I wanted to say this, that the supposition for the moment, rightly or wrongly (I say wrongly), that such a policy is tolerated by, or has the support of the Imperial Government, lowers the prestige and the honour and dignity of England in South Africa in a way that is lamentable. I do not wish to convey that there is anything like a very large proportion of the people that hold what I consider an erroneous opinion upon that point. But it is not unnatural that those who are most offended in the North (Transvaal) are

most suspicious, perhaps, upon even such a point as that; and what we desire as to that, and what we hope will be the result of the deliberations of this Committee and of the Imperial Parliament, is the vindication of the honour and dignity of the Empire in South Africa.'

It was obviously all-important that not the slightest breath of suspicion should be attached to any of the members of Her Majesty's Government. To see this assertion in its real light, we must consider for a moment the trial of Dr. Jameson and his officers. The Boers were very dubious about the genuineness of this, and anticipated a prejudiced trial on their own methods, knowing that no Boer jury would ever convict their fellows for raiding, which, in the early days, used to be a regular and recognised occupation. To their surprise, they found that English justice knew no favours, and at once a much better feeling was engendered throughout South Africa. But this did not induce Mr. Kruger to relax his preparations, which went on without cessation, and found justification in the eyes of the Boers when, towards the end of 1896, the various statements which had been made by some of the officers during the trial gave them the impression that Mr. Chamberlain, and in all probability the English Government, were involved in the Raid itself.

To ascertain the real facts of the case we have to remember Mr. Rhodes' policy as applied to South Africa. That policy became a sound Imperial one after the acquirement of Rhodesia; it may have been drifting previous to that stage, but then it became fixed. The trouble was that his Imperialism was made conditional; it involved the non-interference of England in South African problems—in fact, the absence there of the Imperial factor. This was sound enough up to a *certain point;* but when the Imperial Government had

at last awakened to a sense of its responsibilities, when Mr. Chamberlain came to the Colonial Office, the Rhodesian policy was no longer called for. It was useful in the case of weak and opportunist Governments, which had been our experience in the past, but it became a dangerous policy if Mr. Kruger had to be pushed to extreme concessions. The assumption that Mr. Rhodes would brook no Imperial interference may be disputed on the ground that he did not object to it on the Drifts question, but there was no question of fighting in that. Mr. Rhodes knew that perfectly well, and by appealing to the Imperial Government he not only discovered the way the wind was blowing there, but he also had an opportunity of gauging the feeling of the Africander party with regard to such action, arguing that if they supported the Imperial Government in that, they might go still further with him.

As will be seen by the reports of the Select Committee, the Transvaal question called for immediate settlement. Mr. Kruger's plans were becoming too apparent. Was such a settlement to be effected internally by Mr. Rhodes, or was the Imperial Government to undertake it? In the one way Mr. Chamberlain would fulfil his greatest ambitions, in the other Mr. Rhodes. All the evidence on the subject goes to show that the British Government had then already determined on an active policy. It was clear that things in the Transvaal were going from bad to worse, and, as we have said, the British Government was kept well informed by the Loyalists with regard to the secret menace which was being prepared. Of course, a firm policy was all that could be desired on behalf of the majority of British subjects in the Transvaal. As a proof of this we take an extract from Mr. Fairfield's letter to Mr. Chamberlain on November 4, 1895,

a month or two before the Raid. He says: 'I do not think that there can be any doubt but that the Transvaal will give way on the immediate question of the Drifts, but that will not end the political unrest. They will have in their hands to-night or to-morrow morning a letter from Montagu White, written after Lord Salisbury's message to him warning them that the British Government is in deadly earnest' (on the subject of Reform).

It now turned out, however, that such a policy would interfere with Mr. Rhodes's plans, which were rapidly maturing, but which were as then a secret confined to himself and a few friends. There can be no doubt that the Colonial Office must have received a hint in some way or other that it was inadvisable to follow an Imperial line in South Africa, but that everything should be left to Mr. Rhodes, who was interesting himself in the matter, and would take all responsibility. The main argument was probably that the Cape Dutch and the Free State Boers would not be controllable in the event of any action being taken, involving in consequence the use of the Imperial forces to clinch the matter. On the other hand, Mr. Rhodes, who only asked for a free hand, and guaranteed Imperial interests in return, expressed the belief that if no interference took place with regard to his plans, 'he thought they would be carried through without bloodshed.' This meant the passive acquiescence of the Colonial Office in whatever he might do.

In the face of these considerations, Mr. Chamberlain was placed in a very awkward position, because it seemed to resolve itself into the question whether his ambition or his patriotism would win the day. Mr. Rhodes had great claims on the British Government; he had saved Rhodesia for the Empire, had turned the *Cape Dutch* for the moment into semi-loyal subjects; he

now asked to be permitted to crown his work with his own hands, and unify South Africa in his own time and in his own way.

When Krugerism had ceased to exist, and that great danger to the Empire had disappeared, it would be a matter of indifference as to who had done the deed. Mr. Rhodes seemed likely to be able to carry out his plans, and, as there was no reason to doubt his loyalty, it appeared impolitic to hamper him. It meant, of course, that Mr. Chamberlain renounced much of his share in the glory to be won as the Founder of South African unity.

It is gratifying to know that Mr. Chamberlain took up what he thought to be the patriotic course, though it must have been a disappointment to his ambition.

Mr. Chamberlain and Mr. Rhodes have often been bracketed as Empire-builders; but as such their interests cannot always be identical, and their very positions tend to make them rivals. Therefore a very considerable self-sacrifice was involved in surrendering to the Rhodesian arguments.

It reduced the part to be played by the Colonial Office to that of a looker-on, merely giving warnings as to the European or American barometer, unprepared to discountenance so-called revolutionary as discriminated from Raid methods, and at the same time unable to do anything much except hope for success.

A doubt must have existed at the Colonial Office as to Mr. Rhodes' loyalty to the Empire, even after it was decided to leave matters to him. The Colonial Office did all it could to make sure that Mr. Rhodes was not working his plans on a republican basis, and went so far as to elicit this cable from him, dated November 6, 1895: 'As to English flag, they must very much misunderstand me at home. I, of course, would not risk

everything as I am doing excepting for British flag.' This placed Mr. Rhodes in a very good light; but it proved that he did not know the men he had to deal with in Johannesburg. Those Reformers, with exception of the Loyalists, declined to use the Transvaal flag as a subterfuge, considering that it would have been impossible to alter that flag once they had successfully run it up. In 1894 the Loyalists had proposed a compromise, but on very different grounds; and there was no pseudo-republicanism about that proposal.

Assuming that Mr. Chamberlain gave Mr. Rhodes practically a free hand in South Africa on grounds which seemed to him dictated by patriotic considerations, there is not the slightest shred of evidence to prove that Mr. Chamberlain had any prior knowledge of the Raid. His actions go to prove that it came as a great shock to him, and in spite of the remonstrances of Mr. Rhodes, he did not hesitate to take the only course which was possible to a man who had been no party to the filibustering.

Mr. Chamberlain's dignified diplomatic attitude at the time; his adoption of the only right course in repudiating Jameson; his instructions to Sir Hercules Robinson 'to leave no stone unturned to prevent mischief'; his foresight; and his firmness on the subject of foreign intervention, which had been foreshadowed by Miss Shaw, entitled him to everyone's respect as a statesman. Mr. Rhodes' failure gave him his chance; Mr. Rhodes' methods had failed, and now South Africa recognised that the struggle was limited to Mr. Chamberlain and President Kruger.

We have striven to give some faint idea of what the position was when the collapse came, which left in the hands of certain persons secrets which, while in no way *derogatory to* the honour of the Colonial Office, were

yet sufficiently ambiguous to awaken the suspicions of the distrustful Africanders in South Africa, and were calculated to create a very bad impression as to our good faith on the Continent. The extent of the 'secrets' possessed by these parties would seem to be confined to the messages which passed through Mr. Fairfield, both verbally and in writing; but whatever were the nature of those communications, they should have been kept hidden, and no hint even given that they existed. It was a case of suppressing information which it was not in the public interest to disclose. The mere fact that it is admitted to-day that much which took place at that time has tarnished our reputation condemns in itself the disclosures made. If there was some carelessness in the mentioning of names in the cables, the blame did not lie with the men who had been acting in the best interests of the country. The correct course to prevent the slightest slur resting on the Government was for Mr. Rhodes to have muzzled his lieutenants, and make a determined effort to show at all risks that the Colonial Office had not the slightest inkling of his plans. As he failed in the execution of his plans, so he failed here again to rise to the situation.

The testimony of Mr. Hawksley and others at the Select Committee, and after, has done irreparable injury in South Africa. Personal antagonism, private ambitions, do not justify the use of weapons which not only damage the individual, but strike at the credit of the country. There is not a Boer in the Transvaal who does not firmly believe to-day that Mr. Chamberlain was over head and ears in the Raid, and nothing will convince him that this is not so. The mere fact that persons implicated, either from design or inadvertency, strove to prove this was quite sufficient evidence for them, just as it has been, one grieves to admit, for a large section of the British public.

The regrettable consequence has been that Mr. Chamberlain has been hampered from the first in his negotiations with the Transvaal. This feeling of mistrust went so far as to engender the absurd belief that Sir Alfred Milner is a tool of Mr. Rhodes. The Raid gave the President an excuse for all his actions, and the Boers looked upon it as a deliberate attempt by the English Government to steal their country by dishonourable means. They regarded Sir Alfred Milner's negotiations merely as veiled attempts to do the same, and declined to give him the slightest credit for striving to find a settlement of the many questions at issue. The Kruger clique of course did everything they could to kindle this feeling, and thus the Progressives were driven into the enemy's camp.

While touching on the evidence of the Select Committee, we wish to make one or two further observations before bringing this chapter to a close; and in doing so we wish it to be distinctly understood that none of our remarks apply to Miss Flora Shaw, whose evidence was given admirably, and was much appreciated by loyal South Africans. That talented lady has, like Oom Paul, the great gift of using language to conceal her thoughts—a most useful talent in a diplomatist. An instance of this occurred many years ago, when Miss Shaw visited South Africa, which made the Loyalists of the Transvaal look upon her for a long time as pro-Boer. Such belief was caused by the fact that she was the guest of Mr. A. H. Nelmapius, to whom we have alluded in our chapter on concessions; she was also made much of by Dr. Leyds and the Kruger group, who kept her as much as possible aloof from outside opinion, in which, judging from subsequent events, they were not successful. The reasons which justified the thought among the Loyalists were, *firstly, that* they suspected those who surrounded her,

and, secondly, that she was a strong advocate for the abandonment of the Swazies. In that her unflinching devotion to Mr. Rhodes is apparent. We can all admire the fidelity and honesty of purpose, coupled with the resolve to be worthy of the trust which was reposed in her, which characterized her evidence before the Select Committee.

The most interesting points elicited in Mr. Rhodes' evidence were the proofs of German activity in the Transvaal. If a treaty did not exist at that time, binding Germany to assist the Transvaal, it was thought there must have been an oral understanding; but although the most strenuous attempts were made to prove this to be the case, no evidence could be obtained on the subject. The tone of Baron van Marschall's despatch to Lord Kimberley, dated February 1, 1895 (see Appendix D), would imply that it was not the first time that Germany had interfered in South African matters. There seems to be no shadow of a doubt that such was the case in 1894, when we made such a complete surrender to the Boers. Some light is thrown on Sir Graham Bower's action at that time by the following extracts from the evidence in the inquiry:

'2,484. MR. SECRETARY CHAMBERLAIN: Now, did you anticipate that these troubles might lead to a change of Government in the Transvaal? [in 1894].—My feeling in the matter is this, or was this at any rate, and it is also still the same: that it was contrary to British interests to establish an Anglo-Saxon republic up there. An Anglo-Saxon republic would, by its example, as well as by its influence, strengthen and promote republicanism in South Africa,' etc.

'2,485. SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT: I cannot hear what you say.—It was not making republicanism popular; I mean the existing Hollander Government

in the Transvaal. An Anglo-Saxon democratic Republic would, by its example, as well as by its influence, make republicanism popular, and thus weaken the British connection; and therefore, although it seems a cynical thing to say, I felt that British interests would be best served by the maintenance of the existing Government.'

What an admission! There is no doubt this foolish idea, which must have been known to Lord Loch, and may have influenced him, has had grave consequences. At that time the Loyalists did all they could to show the High Commissioner that they wanted a change of flag. The demonstration at Pretoria on the arrival of Sir Henry Loch centred round the flag, and if he had obtained their rights for them without bloodshed, their efforts would have been devoted to completing that confederation which was the goal of their ambition.

A good deal of abuse was showered on Mr. Schreiner's head in connection with his evidence on the subject of Uitlander grievances, much of it undoubtedly well deserved. It is a matter for surprise that Mr. Schreiner, as a lawyer, was not better acquainted with the facts concerning the interference with the independence of the High Court (3,606) involved in the release from prison of Mr. A. H. Nelmapius on an order of President Kruger; a most serious matter, causing the resignation of Judge Brand. Even while admitting this fact, he denied that there was any general grievance, forgetting the Doms and McCorkindale cases, and disputing Chief Justice Kotze's action in regard to the testing right as applied to laws in the Transvaal. It was common knowledge that the President had on several occasions interfered in one way or another with the course of justice (see Appendix J). All Mr. Schreiner did was to admit

on pressure a minimum of Uitlanders' grievances, in which connection we quote, in Appendix E, a letter and cable sent at the time by the Uitlanders' Association of Pretoria on the subject. This was supplemented by a contradiction of his evidence on the Educational system, by Messrs. Caldecott and Robinson, of the Johannesburg Education Council. As an illustration of the petty persecution to which the Transvaal Government would go in this direction may be instanced the case of a Miss Robbins, who had a school outside the Government scheme. This lady rented a room for the purpose from the Netherlands Railway, but in consequence of her refusal to come under Dr. Mansveldt's wing, notice was given her to vacate the premises, and only with the greatest difficulty did she succeed in getting another suitable place.

It is hard to understand Mr. Schreiner's policy when we see him admitting the knowledge of President Kruger's ambitions (4,080, 4,081): 'President Kruger has the contrary ideal [to confederation], probably, of an extension of republican principles. I should say so. I have not got it from himself; but judging of his policy, I should say he isolates himself in his Republic, and would like to see the republican principles extended.' Questioned under what flag, he says: 'Not the Dutch flag; he has his own flag; and the Orange Free State has quite a different flag; but probably a South African flag which would be the flag of what he would call a free nation, whatever the quarterings might be upon that flag,' etc. This shows that Mr. Schreiner must have been alive to Mr. Kruger's intentions; and yet what steps have he or the Africander Bond taken to point out the dangers to England of such aspirations, or to warn the Imperial Government with regard to the immense accumulation of arms, ammunition and artillery (some of which he

was himself instrumental in transmitting)? For this want of fidelity to his trust he is assuredly to blame. Surely it must be in accordance with the traditions and the necessities of high colonial office for the Premier of any colony to keep Her Majesty's Government informed of events of this nature—events likely to shift the balance of power in South Africa and to constitute a serious menace to the Empire.

The interests of the colony and the interests of the whole Empire should both be ever equally present to all holding such high office.

CHAPTER XV

KRUGERIAN METHODS

It is doubtless difficult for an Englishman who has been brought up to value the privileges he enjoys —the constitution of his native land—to understand how Mr. Kruger has been able to turn his position, as the ruler of a State, to his personal advantage. The simple, pious Boer, as he is supposed to be, should be free of the chicaneries of the wicked and unscrupulous. It is not natural that, owing to this very simplicity, Mr. Kruger should have obtained a position of almost absolute authority amongst his ignorant countrymen. When it suits his purpose, he can be mild and suave, full of wit and humorous badinage. The language (*taal*) he uses is very favourably constructed for such purposes; it is familiar to his hearers in all its shades and inflections, and his admiring audience fully appreciate his homely metaphors, framed upon their everyday surroundings. That is the tone which Mr. Kruger adopts when he wishes to secure the concurrence of the Volksraad in some scheme upon which he has set his heart, but which can only be realized through the intervention of the Legislature. Should the members not see eye to eye with him, and dare to oppose in open Raad, his wrath is speedily aroused, and his naturally harsh voice becomes a spluttering roar, which prostrates the victim of his displeasure.

It usually happens that when any measure of importance is to be carried or rejected by the Volksraad, the subject is discussed in all its bearings by members meeting privately at the President's house. It has frequently occurred that when a law, or a portion thereof which did not meet with the approval of the majority, would be likely to be thrown out, if voted upon at the time, it has been discussed up to the hour of the adjournment, and those members who were wavering between humouring the President and doing justice to their constituents have been brought into a proper frame of mind upon the stoep of the President's residence.

Sometimes, when the pill has been rather too large or not sufficiently gilded, the Volksraad has stood upon its dignity, and administered an open rebuke to the President; but their righteous indignation rarely survived the coffee and pipes, and orders given during the evening séance in the President's drawing-room were seldom disregarded. Rarely only has a member with a regard for his own interests and some courage, as well as a good cause, stood up against Mr. Kruger in the Volksraad, treating with equal contempt oily words and bombastic threats, and this has invariably resulted in an appointment having been found for him of a permanent character and carrying a good salary.

Mr. P. G. Mare secured the Landdrostship of Boksburg, and Mr. G. Du Toit the Landdrostship of Middelburg, simply because their criticisms in the Volksraad of the measures of the Government was distasteful. But these gentlemen do not furnish the only instances in which a well-timed opposition to the Government has been productive of substantial good to the recalcitrant legislator. Credit was given to them for the possession of some sort of independence and honesty, which made their attacks upon Government *measures* more telling with the public than otherwise

would have been the case, while their subsequent conduct gives reason to the conjecture that their attitude of hostility was a carefully prepared plan for their personal aggrandisement.

The 1893 election, when President Kruger was really ousted by General Joubert, although at the close of the heaviest poll that had ever taken place in the country he headed the list of votes by about 800, was a result attained largely by the means alluded to. That result was not allowed to pass unchallenged, and charges being made of wholesale personation and other political crimes, the matter was remitted for investigation to a committee of the Volksraad. A considerable number of Kruger votes were struck off on revision; but the Commission declined to go into the question of illegal practices upon the ground that it was not desirable to maintain the agitation, and so cause division amongst the burghers. Mr. Kruger's election was thereupon confirmed by the Volksraad, and he was re-established in the Presidential chair.

The Government immediately introduced a law prohibiting the formation of election committees amongst the burghers, thus nullifying any future attempt to educate the people upon public questions of importance as a means to guide them in their choice of a properly qualified head of the State. By this method the whole conduct of the elections in the Republic was thrown into the hands of the enormous army of Government officials, Landdrosts, and Veldcornets, who were almost without exception the creatures of Mr. Kruger, owing their appointments to his favour, and naturally enough taking upon themselves the voluntary duty of influencing more or less directly the votes of the burghers. That they were successful to an extraordinary degree was shown at the last election, when 12,000 votes were polled for Mr. Kruger, whilst his

opponent, Mr. Schalk Burger, registered but few more than 3,000, notwithstanding the efforts of his party and all those who were honestly desirous of appointing a more enlightened ruler than Mr. Kruger.

Mr. Schalk Burger favourably impressed the Uitlander population by his conduct during the sittings of the Industrial Commission appointed by the Government to investigate the truth of the grievances under which the Uitlanders suffered. The report of the Commission was eminently satisfactory, as it was proved by fact and figure that the complaints of the alien population were well founded and required to be remedied. This result was so unexpected by the Government as to cause uneasiness, and the report was sent to the Volksraad committee, to be reconstructed, in defiance of the rules of the Legislature. But, as usual, President Kruger had his way, and in the end the valuable report was shelved. Mr. Burger had established a reputation for level-headedness, and a just intention towards the Uitlander, which it was hoped would not be without influence in bringing about his elevation to the Presidential chair; but that hope was defeated by the very complete organization of officials in the pay of the Government, which was infinitely stronger, and brought into far closer connection with the burghers than any temporary political committee could have been.

In this manner Mr. Kruger has been able to maintain an almost impregnable position in the Legislature, from which he weeded out dangerous members, firmly established by the corrupt management of his own election campaign upon the apparent unanimity of the people as to his desirability as President. He did not confine himself, however, entirely to the milder and less obtrusive methods mentioned, and where they failed he did not shrink from practising intimidation, unfortunately with success during later years; and the

impunity with which he has been allowed to act in defiance of the constitutional law of the State in matters of importance has emboldened him even to attack the tribunals of justice in the Transvaal.

It is desirable to enter upon that question in some detail, in consequence of its tremendous import to every inhabitant of the Transvaal, whether burgher or Uitlander. The necessity of the maintenance of even-handed justice, free from political influences, is self-evident to every rational being, and yet Mr. Kruger, secure in his position, had the temerity to tamper with the foundations of society, of public order, and the security of life and property in the State of which he is the head.

It very unfortunately happened that Chief Justice Kotze and his then colleagues upon the Bench, by their judgments in the case of 'McCorkindale *v.* the State' and 'Doms *v.* the State,' had recognised as law the resolutions of the Volksraad, by which the cases were summarily disposed of, the defendants barring the avenue to a legal decision upon the validity of their claims. The late judge, Mr. Samuel Jorissen—a son of the present Judge Jorissen—pronounced a dissentient judgment, but the majority of the Court carried the day, and both McCorkindale and Doms were deprived of some very valuable property without chance of appeal. In the Doms case summonses were issued, and the cause ripe for trial, when the Volksraad, with but little discussion, passed a resolution prohibiting the Court from proceeding to investigate a claim for the declaration of rights. There can be little doubt that the Chief Justice, holding that the Volksraad was what it claimed to be, 'the highest power in the land,' honestly recognised as good in law the authority claimed for a Volksraad resolution, framed on the spur of the moment, and intended to meet a temporary emergency. At a later period the question came up

again for argument in an appeal from the decision of the Circuit Court judge at Johannesburg, in the matter of 'The State *v.* Hess,' and after a laborious investigation of authorities Chief Justice Kotze pronounced an elaborate judgment, admitting that in the cases of McCorkindale and Doms the decisions given by himself and Judge Ewald Esselen were wrong, and out of accord with constitutional principles. It is greatly to be regretted that the inconsistency of the earlier judgments with the later one placed an instrument in the hands of Mr. Kruger to subordinate the temple of justice to his will for the furtherance of his own designs.

Some time in the latter part of the year 1895 President Kruger began the exercise of his system of intimidation, and he interviewed the Chief Justice upon the subject of Volksraad resolutions (see Appendix H for a narrative of the proceedings at that interview). It will be seen that at that time Mr. Kruger threatened to suspend the Chief Justice and his colleagues from their position on the Bench if the validity of Volksraad resolutions were questioned on the ground of their being unconstitutional. Later a case came before the High Court of the Transvaal, 'Brown *v.* the State,' in which heavy claims were made for damages consequent upon the action of the Government in withdrawing a proclamation with regard to a public gold-field. After a lengthy trial the Court pronounced a judgment adverse to the contention of the Government, and reaffirming the right of the Court to decide upon questions of the validity of resolutions passed by the Volksraad as law of the Republic. In this judgment also the Chief Justice most courageously maintained and justified his recantation of his former error, notwithstanding that he had the threat impending over his head of summary dismissal from office in the event of *his proving* obdurate. To depose Mr. Kotze at once

was too dangerous a step to take, and acting on the astute advice of Dr. Leyds, then State Secretary, a law was introduced into the Volksraad, and carried through all its stages in three days. This law is the infamous production known as Law No. 1 of 1897, and was designed to place the Judicial Bench under the thumb of President Kruger, aided by a corrupt Legislature.

It was not long after the passage of this law that the President began to put its provisions into operation by demanding from the judges a categorical statement of their acceptance of the new oath, which they would be compelled to adopt as a condition of their remaining on the Bench. The judges unanimously agreed in a reply virtually declining to give any assurance to the Government on the subject. The present Chief Justice Gregorowski declared 'that so long as that law remained on the statute-book no honourable man could sit on the Bench.' But this same gentleman did not find his honour a barrier to retaining his judgeship, and one by one the other judges forfeited their pledge to stand by the Chief Justice in his fight with the Government on constitutional grounds. Mr. Justice Ameshoff, a Hollander, distinguished himself honourably by resigning his position as puisne judge of the High Court, thereby vindicating his integrity, and, although perhaps the poorest of the Bench in a financial sense, sacrificed a comfortable salary without even the prospect of appreciation by his confrères or the public. His act of self-abnegation is more worthy of regard, as it naturally tended to sever him from the companionship of many of his fellow-countrymen, who, whatever they may think of the motives and the actions of the Government, possess the valuable gift of being able to stick with grim tenacity to their places and emoluments.

The Uitlanders were stunned by the assault made upon the independence of the High Court, and every

legal practitioner, Bar and side-Bar, enthusiastically supported Chief Justice Kotze after his dismissal from office by order of the President.

About £6,000 was subscribed by the public in Johannesburg as a testimonial to that gentleman for his maintenance of the independence of the Court over which he had presided for nearly a score of years, but popular opinion had no value in the eyes of the Pretorian autocrat.

Before the final step was taken in the dismissal of the Chief Justice, Sir Henry de Villiers, the Chief Justice of the Cape Colony, made his appearance on the scene. It was thought at first by his Transvaal brethren that he came to lend his powerful aid to get rid of the scandal, but it soon became evident that his sympathies were not with the men who were risking their positions as champions of truth and justice, but rather on the side of those who were perpetrating a grievous wrong, not only on the judges, but on the people at large. After a conference with the judges, he proposed, as a method of getting over the difficulty, that they should address a letter to the President which contained the following clause: 'Their [*i.e.*, the judges'] answer is that Law No. 1, 1897, whatever opinion they may entertain as to its principle, now forms part of the law of the land, and that, consequently, so long as they remain judges of the land they must abide by present and future laws and Volksraad resolutions (*besluiten*), and not exercise the power of testing whether such laws and *besluiten* are in accordance with the Grond-Wet' (written constitution of the Republic). This draft was rejected by the whole Bench, it being clear that to accept it was to abandon the whole case, and recognise the power of the Volksraad to deny justice to litigants, whether burghers or *Uitlanders,* and thus infringe upon the sacred rights

and liberties of a free people. Eventually the following reply was decided upon as a *via media*, by which time and opportunity would be allowed for the final settlement of a great constitutional question:

'*His Honour the State President.*

'HIGH COURT OF THE
'SOUTH AFRICAN REPUBLIC,
'PRETORIA,
'*March* 19, 1897.

'YOUR HONOUR,

'The judges have the honour, in reply to the communication addressed to them on your behalf, and in which a certain question is put to them, to answer as follows:

'They deeply regret that the Honourable the Volksraad has authorized Your Honour to put a certain question to them, and were it not for the existence of exceptional circumstances they would not feel at liberty to give any answer. The exceptional circumstances which justify them to depart from a well-recognised principle are: (1) That the Government and Volksraad have been placed somewhat in a difficult position by a recently pronounced judgment, however honestly and conscientiously given; (2) that the point at issue affects an important constitutional question which seldom comes up for decision; (3) that under the present circumstances of the country a conflict between the legislative and judicial powers should, if possible, be avoided.

'For these reasons the judges feel at liberty to give the following answer: Considering that conflicting decisions have been given by the High Court with regard to the exercise of the testing right, and considering that some of the members of the Court are of opinion that it does not possess this right, and especially

after the clear opinion of the Honourable the First Volksraad on the point, the judges will not test existing and future laws and resolutions of the Volksraad by reference to the Grond-Wet.

'The judges declare this on the understanding that Your Honour will, as speedily as possible, submit a draft to the Honourable the Volksraad, whereby the constitution or Grond-Wet (guaranteeing among others the independence of the High Court) will be placed upon a sure basis, so that no alterations can be made therein than by means of special legislation alone, after the example of the provisions on the subject contained in the Constitution of the Orange Free State. In the drawing up of such a draft the judges are prepared to give the Government and the Volksraad every assistance.

'The judges have the honour to be,

'Your obedient servants,

'J. G. KOTZE.
H. A. AMESHOFF.
E. J. P. JORISSEN.
GEORGE T. MORICE.
R. GREGOROWSKI.'

This was accepted as satisfactory by the President, as it contained the promise that pending the introduction of a definite clause in the new Grond-Wet, by which the Courts of the Republic should be maintained in their independence, the judges would refrain from raising the constitutional question. There is much reason to believe that the judges regretted having made the compromise, but did so hoping that the Government would as soon as possible bring the question before the Volksraad on the lines suggested. In that letter they fulfilled their part of the bargain. It soon became apparent that the President intended to procrastinate

as much as possible, and Chief Justice Kotze, considering it his duty to remind him of the compact entered into, wrote a letter expressing disappointment after the close of the ordinary session of the Volksraad of 1897, and asking for the reasons which induced the Government to depart from the understanding agreed to by both sides. That letter was followed by others, which failed to elicit replies from the Government or the chairman of the Commission appointed to revise the Grond-Wet, and culminated in a last letter of the Chief Justice, dated February 5, 1898, 'stating that as the understanding between the judges and the Government had not been carried out, he considered himself relieved from the obligation to refrain from the use of the "testing right."' On February 16, 1898, the President availed himself of the provision of the infamous law he had forced through the Volksraad at the highest speed possible, and dismissed Mr. Kotze from his office as Chief Justice of the South African Republic. The questionable influence of Sir H. de Villiers in getting a hurried settlement was further shown by the publication of some notes which he made six weeks after the events in which he took part, which enabled the Government to contend that it was not bound to bring the subject before the Volksraad before the ordinary session of 1898. It is greatly to be regretted that he should have interfered either on one side or the other. It is commonly known that Sir H. de Villiers received no invitation from either side to intervene, but there is internal evidence that if not inspired by Mr. Hofmeyr, he certainly visited Pretoria with that gentleman's knowledge. It also appears from Sir Henry de Villiers' statement in the Legislative Council that he forgot to ask leave of absence from the colony, as he is bound to do before going beyond its borders. There are so many discrepancies between the known

facts and statements made with regard to this matter, that it is very difficult to reconcile the one with the other. Suffice it to say that Sir H. de Villiers was an uninvited mediator, that the sum of his services was the strengthening of Mr. Kruger in his determination to make the Law Courts of the Republic subservient to the Government and Legislature, and that the immediate result was to secure the dismissal of Chief Justice Kotze from his position. He has apparently made no effort to remedy the mischief which he wrought by his ill-timed intervention in a matter with which he had no personal concern, but which was one that a constitutional judge of a constitutionally governed British colony might reasonably have been expected to consider with full sympathy. For after all the matter embodied the struggle of justice-loving people against an autocrat whose every endeavour had been to concentrate the most despotic power in his own hands. As a politician of the Africander Bond stamp, Sir H. de Villiers may be deemed to have done a smart thing, and by judiciously flattering the burghers have paved the way for developments which would loom largely the moment Mr. Kruger vacated his position as President of the South African Republic. There had been talk of Sir Henry de Villiers becoming the President of the Transvaal on the near approach of the termination of President Kruger's third tenure of office, a consummation most unlikely now, when the end to Republics in South Africa seems near at hand.

In the Appendix will be found a leading article from the *Transvaal Advertiser* of March 15, 1897, which Chief Justice Kotze in his pamphlet, 'An Appeal to the Inhabitants of the South African Republic,' describes as being 'clear and irrefutable,' and which he 'commends to the earnest attention of all right-thinking men' (see Appendix I). As may be expected

the appeal met with no response from the burghers, and the Transvaal has been deprived of the services of a learned judge, whose decisions have for the most part given satisfaction to the public, and who has built up a reputation for the High Court of the Transvaal of which he and the country might well be proud.

Perhaps the most nefarious of Krugerian methods was the tolerance with which bribery and corruption of public officials and legislators was viewed. It is of course difficult to name specific instances, but it is a fact that officials and Volksraad members suddenly developed tastes which could not be gratified on their salaries or even the sanctioned perquisites of their offices. From the facts which were patent, a system of secret 'presents' to officials and members of the Volksraad had rapidly developed so as to avoid the appearance of direct bribery. The wives and female relations were made the recipients of gifts which it would hardly have been safe to tender direct to their official or legislatorial relatives. An overheard conversation between a Volksraad member and a person desirous of getting some concession passed through the Volksraad was to the effect that the would-be concessionaire was willing to pay £2,000 to secure his object, but the honourable member stated that £5,000 would be nearer the mark. The other responded that when he had paid that amount, together with the accustomed douceurs to officials, there would be nothing left for himself, and he thereupon made up his mind to abandon the project. The member alluded to has usually been considered 'straight' by the public, and would be the last person to be suspected of underhand dealings, but even he has become richer since he was elected to represent an important constituency.

Before leaving this unsavoury subject we must allude

to one more instance of unscrupulous high-handedness on the part of the 'President.' Towards the middle of last year, and just after the termination of the Bloemfontein Conference, a bold attempt was made to inculpate certain persons alleged to be officers holding Her Majesty's commission in the army as conspirators against the State. Some half-dozen persons were arrested during one night and taken to Pretoria, where they were incarcerated in the common gaol, upon a charge of high treason. For some time these persons were kept in prison, and strenuous efforts were made by officials and one or two of the persons arrested to induce the principals to make a confession of guilt or guilty knowledge of a plotting to overthrow the Government of the Republic. With great difficulty the principals managed to communicate with Mr. Conyngham Greene, Her Majesty's Agent at Pretoria, and he took the necessary steps to bring the matter to an issue. The State Attorney, Mr. Smuts, approached Mr. Greene, and offered to withdraw from the prosecution upon the ground that he felt reluctant to proceed against men holding commissions in the British army. Mr. Greene, however, knew what this cunning suggestion meant, and after consulting the Colonial Secretary, Mr. Chamberlain, informed the State Attorney that the British Government insisted upon the matter being sifted to the bottom, and that an advocate was to be appointed to defend the accused. For this purpose Mr. Greene secured the services of Messrs. Tancred and Lunnon as attorneys for the defence, and they appointed Mr. Advocate Duxbury as counsel. The Government was in consequence forced to proceed with the investigation, and preliminary examinations extending over several days took place. It then appeared that some of the secret agents of the Government had been imprisoned intentionally, with

the object of enabling them to gain incriminating evidence, and of becoming State witnesses at the trial. Mr. Duxbury subjected these gentry to such a severe cross-examination as to fully expose the intention of the plot, which was to identify the Imperial Government, through the agency of British military officers, with a revolutionary propaganda in the Transvaal, and thereby justify the hostile attitude which the Transvaal intended to adopt. Through the able efforts of the counsel engaged for the defence the charge broke down completely, and eventually, the Government deciding not to proceed with the case, the accused were released from custody. At this time the authorities of the Republic shrank from no means to further their end, and the case in question seems to us one very nearly approaching to the crime of subornation of perjury. The secret agents, having their instructions from the head of the department, were ordered to make the necessary affidavits against these British subjects so as to set the criminal law in motion; and these same wretches were set on the watch to entrap persons who allowed themselves to audibly condemn the actions of the Government.

The suggestion made by the State Attorney, that he would abandon proceedings if desired by the British Government, is essentially Krugerian. If Mr. Greene or Mr. Chamberlain had fallen into the trap, the Transvaal Government would have claimed that the charge was so absolutely true that the British Government was afraid of the circumstances being dragged into the light of day, and it would have been used as a reason for the earlier declaration of war. As it is, there can be little doubt that the mass of the people believe that it was only by the vigilance of the Government that a serious conspiracy against the independence of the Republic was brought to light, and the

fact of the State Attorney declining to prosecute was solely in deference to the wish of the British Government, and therefore a magnanimous forbearance on the part of the Transvaal. The report on the proceedings at the preliminary examination has been published in a recent Blue Book, and it shows clearly the quality of the means used by the Government in order to gain the desired end.

The circumstances relative to the illicit purchases of gold under the authority of the Government have often been dwelt on, but the charge of purchasing gold amalgam brought against a certain Count de Sarigny, and the State Attorney's interference, is perhaps less generally known. The accused was discharged before any evidence could be adduced simply because it would have involved the Government in the scandalous affair. Sufficient, however, leaked out to show that a system of permits was instituted by which certain persons were held free of damage in case of being detected in purchasing gold. The ostensible reason for the institution of special permits was to ascertain how and by whom the thefts of gold were made from the batteries of the mining companies. That was a sufficient reason for the adoption of extraordinary means in order to ensure the destruction of a system of pilfering which had grown up on the Rand Gold-field. But it is a remarkable fact that not a single amalgam thief has been discovered through this agency, whilst there is reason to believe that the gold bought under special permit has not been less than £750,000 in value. It is difficult to trace gold obtained by theft or by the authorized robbery countenanced by the Government, but it is pretty certain that a considerable amount of the stolen gold found its way to agents stationed at Delagoa Bay, where the price of amalgamated and cyanide gold is *openly* quoted.

CHAPTER XVI

PREPARATIONS FOR WAR

It has been a favourite argument, with those who personally know nothing about Transvaal affairs, that President Kruger did not make preparation for the struggle in which he is now engaged until after the Jameson Raid. That is a very serious error, for it may with truth be asserted that from the time when the goldfields at Barberton and, later on, the Witwatersrand were discovered there have been steady preparations for a conflict with Great Britain. It is quite true that until Jameson showed the Transvaal that it was possible for an invading force to penetrate into the heart of the country, and even to threaten Pretoria and Johannesburg, the construction of forts for the defence of those important centres was not commenced. It is also true that the enormous importations of warlike munitions were carried on after the Raid without disguise, except, perhaps, as to the number and nature of the projectiles and warlike weapons. But it would not be difficult to show that from an early period after the retrocession—in fact, as soon as the revenue afforded it—steps were taken to place the Republic in a position of defiance or defence. There were the Powder Factory and Dynamite Concessions, through which the Government would be independent, it was expected, of explosives of foreign origin, being of im-

portance also for the development of the gold industry, which was the only means by which a large surplus revenue could be secured. It may be said that the armament of the Transvaal with the view to a foreign (*i.e.*, British) war commenced towards the end of the eighties, and has been continued ever since.

At the time when Lucas Meyer and his compatriots made an incursion into Zululand, which resulted in the establishment of a Boer Republic in territory conquered at the cost of many valuable lives and heavy expense by Great Britain, wagonloads of ammunition were sent from Pretoria for his use. The editor of the *Transvaal Advertiser* was threatened with prosecution on account of his having published this fact; but as, fortunately, his information was too precise to be contradicted, he was not only able to defy the Government, but even to add evidence which showed the complicity of the authorities in the attempt to establish the Republics of Stellaland and Land Goshen in the heart of Bechuanaland.

The sending of ammunition to Lucas Meyer in Zululand could, under no circumstances, be regarded as the act of a friendly nation, because it was well known that by the capture of Cetewayo and the dispersal of the Zulu army the pre-emptory claim to the land vested in Great Britain. The Little Englander was then supreme in the councils of the Empire, and the consequence was that Zululand was left open to whoever chose to seize it. The Boers were, of course, not slow to profit by this, and, on the strength of a concession from Dinizulu, the successor of Cetewayo, they possessed themselves of the most fertile portion of the native territory. The territory had at first been offered to Natal, which colony declined the offer with nothing short of monumental shortsightedness. Whereupon the Transvaal accepted this valuable addition

to the area of the Republic with scarcely concealed avidity and with carefully disguised contempt for the stupidity of our Government. The reasons for declining the country were the few thousands a year required for the administration of a territory as large as Great Britain, with a dense native population, only too ready to yield obedience to the conqueror, and to submit to the taxation necessary for the protection of the British flag. Small wonder that the dream of the conquest of the whole of South Africa was indulged in by the Transvaal statesmen! If the British Government did not hold *Z*ululand when it was conquered, and declined to keep it when it was to be had for the asking, was it not likely that a similar course would be followed with regard to other parts of South Africa, especially if the Republic grew to be so powerful as it was the hope of Mr. Kruger to make it?

The first step taken towards that end was the fatuous indifference shown by the British Ministers at the close of the *Z*ulu War, and from then dates the systematic organization of the forces of the Transvaal.

At the retrocession of the country the Boers were armed with a very odd assortment of weapons, from the old-fashioned flint-lock to the more modern Express rifle used for shooting big game. As a first step it was resolved to introduce, as far and as quickly as possible, uniformity in the weapons of the burghers. The first small arm was the Martini-Henry rifle, and as means allowed those guns were imported and issued to the burghers, some paying the actual cost, while others received them gratuitously upon condition of keeping them in good order, and at the instant service of the Government when commandeered.

It is probable that about 200,000 military rifles have been introduced into the Transvaal and the Free State, most of them since the Jameson Raid, which

afforded a reasonable excuse for extensive armament, of which the Government was not slow to avail itself. The war expenditure, as shown by the yearly returns prior to 1895, was comparatively moderate, but there were other items in the returns which were described as 'divers payments' and 'unforeseen expenditure,' which assumed gigantic proportions at times, and for which there was no outward and visible sign of their being mainly for war purposes. There can be little doubt that a fair proportion of the money expended under these heads has gone towards the cost of arming the country, the idea being that with so great a store of war munitions in the Transvaal magazines Great Britain would hesitate about going to war.

Prior to 1885 the Republic had nothing to spare out of its revenue for these purposes, though the arming of the Transvaal against Great Britain began about that time. With millions of pounds sterling to spend in later years, and with the idea of republican supremacy in South Africa growing at an equal rate with the means of apparently carrying it into effect, it is quite natural that the President should pretend that the uneasiness of his people was a sufficient reason for the enormous armament which took place since the Jameson fiasco.

Everything goes to prove that the Raid was a welcome incident, which was skilfully used by the President as a cover for his ulterior design of wresting South Africa from the rule of Great Britain, and placing the Transvaal in the premier position in a new republican federation.

Those who look upon the Boer as a simple-minded and God-fearing peasant scarcely do him justice. He, until lately, knew that, being weak, he had no chance in a death struggle with the mighty power 7,000 miles away, and he foresaw years ago that he

must carefully prepare for the fateful conflict in which he had made up his mind to embark. What he had to do was done in secret, and it was certain that the mass of the people guessed only very faintly the end to which their leaders were conducting them blindly. Nevertheless, the tendency of Krugerian scheming was apparent enough to those who understood his manner of working and could see a little below the surface.

The more recent native wars against Malaboch, the Woodbush chiefs, one of whom, Magoeba, was beheaded, and M'Pefu, the successor to old Magato, whom the Boers never had the pluck to tackle, were intended to accustom the younger burghers to arms in the battlefield. For though the older men had had some experience in the operations against Mapoch and Massouw, the youth of the State had but little opportunity of learning the art of war. If the truth must be told, the rising generation did not show up brilliantly in those campaigns. As usual, the real work of the war was mainly done by the Uitlanders, who either volunteered or went up in obedience to the commandeering of the Veldcornets of their district, and the Staats Artillerie. That is why it was important to get the youths from eighteen to twenty years of age accustomed to the whistle of a rifle bullet or the roar of a shell.

These wars had practically no other justification, and it is a well-known fact that the Kaffirs were shamefully treated by the men set over them by the Government. Native Commissionerships were in great demand by the supporters of Mr. Kruger, as they afforded exceptional opportunities for adepts in the science of unscrupulously acquiring riches. Native wars were promoted on the flimsiest pretences when the rural Boers required employment, and numerous commandos were set on foot for the sole purpose of

capturing children made orphans by the shooting down of their parents. This practice has been so common throughout the history of the Transvaal under Boer régime that very little notice was taken of it either by the public or the Government; many expeditions for this purpose in remoter districts were not even reported at headquarters. A pretended theft of cattle, or some excuse of the kind, was always sufficient foundation for a foray, and the slightest resistance offered by the unfortunate Kaffirs to protect their property was held a good reason for the strongest and most vindictive measures on the part of a commando.

Of late years greater attention had to be given to the arranging of detail, as the newspapers somehow generally managed to get on the scent of the most atrocious of these proceedings. Abel Erasmus, who was denounced by Sir Garnet Wolseley in the strongest terms, was a dexterous hand at the game; but he was so useful a servant of the Government that promotion awaited him instead of punishment. A good deal of misery would have been saved the wretched Kaffirs under his jurisdiction had Sir Garnet Wolseley been able to carry out his threat to hang him if he got him in his power. The Kaffir wars afford everywhere examples of the most callous brutality winked at by the Boer Government, by whom they were undertaken simply as an exercise for the purpose of getting the fighting force of the Transvaal accustomed to life on the battle-field, and ready for the time when the more serious task of bearding Great Britain would have to be ventured upon. This means of acquiring the necessary qualities seemed almost dictated by the absence of sport.

The indiscriminate slaughter of game in times past had deprived the youths of the Republic of the opportunity of becoming marksmen in the hunting-field, and

it was necessary to find some other means of making them skilled shots besides target-shooting for prizes, which was encouraged by Government.

In 1892 some 300 Germans entered the service of the country, and they were followed by others who had had a certain amount of military training in their own country, until some 1,200 were enrolled as mercenaries. This is in itself a proof that the Government had, years before the Raid, other plans in view than the fighting of natives.

The Free State began to arm openly at about the same time as the Transvaal, and for the same ostensible reason. It is not to be forgotten, however, that neither the British Government nor the Uitlanders in the Transvaal had any reason to complain of the attitude of the adjoining Republic until the election of President Steyn. His predecessor, Mr. Reitz, after recovering his health, migrated to Pretoria, and was hailed with joy in the innermost circle of the oligarchy. In his position as State Secretary he is only inferior to the President, and being a man of superior education, he may be said to be in reality the Government. Now, as it has been proved by Mr. Theophilus Schreiner that the object of the Africander Bond in the Free State (of which Mr. Reitz was formerly Chief Justice) was to get rid of the power of Great Britain in South Africa, it will be seen that he had a congenial and powerful ally in the President of the Transvaal, who was permeated with the same desire.

We have already dealt with the closer alliance of the Transvaal with the Free State, which was at one time hampered by the condition that 'before taking up arms in a Transvaal quarrel with a foreign [meaning, of course, Great Britain] Power the cause of their sister Republic should be found just and reasonable.' This being done away with, in spite of the protests of

Messrs. Fraser and Wessels, and other more enlightened members, owing to the action of the majority in favouring Africander Bond principles, the Volksraad decided upon a practically unconditional alliance, with the assurance that the Free State was under obligations to share with the Transvaal whatever good or ill might betide. That accomplished, Kruger's exertions of the previous seventeen years in sowing disloyalty amongst the Free State burghers was at last rewarded with success. Long before any vital question had arisen between the British and Transvaal Governments the emissaries of the Republic had directed public opinion in the Free State upon the question of political alliance, with a view to being prepared for taking a part in the programme of driving the English out of South Africa. The protracted negotiations with the Free State with the definite object of obtaining 'closer union' between the two Republics commenced shortly after the Convention of London was completed by ratification.

As regards the Cape Colony, there is ample evidence that for many years past Transvaal agents have been at work among the farmers inhabiting the north-western districts. Some of these agents have held high positions in Pretoria officialdom, such as the late Henning Pretorius and General Smit. Quite shortly anterior to the war large numbers of persons were sent into the colony and Natal to feel the pulse of the Dutch farming population there. No fewer than thirty young men from the public offices who were known to be good cyclists, and could speak English and Dutch equally well, were sent from Pretoria to gather statistics and report. This was cleverly conceived, for who among the stay-at-home farmers could refrain from opening his heart to a cyclist bound on a pleasure trip, and whose manners and liberality were *so thoroughly* those of a gentleman? There can be

little doubt that through these agencies many among the less enlightened of the farming class were seduced in both colonies—a process aided by the exhortations of the majority of the Dutch Reformed clergy in the country districts, whose influence for good or evil is immense. The propaganda in the Cape Colony is more recent than that set up in the Free State, but it proved to have been so far successful that several thousand rebels were induced to take up arms when the war broke out. Most of these are members of the Africander Bond, and it will in due time be found necessary to break up that organization, whose purpose and ambition it is to encourage anti-English tendencies, and to incite British subjects to rebellion.

The foregoing are the main features of Transvaal policy for many years. There has been no sudden ebullition of feeling against some act of oppression which has led the Republics to regard the existence of British authority as a common and threatening danger. The sentiment has been slowly and persistently worked up for years, and has culminated—as it was intended to culminate—in the declaration of war last autumn.

The Boers were encouraged and helped in this by the negligence of the Cape Ministry in keeping an eye on the enormous amount of armaments going into the Transvaal and the Free State. There can be no excuse for this, because arms and warlike munitions alike had to pass under the very nose of the colonial authorities through Cape Colony to Bloemfontein and Pretoria. The present Cape Government has thereby forfeited every claim to be regarded as loyal to the British Crown, for surely even Ministers should be judged by actions rather than by words. It is a small but insignificant thing that O.H.M.S. was changed to O.P.S. on official documents, and it shows the bent of the Cape Ministerial mind. Why 'On Her Majesty's

Service' should be considered objectionable, and 'On Public Service' preferable, is a riddle which can best be solved by those who are adepts in the solution of political conundrums.

It is fortunate that Great Britain has, in the person of Sir Alfred Milner, a Governor and High Commissioner who is thoroughly well acquainted not only with the tactics of a band of discredited politicians, but also with those who, although in the background, were, even at the outbreak of war, pulling the wires in Cape Colony, with the object of frustrating the efforts of Great Britain to establish equal rights for all white men throughout South Africa. The failure of the Bloemfontein Conference between Sir A. Milner and President Kruger caused in well-informed circles the belief that war with the Transvaal would ensue, a feeling which was shared by most classes of the inhabitantsin that State. A captain in the Staats Artillerie expressed the prevailing opinion as to the proximate causes of hostilities when he said, 'We gave the President a hundred pounds to buy the horse with, instead of which he tried to get it for twenty pounds; now we shall have to fight,' referring to the fact that the Volksraad had given the President a free hand as to the means of completing a settlement with the High Commissioner at the Conference, but that the former had thrown the chance away, and lost the opportunity of arriving at a compromise which would have satisfied Great Britain and at the same time strengthened the Republic. The great fear of the Loyalists, who knew with whom they had to deal, was that the President would accept the very easy terms which were offered, or a modification of them, and that the Conference would have been the means of playing into his hands, and strengthening him in his dream of a 'United *Republican* South Africa.'

The generous advances made were certainly a bold experiment on the part of the British Government; it depended for its success on the gratitude of those British subjects who would be enfranchised, and on their showing their appreciation of the privileges obtained for them by changing a policy of hostility into one of friendship, followed, perhaps, by federation under the British flag.

What convinced the President that he could afford to stand out as he did in the face of Sir Alfred Milner's efforts to bring about a peaceful solution was the 'closer union' and offensive and defensive alliance with the Free State, which assured him that that Republic would be with him if it were wanted. In fact, the feeling in the Free State generally was more bitter and anti-English at this time than in the Transvaal itself. He also reckoned upon his rebel friends in the Cape Colony. Whether the Transvaal spent large sums of money on the Bond elections or not, the fact remains that the President knew that he had the Africander Bond behind him, ready to assist him in every way in hampering the High Commissioner. The statement was authoritatively made by men in high official positions, to reassure people in Pretoria, that 'there would be no war, because a Bond Ministry was in power.' It will be remembered that this cry was raised by the Bond throughout the elections—that unless *they* were returned war with the Transvaal was inevitable, and this plainly pointed to a certain collusion between them and the authorities in Pretoria, who wanted to fight at their own time and in their own way. It is also certain that emissaries were sent from the Transvaal to assist at the elections, and in all probability there were anonymous contributions to the election funds, which the Bond could pretend were the gift of individual members, whilst it was otherwise.

We know of one instance which came to our personal knowledge of a certain agent being sent by the Transvaal Government to agitate on behalf of the Bond party in the Cape Colony at the time of the general election, for which he received £50 per month and expenses. He and his like were often successful; but fear of the consequences, and the fact that the leaders of the party ran too great a risk, prevented the rebellion policy being carried out very openly, and its failure has been a matter of great disappointment on the other side of the Vaal River.

The Bond never loses an opportunity of influencing leading people and journalists when they visit the Cape Colony. To its apparently guileless courtesy, its diplomacy and its tact may be attributed the wrong impressions which well-meaning men may have gathered, when only actual residence in the Transvaal would have revealed the real condition of things. We remember years ago on the occasion of the departure of a well-known lady journalist for Europe, seeing the well-groomed figure of one of the leaders of the party offering a bouquet of flowers to the lady in question. This was characteristic of what had gone before. She had been fêted and made much of upon her arrival in South Africa, and was launched up-country with the best of Bond introductions, to imbibe ideas which were a repetition of those she had heard in Cape Town. The flowers and the cordial adieu were the finishing touch, and the good man of the 'Bond' had made sure that she who would write and influence had seen and known only what it was intended for her to see and know.

That all these schemes should come to naught was very disappointing to Mr. Kruger and his friends. They had laid their plans so well that failure seemed *impossible*. They expected to be in a position to

dictate terms. This was recognised by Sir Alfred Milner, and he quickly took steps to prevent their gaining time for the fruition of their plans. As soon as this became apparent, the preparations for hostilities were carried on apace. In the towns the feeling was strongly against war; in the country districts war was popular, as the farmers had not the slightest doubt they would be able to carry out their threat of 'driving the English into the sea.' The first step was the expulsion from the country of men, women and children who were of British origin.

Skilled artillerymen were finding their way into the country towards the end of August last. The Boers themselves did not put much faith in their artillery, but they were reassured by the officers who told them that they would yet learn to respect its usefulness and efficiency—a prophecy which to our cost has been more than fulfilled. In fact, every credit must be given the Staats Artillerie for the way in which they have handled their guns.

General Joubert was always ready and willing, at any time, to inspect and test new guns or military necessaries, and no expense was spared to make the Transvaal burgher army a first-class fighting-machine. Within the last three years the Martini was superseded to some extent by the Guedes rifle, which did not satisfy the critical Boers, so a Commission reported on all the latest and most improved small arms, and came to the conclusion that the Mannlicher and the Mauser were the most efficient weapons. Ultimately the Mauser was adopted. This rifle has been described so fully that there is no need to refer to it on our part; its supposed advantage over the Lee-Metford consists in the fact that its cartridges are all embodied in a clip, which can be slipped into the magazine at one movement, whereas with the Lee-Metford the cartridges

have to be put in singly, which may be a disadvantage on the battle-field. The Mauser pistol is also undoubtedly the best in the world to-day.

From time to time meetings of the Veldcornets and Commandants were held to arrange the questions of defence or attack. One of these gentlemen assured the writer that all the means of diplomacy would be exhausted to prevent war taking place until the rainy season set in, when they would have plenty of grass for their horses and the roads and rivers would be impassable to the enemy. Then they would fight. To this someone replied jokingly that the British were waiting for water and the Boers for grass!

Surprise has been expressed at the inaccurate statements made by colonials as to the fighting strength of the Boers. They had not allowed for the enormous increase of population. From an absolutely reliable source the writer ascertained in September last that they could put in the field between fifty and sixty thousand men, made up as follows:

Transvaal burghers - - - -	22,000
Resident foreigners, etc. - - - -	10,000
Free Staters - - - - -	16,000
Colonists who would cross the border and join -	6,000
Total	54,000

These figures would be considerably augmented when the Boer forces succeeded in entering either of the colonies.

There is good reason for believing that the President never thought that the British Government was prepared to take warlike measures; but towards the end, as he said himself, the 'riem was round his neck,' and he must either fight or sacrifice his idea of a United South African Republic. The reiteration of the refusal to recognise British suzerainty, which was no doubt a point of great importance, was brought about by the

assurances with which Mr. A. D. W. Wolmarans brought to the Executive from the Free State Government.

Yet there was against him a large number of influential burghers, mostly naturalized British subjects, who realized the consequences of such a war, and these succeeded, with the help of the State Attorney, Mr. Smuts, in getting the Executive to make the much-discussed offer of a five years' conditional franchise. The hitch in the matter was, it will be remembered, the impossible conditions with which the proposal was hampered. It will be remembered that the offer was put forward by the Government without the knowledge of the Raad, and it is more than doubtful whether, in the then state of mind of that body, they would have given it the necessary confirmation, even had the English Government accepted it unhesitatingly. Many were extremely annoyed with the Government for having dared to make such a proposal without their knowledge; the reason being that the country had drunk too deeply of the policy of the President, who had sown the seeds of race hatred so industriously that his people had got out of his hand. Contingencies had arisen which he had never foreseen, and in proclaiming war he was forced to take a step which was in advance of his plans, and the result of which he probably felt must be doubtful.

As soon as war seemed likely, no time was lost in perfecting the military arrangements. Before Great Britain had thought of mobilizing a soldier, the Boer emissaries were again scouring the colonies of Natal and the Cape, sounding the farmers as to what part they were prepared to take in the coming conflict. At Bronkhurstspruit Station, in September last, the writer heard two Dutchmen in conversation on the subject of the war. The one was of opinion that the English would 'climb down'; the other, who gave his

name as one Potgieter, from Natal, said: 'In any case, we are all ready with horse and rifle to join you when required.' A loyal Africander lady met at this time in the train, between Johannesburg and Pretoria, a certain Mr. Marais, a high official of Heidelberg and formerly a Cape Colonist. He told her that he had been sent by the Transvaal Government to the colony to agitate, that he had been to almost all the towns and districts of the Western Province for the purpose of gauging colonial feeling, and he assured this lady that 'they would all join except Kimberley, which had said it would do what the High Commissioner ordered.' His conviction was that as soon as the Federal forces invaded the colony, district after district would join as the Republicans passed through. This was on the last Wednesday in August.

While people at home were wondering what the next move would be, the Boers were ready to answer the question. Towards the middle of September all preparations were completed, the Government had laid in large quantities of supplies (mainly of flour, Boer meal, and tinned foods), which they anticipated would tide them over twelve to eighteen months, and by that time, if they had not beaten the British, they relied on foreign intervention. They had also received large sums of money from Europe, and some additional supplies of arms and ammunition. Ammunition was distributed in large quantities throughout the country, each burgher receiving a sealed packet in addition to his ordinary supply. The last batch of the Mauser rifles was distributed, and the mobilization scheme finally arranged, by which, on a given word being telegraphed to the different centres, the first Republican army corps would be mobilized within twenty-four hours. This actually took place.

The plan of campaign has now been exposed, but

the invasion of the colony seems to have been contingent on the occupation of Mafeking by the Boer forces. The failure to effect this, coupled with the proclamations of the High Commissioner and the fear of consequences to which we have alluded, prevented a general rising in the disaffected districts of the Cape Colony. Too much importance altogether has been attached to what is called the restraining influence of Mr. Schreiner. No influence could restrain men who have the courage of their convictions. Fear has been the great deterrent in districts which the Federal forces (as they call themselves) have not invaded. Where this has been the case the rank and file were in open rebellion; and members of the Government even have acted in a manner calculated to arouse suspicion concerning their motives. Messrs. Van den Heever, M.L.C., Van Wyk, and De Wet, M.L.A., will, we hope, be called upon to explain the manner in which they influenced their constituents during the invasion of Cape Colony.

The British Government could hardly fail to be aware of the fact that the Transvaal was in earnest this time. A visit to the country districts towards the end of August, about the time when the Boer Executive themselves sounded the country through their private agencies, would have revealed the fact that the people were not only perfectly willing to go to war, but that they absolutely wished for it. As one Boer put it to the writer: 'We look on fighting the English as a picnic. In some of the Kaffir wars we had a little trouble, but in the Vryheids Oorlog (the Boer War of 1881) we simply potted the Rooineks as they streamed across the veld in their red jackets, without the slightest danger to ourselves.' They had the utmost contempt for Tommy Atkins and his leaders, many of them bragging that the only thing that deterred them from advocating

war instanter was the thought that they would have to kill so many of the soldiers, with whom individually they said there was no quarrel.

With such a state of things, which should have been perfectly clear to the Intelligence Department (and through it to the War Office) in London—because no resident with eyes to see could be deceived in the matter—*we allowed the present war to find us unprepared!*

CHAPTER XVII

THE END OF KRUGERISM

It may be somewhat premature to say that Krugerism has been weeded out of the souls of the Dutch race in South Africa. The seed has been sown too carefully and its germination attended to with such unremitting assiduity for so many years, that the victory of the British troops and their entrance into the capitals will do but comparatively little towards the extermination of the poisonous plant. But for all that, the system of authority calculated for the forwarding of purely personal and selfish ends, with its endless corruptions and tyrannies, will have come to a conclusion when the British troops enter Pretoria and plant the flag of freedom upon the Government buildings. It may be that the memory of Paul Kruger will be reverenced in the hearts of the people, and the remembrance of his policy towards the stranger will be still entertained with respect in the hearts of many of his burghers, so that it will need a generation before the Boer and the Uitlander become the members of one family. It is natural that the conquered should look askance at the victor. Savage instincts of revenge cannot be laid aside at once after the last shot has been fired, and that is especially the case with men whose temperament is fatalistic, and whose most cherished ideals have been swept away by the hard logic of cold steel and flying

bullets. The one thing to be guarded against in the final settlement is weak-kneed magnanimity.

The Boer does not practise half-measures in his quarrels with natives. His methods are stern and uncompromising when he gets the better in any contest, and by the same measure which he metes out to his conquered adversary must he be dealt with in the final reckoning. It was a consequence of the weakness shown by Sir T. Shepstone that sedition honeycombed the land within a couple of years after he had, by annexing the Transvaal to the British Empire, saved the people from becoming the victims of the savage hordes under Cetewayo, and that the people began to talk of re-establishing Boer supremacy. He allowed meetings to take place which he had previously forbidden, and took no steps to punish the ringleaders. Later on Colonel Lanyon followed a similar course, with the result that the whole country broke out in open rebellion. It is absolutely necessary that any government which may be established in the Transvaal, after military rule has ceased, should be prepared to deal firmly but justly with malcontents. The Boer understands both qualities when combined in an administration; but firmness without justice would mean tyranny, whilst justice without firmness in carrying it out would seem to Boers a sign of weakness on the part of the Government.

The cost in valuable lives of the contest for supremacy in South Africa has been so enormous, that any policy of the Home Government which would leave matters in a state of doubt would be in the highest degree to be regretted. If the Free State and the Transvaal are conquered, as they probably will be before many weeks are past, the safe course would be their permanent annexation to the British Crown, the very idea of an *African republican* form of government being banished at

once and for ever. To refrain from taking this course would be to evoke disloyalty amongst the British, and confirm the same impression as that produced by Mr. Gladstone's fatuous magnanimity. The British residents in the Transvaal have surely suffered enough to entitle them to the fullest assurances that neither they nor their children shall ever again be subjected to the tyranny and misgovernment they have had to bear under Mr. Kruger's rule.

We do not plead for the capitalists, who are secure in the enjoyment of their fortunes, but for those who by the work of their hands and the labour of their brains have made homes for themselves in this distant land. They constitute, after all, the backbone of a permanent population, and are more worthy of consideration than the man who by a fortuitous concurrence of events has made a fortune which to enjoy he must spend elsewhere. It is due to the loyalty of a few sons of Great Britain, without fortune, toiling hard for their daily bread, that the foundations of a regenerated Transvaal were laid—men without means and without standing in what is called 'society,' earnest in protecting what few privileges were allowed to their countrymen, and championing the cause of those who suffered oppression. They were loyal to their Queen when the Uitlander mining magnates professed to be enamoured of the Republican flag. For it was only at the last, when the battle was almost won, that the capitalists joined hands with the men who had been labouring for many years to bring about a pure government in the Transvaal. These are the men, and these almost alone, who should be considered when a rearrangement of affairs takes place. They fought for the recognition of their claim to the rights of citizens by strictly constitutional means, and they alone by their determined action compelled the President to abandon his barbaric idea

of forcing men to fight the battles of the Republic when they were denied the rights and privileges of citizens.

The next, in order, entitled to have a say in the final settlement are unquestionably those British colonials who have recognised their duty towards the Empire. They have an indisputable claim to share in deciding the terms of the final settlement on account of their proved loyalty and enthusiastic response to the call of duty.

It is humiliating to admit that, with the exception of Natal, the non-African colonies were more eager to stand by the flag than those it ought to have concerned above every other consideration. As a whole, Cape Colony was especially lax in its response to the call; but we must even there acknowledge the individual loyalty which furnished some 15,000 of its manhood. Unfortunately Cape Colony was cursed with a Ministry and a Parliamentary majority which decided that it should remain aloof in the struggle, a Ministry which would have left Kimberley, Mafeking, and Kuruman unarmed and unprotected, which has rendered it necessary that an army of thousands of men should be engaged in protecting from destruction by rebel subjects of Her Majesty the line of railway running through colonial territory, and which, up to almost the day when war was declared, permitted ammunition and weapons to pass through its territory for the purpose of arming the Queen's enemies! Mr. Schreiner and his colleagues have forfeited, it seems to us, all confidence as loyal Ministers of a British colony, and have put themselves out of consideration by their scarcely veiled sympathies with the Republican belligerents and the rebels furnished by the northern districts of the Cape Colony.

It is not desirable to dwell more than is necessary on *the actions* of individuals holding elevated positions in

the Cape Colony, but one is bound to take notice of the fact that the Chief Justice has been far more ready to go to the assistance of Mr. Kruger than he has been to render aid to the cause of British subjects groaning under injustice and unfair taxation. Sir H. de Villiers, as a member of the Royal Commission appointed to draw up the Convention of Pretoria at the close of the war in 1881, was enabled, with the assistance of Sir Hercules Robinson, to secure for the Boers terms which were, to say the least, elastic, and that despite the opposition of Sir E. Wood, who wished to insist upon equal rights being accorded to all whites resident in the Transvaal Republic. The Convention of 1881 shows, as a matter of fact, a naïve simplicity and trustfulness in the good faith of the re-established Boer Government which is touching, particularly as far as those obligations are concerned, which are really only implied, and not very accurately defined, in that document.

When the question of a definite settlement comes up, Mr. Rhodes' name will no doubt be in everybody's mind, and it would be advantageous if he were consulted. The hopes of the colonials are of course vested in the Colonial Secretary and in the High Commissioner.

With Mr. Chamberlain at the Colonial Office, and Sir Alfred Milner as High Commissioner at Cape Town, we may rest assured that the interests of British subjects in South Africa will be as fully considered as those of the Empire. Mr. Chamberlain has declared his intention to render impossible at any future time a situation such as has prevailed, and, as he will be seconded in this by the Governor and High Commissioner, a permanent settlement may be hoped for.

In casting the horoscope of the settlement of Transvaal affairs from the British subject point of view, we must not neglect to look at it also from the burgher

point of view. Since the war commenced the Transvaalers have been recognised as belligerents, and as such they are entitled to all the rights and privileges which appertain to that position. To treat them as rebels because they have refused to acknowledge the suzerainty of Her Majesty since the fatuous Convention of 1884 would elicit on their behalf the sympathies of all nationalities, and even of no inconsiderable proportion of British subjects residing in South Africa. They accepted with no question the assurance of Mr. Kruger that the suzerainty no longer existed, and that the Transvaal was an absolutely independent and sovereign Power.

Thousands of men, women, and children were compelled to flee from the Transvaal, leaving their property without protection or supervision as it stood in thousands of houses in Pretoria and Johannesburg, and they accepted that as one of the hardships which attend a state of war. It will be fair if the treatment accorded to the conquered Boers is to a considerable extent governed by the way in which private property has been treated after the eviction of its owners. If there has been wanton destruction or robbery of effects which were confided by the nature of events to the care and protection of the Government, it will clearly be within the nature of a settlement that the members of the Government should be held personally responsible for the losses.* If, on the other hand, they have assumed the responsibilities

* As we pass these lines for press on May 31, 1900, a letter appears in the columns of the *Daily Chronicle* which contains so graphic and so harrowing a description of what has been going on in our absence that we take leave to reprint it in Appendix L, in the hope that these facts will not be overlooked when the day of reckoning comes, and if possible that these outrages will be brought into account in the general settlement, as well as individual cases of vandalism locally investigated.

towards private property imposed by modern warfare, they should be entitled to the consideration of a conquered civilized State.

Mr. Chamberlain has given notice to the Presidents of the Transvaal and Free State that they would be held personally responsible for any violation of the rules of civilized warfare. Let us only emphasize that Mr. Kruger and his Executive—not forgetting Mr. Steyn—are for the most part exceedingly wealthy. It is also necessary to bear in mind that a large number of the Dutch burghers who have very properly obeyed the summons to the field bear no animosity towards the English race or dominion. They have in the past joined the English in protesting against the faults and corruption of the Krugerian rule, but as citizens they have obeyed the call to defend their country.

The only point remaining for our consideration is the best form of government for the conquered provinces. It would be absurd, even if it were practicable, to give representative institutions at once. For the first year or two at the very least it would be desirable that the Free State and Transvaal should be treated as a Crown Colony under one administration. It is possible that for that purpose a military officer of proved ability and *talent for organization* would be better fitted than a civil official. There will be so much to be done that only a soldier could tackle and overcome effectively, and which a civilian could at best only handle gingerly. The general disarmament of the Boers must be undertaken at a very early period, and there will inevitably be a tendency upon the part of the owners of weapons liable to be confiscated to secrete them. In carrying out such measures the military are obviously more suitable than civil authorities.

Once things are firmly established, it will be time for considering the best form of a permanent Government,

and as representative institutions are dear to the British heart, and have been successfully adopted by the majority of the colonies, there can be little doubt that they will have to be tried here. As the Volksraad will, of course, cease to exist, it will be necessary at a very early period to form a Provisional Government in the country, in order to authorize taxation and other matters and to gradually prepare the way for a general union of the South African colonies after the fashion of the Canadian Dominion and the Australian Confederation.

Before that consummation can be reached trouble will have to be encountered. The Boer is naturally suspicious, and every action will be weighed and analyzed before he finds out what true friends he has in the British Government and the people with whom he will, *nolens volens*, have to live in future. It greatly depends upon the officials with whom he has to deal whether he will yield a sullen or a ready obedience under the new order of things. Treated with firmness combined with kindness, he will in a short time settle down, and, as soon as he realizes that the independence for which he has so blindly fought is a miserable sham, devised by men desiring power only to promote their personal advantage and the acquisition of riches at the expense of the public, he will be ready to accept a government in which all white men are recognised as equal. Race hatred rarely exists between man and man, but it is a terrific power in the concrete, and it will soon be our one great and noble task to eliminate it in South Africa, as it has been in other continents in the past.

We wish to give peace and happiness alike to all white and black populations, and under our rule all will have justice and a voice in the government. Corruption and bribery will cease, and if only the

minds of those in whose hands the near future of South Africa reposes be guided with better knowledge and clearer intuition than were British Cabinets of the past, then indeed this war may not have been fought in vain, and peace and happiness at last be brought to South Africa. That will constitute the balm for our suffering and trouble, the fulfilment of our hope and our prayer—we who have not fought for gold and power, but for the love of our home.

As we pass these lines for press, the news of the abandonment of Pretoria and Johannesburg arrives, and also of the President's flight. This may not mean the immediate end of the war, but it means undoubtedly the end of Krugerism.

APPENDIX A

THE ANNEXATION

THE following is an extract from the text of the official documents, dated Pretoria, Transvaal, 12th April, 1877, proclaiming the Transvaal British territory. After the usual preamble, it proceeds:

Whereas grievous disturbances have broken out in the territories adjacent to our colonies in South Africa, with war between the white inhabitants and the native races, to the great peril of the peace and safety of our said colonies; and whereas, having regard to the safety of our said colonies, it greatly concerns us that full inquiry should be made into the origin, nature, and circumstances of the said disturbances, and with respect to the measures to be adopted for preventing the recurrence of the like disturbances in the future; and whereas it may become requisite to this end that the said territories or portions of them should be administered in our name and on our behalf. Now know you that we, reposing especial trust and confidence in the loyalty and fidelity of you, the said Sir Theophilus Shepstone, have appointed you to be our Special Commissioner for the purpose of making such inquiry as aforesaid, and we do authorize and require you with all convenient despatch and by all lawful ways and means to enter upon such inquiry, and we do require you to communicate to us through one of our principal Secretaries of State any facts which ought to be made known to us, as well as any opinions which you may think fit to express thereon, and if the *emergency should seem to you to be such* as to render it necessary, *in order to secure the peace and safety of our said colonies, and of our subjects elsewhere*, that the said territories, or any portion or portions of the same, should provisionally, and pending the announcement of our pleasure, be administered in our name and on our behalf, *then, and in such case only*, we do further authorize you, the said Sir Theophilus Shepstone, by proclamation under your hand, to declare that from and after a

day to be therein named so much of any such territories as aforesaid as to you, after due consideration, shall seem fit shall be annexed to, and form part of, our dominions. [Here follow the conditions of the appointment.]

Given at our Court at Balmoral this fifth day of October, 1876, in the fortieth year of our reign.

By Her Majesty's command,

CARNARVON.

[NOTE.—The italics are our own.—AUTHORS.]

EXTRACTS FROM PROCLAMATION BY SIR THEOPHILUS SHEPSTONE AT PRETORIA, DATED 12TH OF APRIL, 1877.

Whereas at a meeting held on the 16th day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and fifty-two, at the Sand River, between Her Majesty's Assistant Commissioners, Major Hogge and C. M. Owen, Esq., on the one part, and a deputation from the emigrant farmers then residing north of the Vaal River, at the head of which was Commander-General A. W. J. Pretorius, on the other part, the said Her Majesty's Assistant Commissioners did 'guarantee in the fullest manner on the part of the British Government to the emigrant farmers north of the Vaal River the right to manage their own affairs, and to govern themselves according to their own laws, without any interference on the part of the British Government. And whereas the hopes and expectations upon which this mutual compact was reasonably and honourably founded have been disappointed, and the circumstances as set forth more at length in my address to the people of to-day's date, hereunto attached, show that increasing weakness in the State itself on the one side, and more than corresponding growth of real strength and confidence among the native tribes on the other, have produced their natural and inevitable consequences, as will more fully appear from a brief allusion to the facts; that, after more or less of irritating contact with aboriginal tribes to the north, there commenced about the year 1867 gradual abandonment to the natives in that direction of territory settled by burghers of this State, in well-built towns and villages and on granted farms; that this was succeeded by the extinction of all effective rule over extensive tracts of country included within the boundaries of the State, and, as a consequence, by *the practical independence*, which still continues, of *large native tribes* residing therein, who had until then considered themselves subjects:

That some few farmers, unwilling to forfeit homes which they had created for their families, and to which they held grants from

the Government of the Transvaal, which grants had, however, ceased, and still fail to protect them in their occupation, made terms with the chiefs, and now occupy their farms on conditions of periodical payments to those chiefs, notwithstanding the acknowledgment which such payments involve:

That this decay of power and ebb of authority in the north is being followed by similar processes in the south under yet more dangerous circumstances; people of this State residing in that direction have been compelled within the last three months, at the bidding of native chiefs, and at a moment's notice, to leave their farms and homes, their standing crops, some of which were ready for reaping, and other property, all to be taken possession of by natives, but that the Government is more powerless than ever to vindicate its assumed rights or to resist the declension that is threatening its existence; that all confidence in its stability once felt by surrounding and distant European communities has been withdrawn; that commerce is well-nigh destroyed; that the country is in a state of bankruptcy; that the white inhabitants, discontented with their condition, are divided into factions; that the Government has fallen into helpless paralysis from causes which it has been and is unable to control or counteract; and that the prospect of the election o. a new President, so far from allaying the general anxiety, is looked forward to by all parties as most likely to result in civil war, with its attendant anarchy and bloodshed:

That the conditions above described afford strong temptation to neighbouring native powers, who are known to be anxious and ready to do so, to make attacks and inroads upon the State, which from its weakness it cannot repel, and *from which it has hitherto been saved by the restraining influence of the British Government*, exercised from Natal by Her Majesty's representative in that colony, in the hope, yet unfulfilled, that a friendly understanding might be arrived at between the Transvaal and the complaining native chiefs.

(The Proclamation then refers to the Secocoeni War, and states that 'this tribe [*which, it appears, was in alliance with Cetewayo*], having successfully withstood the strength of the State, disclosed for the first time to the native powers outside the republic, from the Zambesi to the Cape, the great change that had taken place in the relative strength of the white and the black races; that this disclosure at once shook the prestige of the white man in South Africa, and placed every European community in peril; that this common danger has caused universal anxiety, and has imposed the duty upon those who have the power to shield enfeebled civilization from the encroachments of barbarism and *inhumanity*.')

And whereas the ravaging of an adjoining friendly State by warlike savage tribes cannot for a moment be contemplated by Her Majesty's Government without the most earnest and painful solicitude, both on account of the miseries which such an event must inflict upon the inhabitants of the Transvaal, and because of the peril and insecurity to which it would expose Her Majesty's possessions and subjects in South Africa; and seeing that the circumstances have become so grave that neither this country nor the British colonies in South Africa can be saved from the most calamitous circumstances except by the extension over this State of Her Majesty's authority and protection, by means of which alone oneness of purpose and action can be secured, and a fair prospect of peace and prosperity in the future be established.

And whereas *I have been satisfied by the numerous addresses, memorials, and letters which I have received*, and by the abundant assurances which personal intercourse has given me, that a large proportion of the inhabitants of the Transvaal see, in a clearer and stronger light than I am able to describe them, the urgency and imminence of the circumstances by which they are surrounded, and therefore earnestly desire the establishment of Her Majesty's authority and rule; and whereas the Government has been unable to point out or devise any means by which the country can save itself, and, as a consequence, relieve the other white communities of South Africa from the danger of the dire events certain speedily to result from the circumstances by which it is surrounded, and can entertain no reasonable hope that it possesses, or is likely under the present form of government to possess, the means to raise itself to a safe and prosperous condition, etc.

Here follow the annexation clauses, it being stipulated:

That arrangements will be made by which the Dutch language will practically be as much the official language as the English; all laws, proclamations, and Government notices will be published in the Dutch language; in the Legislative Assembly members may, as they do now, use either language; and in the courts of law the same may be done at the option of suitors to a cause.

Equal justice is guaranteed to the persons and property of both white and coloured; but the adoption of this principle does not and should not involve the granting of equal civil rights, such as the exercise of the right of voting by savages, or their being entitled to other civil privileges which are incompatible with their uncivilized condition.

The native tribes living within the jurisdiction and under the

protection of the Government must be taught due obedience to the paramount authority, and be *made to contribute their fair share* towards the support of the State that protects them.

All officers now serving the Government, and who may be able and willing to serve under the altered circumstances of the country, shall be entitled to retain their positions, and such rights as their positions now give them.

(The Proclamation then confirms the rights of contracts, etc., and attorneys' appointments.)

(Signed) T. SHEPSTONE,
Her Majesty's Special Commissioner.

MINUTE OF THE VOLKSRAAD, 22ND FEBRUARY, 1877.

Resolved: To recommend to the Government to reply to the despatch of Sir Henry Barkly, which accompanies the above-named despatch and Bill, in conformity with these considerations; and at the same time to take the necessary measures for the maintenance of the independence of the republic, for the preservation of the friendly understanding between the republic and the neighbouring States and colonies of South Africa, and for the continuance of general order, peace, and the supremacy of the whites over the natives.

This resolution carried by majority.

(Signed) T. G. C. VAN LEENHOF,
Secretary of the Volksraad.

RESOLUTION OF THE EXECUTIVE (THE BOER CABINET).

On the order: Despatch from Her Britannic Majesty's Special Commissioner, dated the 9th of April, 1877, giving notice that His Excellency has decided to proclaim, without delay, British authority over the South African Republic:

That whereas Her Britannic Majesty's Government, by the Convention of Sand River, 1852, has solemnly pledged the independence of the people to the north of the Vaal River:

Whereas the Government of the South African Republic is not aware of ever having given any reason for a hostile act on the part of Her Majesty's Government, nor any ground for an act of violence:

Whereas this Government has ever shown its readiness, and is still prepared to do all which in justice and equity may be demanded, and also to remove all causes of dissatisfaction that may exist:

Whereas this Government has repeatedly expressed its entire

willingness to enter into such treaties or agreements with Her Majesty's Government as may be considered necessary for the general protection of the whole population of South Africa, and is prepared punctually to execute such agreements; and whereas according to public statements of Her Majesty's Secretary of State for the Colonies, Lord Carnarvon, there exists no desire on the part of the British Government to force the people of the South African Republic, against their wish, under the authority of the British Government:

Whereas the people, by memorials or otherwise, have by a large majority plainly stated to be averse to it; and whereas this Government is aware that it is not in a condition to maintain the right and independence of the people with the sword against the superior powers of Great Britain, and, moreover, has no desire to take any steps by which the white inhabitants of South Africa would be divided in the face of the mutual enemy against each other, or might come in hostile contact with each other, to the great danger of the entire Christian population of South Africa, without having first employed all means to secure, in a peaceful way and by friendly mediation, the rights of the people:

Therefore the Government protests most strongly against this act of Her Majesty's Special Commissioner. It is also further resolved to send, without delay, a Commission of delegates to Europe and America, with full power and instructions to add to their number a third person if required, in order to endeavour, in the first place, to lay before Her Majesty's Government the desire and wishes of the people; and in case this might not have the desired effect, which this Government would deeply regret and cannot as yet believe, *then to try and call in the friendly assistance and intercession of other Powers*, and particularly of those who have acknowledged the independence of this State.

As members of this Commission are appointed the Honourable Attorney-General, Dr. E. J. P. Jorissen, and S. J. P. Kruger, Vice-President of the South African Republic.

I have, etc.,

(Signed) H. Stiemens,
1st Clerk.

Memorial to Lord Carnarvon, Minister for the Colonies in England.

Pretoria, *January* 7, 1878.

We, the undersigned, white inhabitants of the Transvaal, having this day received report from our deputation sent to

England, consisting of the Honourable S. J. P. Kruger, Vice-President of the South African Republic, and Dr. E. F. P. Jorissen, State Attorney, with the view to get back our independence, of which we have been deprived on the 12th of April, 1877, have learned with deep regret that they have not been able to obtain that object.

It pains them so much the more, because it appears most clearly from the documents produced by the deputation, that the loss of their independence is entirely and solely due to the false and incorrect representation of the position said to have existed here, as given by people who acted from selfish motives —in a word, by calumny.

The fact, however, that the Government in England has been so totally misinformed about the real sentiments of the vast majority of the population, inspires the undersigned with courage to venture another attempt, and to show by their signatures that by far the great majority is opposed to the British sovereignty.

We cannot yet dismiss this matter before we have tried the last means to obtain our end *by peaceable measures*, according to protest dated April 11, 1877.

The undersigned cannot yet believe that it could be England's will and desire to reign over a people that will not be subject to any Power whatsoever.

They much rather believe the words addressed to them to-day by Mr. S. J. P. Kruger, member of the deputation, when he said : 'Brethren, people in England really do not know the actual position here ; and I am fully convinced that England's first Minister, Lord Carnarvon, acted in good faith when he spoke in his despatch to the deputation of that insignificant minority.'

It is therefore with great modesty, but at the same time with fervent earnestness, that we entreat your Lordship to restore to us our country—that country whieh we love as our lives, and for which we always were, and still are, prepared to sacrifice our lives. May it therefore please your Lordship to be moved by our numerous signatures, and to restore to us our country.

Signed by 6,591 qualified electors of the South African Republic, the original, with signatures attached, being in the possession of the deputation, and open for the inspection of Her Majesty's Government. In addition to the above, memorials with 301 signatures were obtained, which were informally sent in, and thus have not been counted.

(Signed) S. J. P. Kruger } *Delegates.*
P. J. Joubert }
W. Ed. Bok, *Secretary.*

EXTRACT FROM PROCLAMATION OF SIR THEOPHILUS SHEPSTONE, REFERRING TO THE MEANS BY WHICH THE PETITION TO LORD CARNARVON WAS SIGNED, AND THE SPREADING OF TREASONABLE PROPAGANDA, DATED 11TH DAY OF MARCH, 1878.

Whereas the return from Europe of the Transvaal deputation has been made the occasion by designing persons of creating and fostering agitation and alarm, by imposing upon the credulity and ignorance of the quietly disposed inhabitants of this country, and of endeavouring by the illegal use or assumption of authority, such as the banding together of themselves into committees for the purpose of misleading the public and coercing individuals, false representations, threats of violence and seditious utterances, to cause disturbance in the land and to bring misfortune upon innocent people:

And whereas it is my duty, as it is also my inclination and strong desire, by timely and friendly warning, to prevent such misfortune from falling upon this country and its inhabitants:

And whereas one of the pretexts under which the evils and mischief aforesaid have been and are yet being done, is to obtain signatures to a memorial to Her Majesty's Government; and it has been represented to me *by many persons and from different quarters*, that intimidation by means of threats of personal violence, confiscation of property, and *even of death*, has been resorted to by those engaged in coercing others to sign the said memorial and other documents, although it is well known that whoever signs a document is responsible for the consequences which may result from such signature; and whereas the setting on foot of the said memorial and other documents was prompted by a spirit of sedition, and their professed object at the time known by those who prompted it to be unattainable; and whereas there is a possibility of many innocent people being made to suffer in consequence of the agitation that it has created, and was intended to create:

Now, therefore, I do call upon, enjoin and strictly charge all peaceably disposed and orderly persons to aid the officers of the Government in maintaining order, etc. (Then follows the usual penalty clauses, which it is unnecessary to quote.)

NOTICE.

Whereas notice has been received by the Committee that some persons should have spread the rumour that they have been moved in signing the petitions for or against annexation by threats, so it is now that opportunity is given to any such person

to make himself known to the members of the deputation, and to scratch out his name before the beginning of next month, May.

P. J. JOUBERT,
Member of the Deputation.

PRETORIA, *April* 9, 1878.

EXTRACT FROM LETTER OF THE TRANSVAAL DELEGATES TO SIR M. HICKS-BEACH, SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES, DATED ALBEMARLE HOTEL, 10TH JULY, 1878.

This letter practically denies *in toto* all the statements made by Sir Theophilus Shepstone as justifying the annexation, and as a specimen of special pleading is very clever ; it concludes as follows :

It is, we unhesitatingly declare, owing to the course pursued by Sir T. Shepstone that the present crisis has been produced. Cetewayo, believing himself to be encouraged by the Natal Government or by Sir T. Shepstone, in the demands he was making on the Transvaal was no doubt daily becoming more insolent and exacting ; but his threats to the Transvaal, which reached the Transvaal only through Natal, produced little or no effect until, by the advance of the British troops, he was led to make a similar movement towards the frontier.

Cetewayo has, with much ingenuity, endeavoured to play off one white Government against the other, and, as it seemed to him at first, with some success. That he should now be exasperated can excite no surprise, for he finds himself not alone *foiled in his game*, and disappointed of the plunder which he expected a joint invasion of the Transvaal would afford, but he also now finds *the cause of his opponent* espoused by those whom he had been led to hope were his friends and supporters.

Evidence in support of what has been advanced by Sir T. Shepstone is, as has been said, entirely wanting ; while, on the other hand, the most striking contradiction is given to it by the present attitude of the Zulus towards his Government, and by the hostilities in Secocoeni's country, and with the Griquas at the south-western border.

The above are some of the chief arguments which we have to advance in order to carry out the instructions with which we have been charged ; and though we are prepared to meet any further points which may be urged in defence or justification of the annexation, we do not feel it necessary here to go into further detail.

We are directed to support with the voice of the people the protest against the annexation, and at the same time humbly and

earnestly to solicit Her Majesty's gracious consideration of their cause.

We protest against the annexation of the South African Republic on the following grounds :

1. That it is a violation of the Convention entered into at Sand River in January, 1852, between Her Majesty's Assistant Commissioners and the representatives of the emigrant farmers.

2. That the reports as to the nature of the disturbances in the Transvaal, and the peril to the peace and safety of the adjoining colonies thereby threatened, and upon which the instructions to Sir Theophilus Shepstone were founded, were gross exaggerations of fact, and misrepresented the actual position of the country.

3. That the condition laid down in Her Majesty's Commission to Sir Theophilus Shepstone, requiring the assent of the inhabitants thereof, or a sufficient number of them, has not been complied with.

4. That the British Government cannot, with justice, avail themselves of the plea that the defencelessness and disorganization of the republic, and the encroachment of the natives, and consequent danger to the British colonies, made the intervention of their authority a necessary act, inasmuch as those evils, if they existed, were the direct result and consequence of the acts of their own representatives as above referred to.

In concluding a letter upon a subject of such vital importance to our fellow-countrymen—to those who have struggled through toil and through danger for years in the one hope of preserving their hard-earned freedom—we cannot but feel the deep responsibility that rests upon us, and that, should we fail in conveying to Her Majesty's Government the conviction of the righteousness and justice of our cause, it will be due only to our defects in laying it before them.

We believe, however, that we have fully met every argument that has been advanced to justify the act for which we now seek redress, and we rest with the fullest confidence on the sense of justice and integrity of the British nation.

We know that, as a subject people, and who have been deprived of their independence by such means, there will be before us many years of bitter heart-burnings, of ill-feeling, of desertion of homes, and of wild and objectless wanderings; *while on the other hand, with justice and with freedom,* there is every reason to hope that the *Transvaal may join hand in hand with the neighbouring States and colonies to work together for mutual prosperity and happiness,* and for the extension of civilization and Christianity into the far interior.

It is now our earnest prayer that Her Majesty's Government

may direct the removal from the Transvaal of the Administrator of the Government, with the British troops and the official staff, and may restore to the country the independence which was guaranteed by the Convention of 1852, and which has been formally acknowledged by the Governments of Germany, France, America, Holland, Belgium, and Portugal.

(Signed) S. J. P. KRUGER } *Delegates.*
P. J. JOUBERT }
W. ED. BOK, *Secretary.*

APPENDIX B

PROOFS OF SLAVERY

MR. NIXON, in his book 'The Complete Story of the Transvaal,' gives a further reason for the annexation, in the charges of slavery which he brings against the Boers. This was a breach of the Sand River Convention, Clause 4 of which reads: 'It is agreed that no slavery is, or shall be, permitted or practised to the north of the Vaal River by the emigrant farmers.' Amongst other cases Mr. Nixon mentions the following; we have only quoted the evidence produced from Boer or Dutch sources.

TO HIS HONOUR THE STATE PRESIDENT, S. A. REPUBLIC.

February 11*th*, 1875.

SIR,

I feel very much gratified by the receipt of Your Honour's Circular of the 29th of January, 1875, and I believe I cannot show my gratitude better than by returning a candid answer to the five questions which Your Honour has laid before me. I have long desired an opportunity of using the papers which are in my possession. I now, therefore, gladly avail myself of the honourable way which has been opened to me to do so. I shall endeavour to be as brief as possible, and to give Your Honour reliable evidence of the matters I bring forward. I pass over everything which I have become acquainted with merely by hearsay. . . .

Second Question.—'Do you know, certainly, of any single case of slavery, or slave trade, permitted by the Government of this republic, or recognised by it, since the Declaration of Independence by Her British Majesty's Government in 1852?'

Before I reply to this question, I must define what I understand by slavery. I understand slaves to be persons who, against their own will and agreement, by craft, persuasion, or violence, are brought into a state of servitude for a definite or an indefinite period; who have no legal right to claim wages for their service;

who are not free before the expiration of a prescribed time to engage themselves to any other master, or to return to their families or relations. Slave trade is the sale or exchange of such persons.

And if I am now asked to say conscientiously whether such slavery has existed since 1852, and been recognised and permitted by the Government, I must answer in the affirmative. Will Your Honour be kind enough to listen to my proofs?

I begin with the early laws. At Origstad, the Landdrost, Prinsloo, was in the habit of registering (*inboeken*) so-called Kaffir orphan children for the term of fourteen years.

On the 9th of May, 1851, a more stringent law was passed by the Volksraad with reference to 'orphan children, or so-called apprentices, who are brought in by the Kaffir tribes around us.' This law contains the following stipulations:

'*Art.* 1.—Whoever obtains a child or orphan, of whomsoever he may have obtained it, he must register it.

'*Art.* 2.—The Landdrost or Veldcornet must make inquiry in what manner anyone has become the possessor of such a child.

'*Art.* 3.—If everything is in order, the child must be registered, and then remain as a servant, till it shall have reached the age of twenty-five, and shall then, as of age, become entirely free from all forced obligation to any service.

'*Art.* 7.—At the death, or if through the poverty, or any other cause of the owner, the latter should become unable to retain the child, it may be made over to others. Nevertheless, no person shall demand or receive more than £2 5s. for the transference of such a child.'

On the 16th of March, 1866, the following addition was made to the above law by the Volksraad:

'*Art.* 1.—No child shall in future be transferred from one master to another unless the guardian' [this is the name given to the owner of the slave] 'dies, when it remains in the possession of the heir.'

I need hardly say, that by these laws the Government have recognised and permitted slavery. This is proved by the practical effect of the resolution of the Volksraad, which provided that a register should be kept of apprenticed orphan children. In this about 480 persons are entered by the Landdrost of Lydenburg. This does not include those entered by the various Veldcornets. All, therefore, which is entered in this register, as also in the day-book of the Landdrost of Lydenburg, must be regarded as permitted and recognised by the Government.

I shall take the liberty of quoting to Your Honour a few of those things which have been extracted from the above-mentioned register:

Under No. 7 are registered, on the 3rd December, 1851, by H. T. Buhrmann, as the Landdrost of Lydenburg, for himself, five children. This one man has sixteen names of children which he thought necessary to register for himself.

The subsequent Landdrost of Lydenburg, C. Potgieter, has also sworn names registered for himself under Nos. 25, 193, and 194.

Under No. 345, on the 12th April, 1866, is registered for Mr. C. Moll, Sr., Landdrost of Pretoria, one child.

Further, under 308, 309, on the 12th May, 1865, are registered for *His Honour the President*, M. W. Pretorius, three children.

Can anyone avoid arriving at the conclusion that this is slavery, permitted and recognised by the Government?

Third Question.—'Do you know of any case of a person at present held in slavery?'

I am acquainted with cases of persons still held in slavery. I shall relate to Your Honour only two out of a number which in other respects are worthy of special mention.

On the 26th of May, 1858, under No. 114, are registered for the widow Gertrude S. M. Kruger, Clara, six years old, and Azie, ten months old, without the knowledge or consent of their parents, who afterwards recovered Azie, but have been unable up to the present moment to obtain Clara. The parents are manumitted slaves and members of our church.

Under No. 284, on the 30th of June, 1864, is registered for C. J. Beeking a three-year-old boy named Windvogel. His relations live on the station Botsabelo, and have made repeated applications to the remarried widow of Beeking for his freedom; but she demanded too high a ransom, and thus he is retained in servitude.

Further, I must mention that there are many who cannot recover their freedom among them, some who never have been registered:

1. Because the slaves themselves can never ascertain whether they have been registered or not.

2. And although they may be aware of their registry, they are not in a position to know when their term of service has expired. With some it appears as though they never attained the age of twenty-one or twenty-five years.

3. Were a law put into operation by which all persons illegally holding slaves (*i.e.*, without having them registered) could be severely punished and forced to release them, a large number of the unfortunate creatures would regain their liberty. Many of these people, who would have rendered great service to agriculture, have taken refuge in British colonies or have fled to some Kaffir chief because they could no longer endure the heavy

yoke with which they were laden. There is in this republic still a lack of labourers, and nevertheless numbers of able-bodied men are daily forced to leave the country. If any of these return voluntarily, they are so severely punished that the majority prefer remaining in exile.

Thus, on the 9th of February, 1863, under No. 253, is registered for Carel John Viljoen, Sr., Windvogel, fifteen years old. In 1872 he deserted the service of his master, and fled to a British colony. He returned, however, and desired to go to his wife and children, who had been taken from him. His sentence was that he should receive a severe flogging and serve his master another year, for his term of apprenticeship had not yet expired. He returned to his master, but again fled. I do not wish to take the part of Windvogel, but when I saw how fearfully he had been lashed I could not help bemoaning the existence of slavery.

Fourth Question.—'Are you acquainted with cases of slave-dealing by private persons with knowledge of the Government since the establishment of the republic? If so, by whom?'

I must also answer this question in the affirmative, and shall fortify my reply with the necessary evidence.

1. Art. 7 of the resolutions of the Volksraad of the 9th May, 1851, says plainly that registered slaves can be transferred to others, and that no one shall receive as payment more than £2 5s. for such a slave.

This has also been frequently done.

2. Under No. 7 of the Register two children are mentioned who were entered by H. T. Buhrmann, the Landdrost, for himself, whom he had 'lawfully obtained,' one from F. A. Grobbler, and the other from J. M. de Beer.

3. Under Nos. 255 and 256 are the words, 'After the registry of the above names, G. S. Maree declared that he had purchased the above-mentioned Kaffir orphan boys of Mr. D. G. Coetzee' (see Day-book, p. 142).

4. In the Day-book of the Landdrost, under the 9th of February, 1866, P. S. Coetser declares that he had purchased or exchanged a girl for a cow of Mr. J. P. Steyn.

5. Under the 14th of February, 1866, Mr. H. J. Viljoen had registered August, a boy of three years old, whom he in 1864 had exchanged with the Kaffirs of Umswaas for an ox.

6. Under the 14th of February, 1866, is entered that J. G. Breytenbach has exchanged Roselyn, a girl of eight years of age, for a blanket.

The above letter was sent by the Rev. Dr. Nachtigal, of the Berlin Missionary Society, the missionary at Botsabelo, to Pre-

sident Burgers in 1875, in response to a circular from the President making inquiries about the existence of slavery. President Burgers had previously denied to Sir Harry Barkly the existence of slavery in 1874, and this in indignant terms.

Again, Mr. Nixon refers to this disgraceful state of things as follows: 'Thus I find it stated in the *Transvaal Argus* of the 8th of September, 1868: "On Sunday, the 19th, Holy Communion was administered. At the service of the first table Mr. Cachet spoke very earnestly to the assembled congregation. He advised all who were guilty of drunkenness, the shedding of innocent blood, violence, and the sale or purchase of Kaffir children to refrain from the Lord's Table."'

Again, Mr. Cachet proposed, and the Rev. Mr. Jooste seconded, a resolution at the General Synod of the Dutch Reformed Church at Utrecht, on the 5th of November, 1869, to the following effect: 'This meeting, seeing that the existing laws against slavery and slave-dealing are almost entirely a dead letter, determines to exercise church discipline on those members who, from this time forth, make themselves guilty of the sale or purchase, the exchanging, the giving or receiving of Kaffir children, all of which are practices contrary to the letter of the laws of the land.'

In 1876 Khama, the well-known chief of the Bamangwato, also implored the British Government to take him under their protection, alleging cruelty and slave-dealing on the part of the Boers. We are unable to reproduce, owing to want of space, so many of the proofs given by Mr. Nixon as we should desire, but the facts given here appear to be unanswerable.

APPENDIX C

EXTRACTS FROM MR. LIONEL PHILLIPS' LETTERS TO MESSRS. BEIT AND WERNHER, AS PRODUCED AT THE SELECT AND SOUTH AFRICAN COMMITTEES.*

June 10*th*, 1894.

I DON'T, of course, want to meddle in politics, and, as to the franchise, do not think many people care a fig about it. What is rankling in people's minds is the open hostility of the Government to the Uitlanders, and their disregard for all principles of sound government. If we can only improve the Raad and get progressive men in, money will be well spent in this way. As things are going, we shall have to spend more and more each year to prevent villainous burdens being tacked on to the industry, and the end will be revolution. I am having a most worrying time all round. On the one hand I check the hot-headed agitators who could land us in a mess in no time, and on the other have to plot and plan to circumvent mischievous legislation.

June 16*th*, 1894.

The Bewaarplaatsen question will, I think, be settled in our favour, but at a cost of about £25,000. . . . I am also informed that he [the President] said he was very angry with the Ecksteins, that Nelmapius was the best friend the State had ever had, and now he is gone his widow has nothing, while *we have made a large fortune out of him.* I think that evil communication must have its origin with . . . Someone has told the Government that the Uitlanders intend to petition their respective Governments to put this country under international control, as Egypt was, and the Government is, I hear, seriously concerned about this. There is, of course, another possible contingency, viz., an appeal to all the other States and colonies of South Africa. . . . The war in the north, if Magato joins, is by no means a foregone conclusion ; and I see the English Government

* The italics are our own.

is objecting to the commandeering of British subjects, which may lead to complications.

June 25th, 1894.

Cyanide.—Your cable to hand. Solomon is going to see Sir Henry Loch. I shall not mix up if I can help it. It seems that the British Government means to have a say here, and it is about time. What I fear is that they may put the brake on one thing, and we may be more oppressed by some devilment of the Government in another direction. The Government is absolutely rotten, and we must have reform. The alternative is *revolution* or *English interference.* Kruger seems beyond himself, and imagines he is guided by Divine will. . . . P.S.—If the British Government can (or will) interfere in a cyanide monopoly, it ought with equal reason to object to the dynamite monopoly. Nobels would of course *resist* their interference in the dynamite business *now!*

July 1st, 1894.

I see that Marquardt [Messrs. Eckstein's Pretoria agent] has a very sanguine view of the effect of the late demonstration. . . . I do not quite share that. I think their eyes have been opened to the fact of there being a sullen discontent among the aliens. Sir Henry Loch put on the brake in the matter of commandeering, and no doubt gave them good advice upon general matters. How far they will act upon it remains to be seen. I do not suppose they will attempt any further repressive legislation this session, but I do not believe they will undo anything already done. Sir Henry Loch (with whom I had two long private interviews alone) asked me some very pointed questions, such as what arms already in Johannesburg, whether the population could hold the place for six days until help could arrive, etc.; and stated further that, if there had been 3,000 rifles and ammunition here, he would certainly have come over. He further informed me in a significant way that they had prolonged the Swazi Agreement for six months, and said he supposed in that time Johannesburg would be better prepared—as much as to say, if things are safer, then we shall actively intervene. I persuaded him *not to visit Johannesburg*, and subsequently I believe (at least, told on excellent authority) that President Kruger personally requested him not to come here. Sir Henry persisted that he felt sure the British subjects would commit no overt act, but Kruger replied that he could not answer for his burghers under the circumstances. The Government has had a fright, and knows that the first shot unjustly fired by the burghers would mean English intervention and the loss of the independence of the Republic.

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In case of hostilities, apart from the loss of life, the Boers would doubtless do no end of damage to machinery. Of course, *we don't want any row;* but, as I *told Esselen and Leyds,* if the Government or Raad does nothing to pacify the people, we shall have a revolution sooner or later. . . .

July 15*th*, 1894.

Politics.—Just got your cable reading 'Don't see Rhodes,' etc., of which I am rather glad. Things are quieter, but I think a good many men are buying rifles in case of contingencies. If Sir Henry Loch comes back in six months about Swazieland there may then be a row. I enclose a letter to Smith [probably a journalist]. If you think it too free on politics, destroy it; if not, please deliver. *We don't want any row.* Our trump card is a fund of £10,000 to £15,000, to improve the Raad. Unfortunately, the companies have no secret service fund. I must devise a way. We do not want to shell out ourselves. I must hear how much Langermann is ready to subscribe. I am told he has said he would spend money, so I presume J. B. R[obinson] must have authorized it.

August 12*th*, 1894.

If they [the Government] knew there were 3,000 or so well-armed men here, there would be less talk—anyhow, less real danger of wiping out Johannesburg upon occasions like the recent incident. . . . Kruger has become such an autocrat that we can hardly expect him to initiate a change, but he will bow to the will of the country if he sees it is inevitable.

APPENDIX D

GERMAN EMPEROR'S BIRTHDAY CELEBRATION AT PRETORIA.

FROM THE 'STAR,' JOHANNESBURG, SOUTH AFRICAN REPUBLIC, OF MONDAY, 28TH JANUARY, 1895.

SATURDAY being the birthday of the German Emperor, the occasion was celebrated locally by a 'Kommers' given at the Transvaal Hotel by the members of the German Club.

President Kruger, replying to the Chairman's speech, said: Mr. Consul, members, and gentlemen,—I am sorry I could not understand all that the chairman said, as I do not know German, but with the assistance of Dr. Leyds I was able to follow the chief points. Still, it is difficult to follow a speech if you do not understand it. In the first place, then, I must thank you for the kind manner in which you received the toast, and, seeing that your chairman has referred to my career and this Republic in connection with Germany, I will refer to those points first. I will be as brief as possible, as time flies. I only regret I could not follow him more closely. You all know that in the year 1884 I went to England about the Convention with 'Her British Majesty the "King" of England and "Kaiser" of Ireland' (laughter). I went to 'Europe and England' in a friendly manner to endeavour to have that Convention altered, and the British Government received me in a friendly manner and had that matter of the suzerainty altered. Previously I could not enter into treaties with other countries without Her Majesty's consent; but they met me in a friendly spirit, and the treaty was altered. They relinquished the suzerainty, and I was free. I was pleased Her Majesty met me in such a friendly spirit, and gave us and our Republic our free pardon. After that I went through Europe, and amongst other places I visited Germany, where I was received by the Kaiser. I always thought before that that our Republic was regarded as a child among other countries, but the Kaiser received me as the repre-

sentative of a grown-up Republic. I was courteously treated, and was able to enter into a treaty with Germany, our Republic being recognised as an important country. I always had the greatest respect for Wilhelm I. Wilhelm II., who now reigns, I met, but only casually, but what I saw of him gave me the impression that he would follow in his namesake's footsteps, and that he would endeavour to narrow the bonds of friendship that exist between Germany and this country. I have received proof of it since he has been reigning, and he has decorated me with the Order of the Red Eagle. His father I met as well, and he received me very kindly. I have another proof of the goodwill of Germany in the subjects of that empire who come into this Republic to stay. They have always proved law-abiding citizens, and in our trouble with the blacks—not only the recent ones, but in those of former years—they willingly came forward to assist us, and refrained from stirring up the burghers against the laws of the land. I know I may count on the Germans in future, and I hope Transvaalers will do their best to strengthen and foster the friendship that exists between them. Only lately, when the subjects of Her Majesty the Queen of Britain took shelter under their nationality, four Germans—I could mention their names—came to my house and said, 'We are subjects of the Kaiser of Germany, and have not been naturalized; but we have come to live here, and if you wish us to assist in defending the land we are willing to do so. If you want us, we will go;' and they went. That is the spirit I admire, and they obeyed and respected the law. I do not often go out, gentlemen. On a few occasions I have attended celebrations in honour of Her Majesty the Queen, but this is the first Kaiser celebration I have taken part in. It may be the last, although I did not feel that I could refuse the invitation to attend here this evening. When the Convention with Her Majesty's Government was signed, I regarded this Republic as a little child, and a little child has to wear small clothing. When a child's clothes are made, they must not be made to fit a man; but as the child grows up it requires bigger clothes—the old ones will burst (laughter). And that is our position to-day. We are growing up, and although we are young, we feel that if one nation tries to kick us the other will try to stop it. When we asked Her Majesty's Government for bigger clothes they said, 'Eh? eh? What is this?' and could not see that we were growing up. As regards this celebration, I am very pleased to see you Germans here to do honour to your Kaiser. You have proved law-abiding citizens here, and I feel certain when the time comes for the Republic to wear still larger clothes you will have done much to bring it about. It is my wish to continue those peaceful relations, and I wish also to give

Germany all the support a little child can give to a grown-up man. The time is coming for our friendship to be more firmly established than ever. I now ask you to drink to Kaiser Wilhelm, and may he continue in the footsteps of his grandfather, Wilhelm I., and may he enjoy God's blessing!

Despatch to Count Hatzfeldt, Imperial Ambassador in London.

Berlin, *February* 1, 1895.

I have the honour to inform Your Excellency of an interview which I have to-day had with the English Ambassador. Sir Edward Malet communicated to me a private despatch from Lord Kimberley, which contained some remarks concerning the attitude of Germany towards the South African Republic relative to President Kruger's words when proposing the Emperor's health on the 27th ultimo.

I remarked to the Ambassador that if Lord Kimberley believed that a spirit unsuited to the international position of the Transvaal was being encouraged in that country by the attitude of Germany, the obligation to give facts on which to found his presumption lay with him. I asked whether it was possible that Lord Kimberley regarded President Kruger's sentiment as regards His Majesty the Emperor as an expression of that spirit, and as compromising British interests.

I said that our policy had the simple object of protecting against any attack those material interests which Germany had acquired through the construction of railways and the opening up of commercial relations with the Transvaal. These interests demanded the maintenance of the Transvaal as an independent State, as laid down in the Treaty of 1884, and a guarantee of the *status quo* as regards the railways and the harbour of Delagoa Bay. I said that this indicated the beginning and end of our policy in those parts.

I asked why, if Lord Kimberley aimed equally at the maintenance of the *status quo*, a check was not put upon those who, while making most unseemly and imprudent attacks upon Germany, were openly in London proclaiming the programme of the absorption of the Transvaal by Cape Colony. Before people addressed more or less veiled reproaches to the German Government, it would be better to check certain aspirations, which ran counter to the maintenance of the *status quo*, and which alone were the cause why the Transvaal was more and more adopting the tone which Lord Kimberley complained of, and with which he was inclined to credit Germany. Sir Edward

regretted the attacks upon Germany, but believed that in Dr. Jameson's latest speech no purpose of annexation, but merely the idea of a 'commercial federation' of the South African States, was to be found. I retorted that it was precisely this idea which Dr. Jameson had developed, namely, that Rhodesia should become the 'commercial union, amalgamation, or federation of all South African States'; that was opposed to our interests, because that, rather more shortly put, signified politically a protectorate, and economically a trade monopoly, for Cape Colony, and the exclusion of German commerce. If the English colonial party were sensitive on the question of the Transvaal, ours was equally so. If Lord Kimberley desired the maintenance of the *status quo*, our views were in every way identical, and I regarded it as by no means an impossibility that we should place this agreement on paper. I emphasized especially that the policy which Mr. Rhodes had announced of the gradual absorption of the Transvaal by Cape Colony, and of the foundation of a commercial federation in order to hasten this process, could scarcely be described as a policy of the maintenance of the *status quo*.

(Signed) MARSCHALL.

His Excellency Count Hatzfeldt.

APPENDIX E

SELECT COMMITTEE ON BRITISH SOUTH AFRICA.

FROM THE UITLANDERS' ASSOCIATION, PRETORIA, SOUTH AFRICAN REPUBLIC, TO THE RIGHT HON. JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN, M.P., HER MAJESTY'S SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES, DOWNING STREET, LONDON.

PRETORIA, TRANSVAAL,
3 *April*, 1897.

SIR,

We beg leave to confirm our cablegram of the 2nd instant (a copy of which is enclosed herewith), and to amplify the same as follows:

From cabled reports of Mr. Schreiner's examination before the Parliamentary Committee we observe that he is represented to have said (*inter alia*): 'The grievances of the Uitlanders are greatly exaggerated'; but, we understand, he afterwards admitted that the summary of grievances issued by Mr. Charles Leonard was a fair one.

We submit that Mr. Schreiner, not being a resident of the Transvaal, and never having had under British rule to submit to any such restrictions and disabilities as those imposed upon us, is not so competent to feel or to judge of the hardships complained of as are those who live under them, and we aver that no exaggeration has taken place.

It has not been denied that the grievances set forth in Mr. Charles Leonard's manifesto of December, 1895, do exist, nor that the Press Law, the Immigration and Aliens Pass Law, and the Firearms Law, and the law subordinating the courts of justice in this State, have since actually been promulgated and carried into effect, and we contend that the Uitlanders must be best able to realize the extent of the pernicious effect such laws have on the people and the industries of this State.

Referring further to Mr. Schreiner's examination, we beg to distinguish between what might be termed Mr. Schreiner's

yoke with which they were laden. There is in this republic still a lack of labourers, and nevertheless numbers of able-bodied men are daily forced to leave the country. If any of these return voluntarily, they are so severely punished that the majority prefer remaining in exile.

Thus, on the 9th of February, 1863, under No. 253, is registered for Carel John Viljoen, Sr., Windvogel, fifteen years old. In 1872 he deserted the service of his master, and fled to a British colony. He returned, however, and desired to go to his wife and children, who had been taken from him. His sentence was that he should receive a severe flogging and serve his master another year, for his term of apprenticeship had not yet expired. He returned to his master, but again fled. I do not wish to take the part of Windvogel, but when I saw how fearfully he had been lashed I could not help bemoaning the existence of slavery.

Fourth Question.—'Are you acquainted with cases of slave-dealing by private persons with knowledge of the Government since the establishment of the republic? If so, by whom?'

I must also answer this question in the affirmative, and shall fortify my reply with the necessary evidence.

1. Art. 7 of the resolutions of the Volksraad of the 9th May, 1851, says plainly that registered slaves can be transferred to others, and that no one shall receive as payment more than £2 5s. for such a slave.

This has also been frequently done.

2. Under No. 7 of the Register two children are mentioned who were entered by H. T. Buhrmann, the Landdrost, for himself, whom he had 'lawfully obtained,' one from F. A. Grobbler, and the other from J. M. de Beer.

3. Under Nos. 255 and 256 are the words, 'After the registry of the above names, G. S. Maree declared that he had purchased the above-mentioned Kaffir orphan boys of Mr. D. G. Coetzee' (see Day-book, p. 142).

4. In the Day-book of the Landdrost, under the 9th of February, 1866, P. S. Coetser declares that he had purchased or exchanged a girl for a cow of Mr. J. P. Steyn.

5. Under the 14th of February, 1866, Mr. H. J. Viljoen had registered August, a boy of three years old, whom he in 1864 had exchanged with the Kaffirs of Umswaas for an ox.

6. Under the 14th of February, 1866, is entered that J. G. Breytenbach has exchanged Roselyn, a girl of eight years of age, for a blanket.

The above letter was sent by the Rev. Dr. Nachtigal, of the Berlin Missionary Society, the missionary at Botsabelo, to Pre-

sident Burgers in 1875, in response to a circular from the President making inquiries about the existence of slavery. President Burgers had previously denied to Sir Harry Barkly the existence of slavery in 1874, and this in indignant terms.

Again, Mr. Nixon refers to this disgraceful state of things as follows: 'Thus I find it stated in the *Transvaal Argus* of the 8th of September, 1868: "On Sunday, the 19th, Holy Communion was administered. At the service of the first table Mr. Cachet spoke very earnestly to the assembled congregation. He advised all who were guilty of drunkenness, the shedding of innocent blood, violence, and the sale or purchase of Kaffir children to refrain from the Lord's Table."'

Again, Mr. Cachet proposed, and the Rev. Mr. Jooste seconded, a resolution at the General Synod of the Dutch Reformed Church at Utrecht, on the 5th of November, 1869, to the following effect: 'This meeting, seeing that the existing laws against slavery and slave-dealing are almost entirely a dead letter, determines to exercise church discipline on those members who, from this time forth, make themselves guilty of the sale or purchase, the exchanging, the giving or receiving of Kaffir children, all of which are practices contrary to the letter of the laws of the land.'

In 1876 Khama, the well-known chief of the Bamangwato, also implored the British Government to take him under their protection, alleging cruelty and slave-dealing on the part of the Boers. We are unable to reproduce, owing to want of space, so many of the proofs given by Mr. Nixon as we should desire, but the facts given here appear to be unanswerable.

APPENDIX C

EXTRACTS FROM MR. LIONEL PHILLIPS' LETTERS TO MESSRS. BEIT AND WERNHER, AS PRODUCED AT THE SELECT AND SOUTH AFRICAN COMMITTEES.*

June 10th, 1894.

I DON'T, of course, want to meddle in politics, and, as to the franchise, do not think many people care a fig about it. What is rankling in people's minds is the open hostility of the Government to the Uitlanders, and their disregard for all principles of sound government. If we can only improve the Raad and get progressive men in, money will be well spent in this way. As things are going, we shall have to spend more and more each year to prevent villainous burdens being tacked on to the industry, and the end will be revolution. I am having a most worrying time all round. On the one hand I check the hot-headed agitators who could land us in a mess in no time, and on the other have to plot and plan to circumvent mischievous legislation.

June 16th, 1894.

The Bewaarplaatsen question will, I think, be settled in our favour, but at a cost of about £25,000. . . . I am also informed that he [the President] said he was very angry with the Ecksteins, that Nelmapius was the best friend the State had ever had, and now he is gone his widow has nothing, while *we have made a large fortune out of him.* I think that evil communication must have its origin with . . . Someone has told the Government that the Uitlanders intend to petition their respective Governments to put this country under international control, as Egypt was, and the Government is, I hear, seriously concerned about this. There is, of course, another possible contingency, viz., an appeal to all the other States and colonies of South Africa. . . . The war in the north, if Magato joins, is by no means a foregone conclusion ; and I see the English Government

* The italics are our own.

is objecting to the commandeering of British subjects, which may lead to complications.

June 25th, 1894.

Cyanide.—Your cable to hand. Solomon is going to see Sir Henry Loch. I shall not mix up if I can help it. It seems that the British Government means to have a say here, and it is about time. What I fear is that they may put the brake on one thing, and we may be more oppressed by some devilment of the Government in another direction. The Government is absolutely rotten, and we must have reform. The alternative is *revolution* or *English interference.* Kruger seems beyond himself, and imagines he is guided by Divine will. . . . P.S.—If the British Government can (or will) interfere in a cyanide monopoly, it ought with equal reason to object to the dynamite monopoly. Nobels would of course *resist* their interference in the dynamite business *now!*

July 1st, 1894.

I see that Marquardt [Messrs. Eckstein's Pretoria agent] has a very sanguine view of the effect of the late demonstration. . . . I do not quite share that. I think their eyes have been opened to the fact of there being a sullen discontent among the aliens. Sir Henry Loch put on the brake in the matter of commandeering, and no doubt gave them good advice upon general matters. How far they will act upon it remains to be seen. I do not suppose they will attempt any further repressive legislation this session, but I do not believe they will undo anything already done. Sir Henry Loch (with whom I had two long private interviews alone) asked me some very pointed questions, such as what arms already in Johannesburg, whether the population could hold the place for six days until help could arrive, etc.; and stated further that, if there had been 3,000 rifles and ammunition here, he would certainly have come over. He further informed me in a significant way that they had prolonged the Swazi Agreement for six months, and said he supposed in that time Johannesburg would be better prepared—as much as to say, if things are safer, then we shall actively intervene. I persuaded him *not to visit Johannesburg*, and subsequently I believe (at least, told on excellent authority) that President Kruger personally requested him not to come here. Sir Henry persisted that he felt sure the British subjects would commit no overt act, but Kruger replied that he could not answer for his burghers under the circumstances. The Government has had a fright, and knows that the first shot unjustly fired by the burghers would mean English intervention and the loss of the independence of the Republic.

In case of hostilities, apart from the loss of life, the Boers would doubtless do no end of damage to machinery. Of course, *we don't want any row;* but, as I *told Esselen and Leyds,* if the Government or Raad does nothing to pacify the people, we shall have a revolution sooner or later. . . .

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APPENDIX D

GERMAN EMPEROR'S BIRTHDAY CELEBRATION AT PRETORIA.

FROM THE 'STAR,' JOHANNESBURG, SOUTH AFRICAN REPUBLIC, OF MONDAY, 28TH JANUARY, 1895.

SATURDAY being the birthday of the German Emperor, the occasion was celebrated locally by a 'Kommers' given at the Transvaal Hotel by the members of the German Club.

President Kruger, replying to the Chairman's speech, said: Mr. Consul, members, and gentlemen,—I am sorry I could not understand all that the chairman said, as I do not know German, but with the assistance of Dr. Leyds I was able to follow the chief points. Still, it is difficult to follow a speech if you do not understand it. In the first place, then, I must thank you for the kind manner in which you received the toast, and, seeing that your chairman has referred to my career and this Republic in connection with Germany, I will refer to those points first. I will be as brief as possible, as time flies. I only regret I could not follow him more closely. You all know that in the year 1884 I went to England about the Convention with 'Her British Majesty the "King" of England and "Kaiser" of Ireland' (laughter). I went to 'Europe and England' in a friendly manner to endeavour to have that Convention altered, and the British Government received me in a friendly manner and had that matter of the suzerainty altered. Previously I could not enter into treaties with other countries without Her Majesty's consent; but they met me in a friendly spirit, and the treaty was altered. They relinquished the suzerainty, and I was free. I was pleased Her Majesty met me in such a friendly spirit, and gave us and our Republic our free pardon. After that I went through Europe, and amongst other places I visited Germany, where I was received by the Kaiser. I always thought before that that our Republic was regarded as a child among other countries, but the Kaiser received me as the repre-

sentative of a grown-up Republic. I was courteously treated, and was able to enter into a treaty with Germany, our Republic being recognised as an important country. I always had the greatest respect for Wilhelm I. Wilhelm II., who now reigns, I met, but only casually, but what I saw of him gave me the impression that he would follow in his namesake's footsteps, and that he would endeavour to narrow the bonds of friendship that exist between Germany and this country. I have received proof of it since he has been reigning, and he has decorated me with the Order of the Red Eagle. His father I met as well, and he received me very kindly. I have another proof of the goodwill of Germany in the subjects of that empire who come into this Republic to stay. They have always proved law-abiding citizens, and in our trouble with the blacks—not only the recent ones, but in those of former years—they willingly came forward to assist us, and refrained from stirring up the burghers against the laws of the land. I know I may count on the Germans in future, and I hope Transvaalers will do their best to strengthen and foster the friendship that exists between them. Only lately, when the subjects of Her Majesty the Queen of Britain took shelter under their nationality, four Germans—I could mention their names—came to my house and said, 'We are subjects of the Kaiser of Germany, and have not been naturalized; but we have come to live here, and if you wish us to assist in defending the land we are willing to do so. If you want us, we will go;' and they went. That is the spirit I admire, and they obeyed and respected the law. I do not often go out, gentlemen. On a few occasions I have attended celebrations in honour of Her Majesty the Queen, but this is the first Kaiser celebration I have taken part in. It may be the last, although I did not feel that I could refuse the invitation to attend here this evening. When the Convention with Her Majesty's Government was signed, I regarded this Republic as a little child, and a little child has to wear small clothing. When a child's clothes are made, they must not be made to fit a man; but as the child grows up it requires bigger clothes—the old ones will burst (laughter). And that is our position to-day. We are growing up, and although we are young, we feel that if one nation tries to kick us the other will try to stop it. When we asked Her Majesty's Government for bigger clothes they said, 'Eh? eh? What is this?' and could not see that we were growing up. As regards this celebration, I am very pleased to see you Germans here to do honour to your Kaiser. You have proved law-abiding citizens here, and I feel certain when the time comes for the Republic to wear still larger clothes you will have done much to bring it about. It is my wish to continue those peaceful relations, and I wish also to give

Germany all the support a little child can give to a grown-up man. The time is coming for our friendship to be more firmly established than ever. I now ask you to drink to Kaiser Wilhelm, and may he continue in the footsteps of his grandfather, Wilhelm I., and may he enjoy God's blessing!

Despatch to Count Hatzfeldt, Imperial Ambassador in London.

Berlin, *February* 1, 1895.

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I asked why, if Lord Kimberley aimed equally at the maintenance of the *status quo*, a check was not put upon those who, while making most unseemly and imprudent attacks upon Germany, were openly in London proclaiming the programme of the absorption of the Transvaal by Cape Colony. Before people addressed more or less veiled reproaches to the German Government, it would be better to check certain aspirations, which ran counter to the maintenance of the *status quo*, and which alone were the cause why the Transvaal was more and more adopting the tone which Lord Kimberley complained of, and with which he was inclined to credit Germany. Sir Edward

regretted the attacks upon Germany, but believed that in Dr. Jameson's latest speech no purpose of annexation, but merely the idea of a 'commercial federation' of the South African States, was to be found. I retorted that it was precisely this idea which Dr. Jameson had developed, namely, that Rhodesia should become the 'commercial union, amalgamation, or federation of all South African States'; that was opposed to our interests, because that, rather more shortly put, signified politically a protectorate, and economically a trade monopoly, for Cape Colony, and the exclusion of German commerce. If the English colonial party were sensitive on the question of the Transvaal, ours was equally so. If Lord Kimberley desired the maintenance of the *status quo*, our views were in every way identical, and I regarded it as by no means an impossibility that we should place this agreement on paper. I emphasized especially that the policy which Mr. Rhodes had announced of the gradual absorption of the Transvaal by Cape Colony, and of the foundation of a commercial federation in order to hasten this process, could scarcely be described as a policy of the maintenance of the *status quo*.

(Signed) MARSCHALL.

His Excellency Count Hatzfeldt.

APPENDIX E

SELECT COMMITTEE ON BRITISH SOUTH AFRICA.

FROM THE UITLANDERS' ASSOCIATION, PRETORIA, SOUTH AFRICAN REPUBLIC, TO THE RIGHT HON. JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN, M.P., HER MAJESTY'S SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES, DOWNING STREET, LONDON.

PRETORIA, TRANSVAAL,
3 *April*, 1897.

SIR,

We beg leave to confirm our cablegram of the 2nd instant (a copy of which is enclosed herewith), and to amplify the same as follows:

From cabled reports of Mr. Schreiner's examination before the Parliamentary Committee we observe that he is represented to have said (*inter alia*): 'The grievances of the Uitlanders are greatly exaggerated'; but, we understand, he afterwards admitted that the summary of grievances issued by Mr. Charles Leonard was a fair one.

We submit that Mr. Schreiner, not being a resident of the Transvaal, and never having had under British rule to submit to any such restrictions and disabilities as those imposed upon us, is not so competent to feel or to judge of the hardships complained of as are those who live under them, and we aver that no exaggeration has taken place.

It has not been denied that the grievances set forth in Mr. Charles Leonard's manifesto of December, 1895, do exist, nor that the Press Law, the Immigration and Aliens Pass Law, and the Firearms Law, and the law subordinating the courts of justice in this State, have since actually been promulgated and carried into effect, and we contend that the Uitlanders must be best able to realize the extent of the pernicious effect such laws have on the people and the industries of this State.

Referring further to Mr. Schreiner's examination, we beg to distinguish between what might be termed Mr. Schreiner's

voluntary statements and those admissions drawn from him during his examination.

In reply to some of your questions, he is reported to have said (*inter alia*) that, in case of hostilities between Her Majesty's Government and the Transvaal, Cape Colonists of Dutch extraction would hesitate between their loyalty to Great Britain and their feelings of kinship with the Transvaal Boers, and that it would be a great strain upon their loyalty to be required to assist the imperial forces in the event of such a war.

This significant admission is all the more important by reason of the various indications of Transvaal Boer intrigue with their Cape relations, and from the fact that (as far as we are aware) no representative body of Dutch colonists have denied the truth of such admission.

We therefore most humbly and sincerely trust that, in view of the strenuous warlike preparations which we know are continuously being made by the Transvaal Government, Her Majesty's Government would take such precautionary measures as will efficiently safeguard imperial interests and the welfare of Her Majesty's loyal subjects in this part of the world.

This association, whilst deeply regretting the fact that such serious disaffection should exist among Her Majesty's Dutch colonial subjects, cannot but feel grateful to Your Honour for having thus forcibly brought such circumstance to the notice of Her Majesty's Government and people.

Mr. Schreiner is also reported to have said, that for *one* Uitlander dissatisfied with the apathy of Her Majesty's Government *one hundred* are satisfied.

We beg to remark that witness is also incompetent to form an accurate opinion on this point, and that he had no authority whatever from the Uitlanders for making the above statement.

It is easy to understand that *some* persons, drawing Transvaal Government subsidies or pay, should approve of the apathy of Her Majesty's Government, in order to prolong the present state of affairs; but, from our daily experience and intercourse as business and working men with our fellows, we know that, should the Uitlander population be canvassed, the probability is that the above-mentioned ratio would nearly be reversed.

We further beg to invite Your Honour's attention and that of the Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry to the fact that since Johannesburg's unsuccessful attempt at revolution, our grievances, instead of being lessened, have been increased (notwithstanding the pretences at reform made by the Government of this State), notably by the passing of the Press Law, the Immigration and Aliens Pass Law, the Firearms Law, and the law subordinating the courts of justice to the unfettered caprice of the Volksraad,

by reason of which laws public expression of opinion has been made almost impossible, the right to enter and reside freely in this State has been taken away, and public confidence in courts of justice has been greatly shaken, so that we are now unable to defend ourselves against unjust and oppressive laws either by open defiance or by confident appeal to the courts of law for redress.

As a result of this further combination of evils, enormous sums of foreign capital are being withdrawn from the country, all enterprise is practically stopped, trade and commerce languish, large numbers of men are being thrown out of employment, and we fear that unless substantial reforms are promptly inaugurated the situation will become even more critical, and life and property will be yet further endangered and jeopardized.

We confidently appeal to Her Majesty's Government, therefore, to *strictly* enforce the Convention of 1884, and all the agreements and understandings by means of which the Transvaal regained its partial independence, and to take such measures as will prevent catastrophe from overwhelming the whole of South Africa.

On behalf of the Uitlanders' Association,

I have, etc.,

ERNEST DUSTING,
Hon. Secretary.

FROM UITLANDERS' ASSOCIATION TO COLONIAL SECRETARY, LONDON.

PRETORIA, 2 *April*, 1897.

Deny Schreiner's statement that Uitlanders' grievances are exaggerated, but grateful for admissions elicited by you from him. Schreiner's voluntary statement, Uitlanders satisfied with imperial apathy, totally incorrect.

A true copy,

ERNEST DUSTING,
Hon. Secretary.

APPENDIX F

THE AFRICANDER BOND

EXTRACT FROM A SPEECH BY MR. J. X. MERRIMAN IN 1885; HE IS NOW A MEMBER OF THE BOND MINISTRY.

Now the situation is a grave one. It is not a question of localism, it is not a question of party politics, but it is a question whether the Cape Colony is to continue to be an integral part of the British Empire. The question is whether we intend to progress along the lines of freedom, of civilization, and respect for law and order, or whether we are ready to take the Transvaal for a model, and have our policy shaped by the Africander Bond. There is no begging the question. That has been the plain question before the colony, and there is no use hiding it. That is the question said out of doors, and it should be said in public. It is said at the corners, and should be said from the platform. That being the case, strong language might be excused, but I will endeavour to be studiously moderate. It is not a time when any citizen can sit with his hands folded. They would have to keep the public men up to the mark, and each one of you will have to make up his mind whether he is prepared to see this colony remain a part of the British Empire, which carries with it obligations as well as privileges, or whether he is prepared to obey the dictates of the Bond? From the very first time, some years ago, when the poison began to be distilled into the country, I felt that it must come to this—was England or the Transvaal to be the paramount force in South Africa? In any other country such an organization could not have grown, but here among a scattered population it had insidiously and successfully worked. What could they think of the objects of the Bond when they found Judge Reitz advocating a Republic of South Africa under one flag, and the Rev. Du Toit spluttering out his disloyalty. No man who wishes well for the British Government could have read the leading articles of the *Zuid Afrikaan*, *the Express* and *De Patriot*, expounding the Bond principles,

without seeing the maintenance of law and order under the British Crown and the object they have in view are absolutely different things. As to the other doctrines of the Bond in reference to the restriction of commercial progress, and the non-education of women, they were errors of judgment. My quarrel with the Bond is that it stirs up race difference. Its main object is to make the South African Republic the paramount power in South Africa. That is the reason of its hostility to John Brand —John Brand, the Africander of Africanders; a true friend to the English, and one who has governed his State and is jealous of all its privileges. He is as much opposed to the Bond as I am, and the Bond is as much opposed to him. Stanch Burgers is not a Bondman, and the Bond did all they could to keep him out. They turned out Mr. Luttig, a most excellent member, because he would not work with the Bond. As I said before, the only advantage derived from the Rooi Grond negotiation is that it has brought us face to face with the actions of the Bond, and it is better to have an open enemy than an insidious foe.

Dr. Rutherfoord Harris on the Same Subject in 1900.

The third fact to which I want to draw your attention may be stated thus—that British paramountcy throughout South Africa, which, as we have just seen, is absolutely necessary to our retention of the Cape station and for our supremacy at sea there, is in grave peril now, as the result of a long-standing conspiracy. I use the word 'conspiracy' deliberately. I mean that for many years past, certainly ever since 1881, after the retrogression at Majuba and the formation of the Africander Bond by Mr. Hofmeyr, an ever-increasing number of the Dutch population of South Africa have been making ready for an attempt to turn South Africa into a united and independent Dutch State, in which the status of Britishers should be the status of foreigners, and in which Her Majesty's Government should have neither part nor lot. It was a matter of common knowledge an attempt would one day be made to republicanize South Africa, and that in the interests of that Africander nation which Mr. Hofmeyr has made it his life-work to create. Sir Bartle Frere was aware of this movement, of this conspiracy, and in a letter to Sir Michael Hicks-Beach, under date August 28, 1879, he warned the Imperial Government of what was afoot. And Sir Alfred Milner did but repeat the warning when, twenty years later, on the 4th of May last, he advised Mr. Chamberlain that a 'mischievous propaganda' was in progress in the Cape Colony 'to oust Her Majesty's Government from their rightful position in South Africa.' Here you have two of the very ablest states-

men who have ever served the Crown in South Africa saying precisely one and the same thing—'that a disloyal movement was in progress among the Dutch population, having for its ultimate purpose to wrest South Africa from the jurisdiction of the British Crown.' I do not propose to-night—it would be impossible—to place before you the whole of the evidence for the existence of this conspiracy. Time is too scant, and I do not wish to interpose too long between you and our distinguished guest, yet I cannot leave this subject without adding to the testimony of Sir Alfred Milner and Sir Bartle Frere, as to what was happening, the solemn warning of another great Proconsul in South Africa, Sir George Grey, as to what must happen. Writing as long ago as 1858, shortly after the Orange Free State and Transvaal had been unwisely called into being, Sir George Grey used the following argument in support of his 'policy of remedying' what had taken place, and what he called the 'dismemberment' of Africa. He wished to remedy it by some form of federation! He pointed out 'that, although broken up into separate States, the Dutch population throughout South Africa would still remain essentially one.' He said 'that in any great national movement the Dutch population would not act in unison.' And he added 'that if in any such movement the Governments of the two Republics took a different view from that of the Imperial Government, it would be very doubtful which of the two Governments the great mass of the Dutch people would obey.' For forty long years these prophetic words have lain buried in our Blue Books, and, though every year since has contributed something to fulfil them and to prove their truth, it was not until the 9th of October, 1899, when President Kruger of the Transvaal, backed by President Steyn of the Orange Free State, and backed by thousands of our Dutch subjects in the Cape Colony, flung his ultimatum in our teeth, that we began to believe that Sir George Grey, Sir Bartle Frere, and Sir Alfred Milner were, after all, right! On the heels of the ultimatum came the revelation, in a series of repulses to our arms, of a degree of readiness for war on the part of the Boers which only long years of planning and preparation could have rendered possible. Ask yourself the question, What would have been England's fate had the Boers withheld their stroke until Great Britain should be locked in conflict with one or other of the Great Powers? Gentlemen, we have to thank the Government and Lord Salisbury's magnificent diplomacy—as prescient as it is patient—that the long-planned endeavour of the Boers to throw us out of South Africa falls at a moment when England is at peace with all the world.

I have ventured to dwell at some little length on the part

which is being played in the South African drama by the disloyal section of our Dutch subjects because it explains some of the peculiar difficulties which harass our Generals, as a while ago they harassed our diplomatists. And there is this other reason for the line I have taken, that no settlement can hope to be permanently effective which omits to provide for the fact that the really dangerous foes to British supremacy are not those of the two Republics, but are men outside the Republics, who, with the lying phrases of loyalty on their lips, have long been making common cause with the Republics for the end I have described, viz., to oust us from South Africa. How this fact should be provided for—what should be the scope and nature of the settlement—it would hardly be seemly here and now to explain. Let us first drive the foe from our own gates, and then, before we talk of settlement, hoist the Union Jack over Bloemfontein and Pretoria, there for ever to remain.

APPENDIX G

EXTRACTS FROM THE BIOGRAPHY OF THE LATE SIR BARTLE FRERE, BY JOHN MARTINEAU

Letter from Madame Koopmans de Wet, November 16, 1880, referring to Abandonment of Sir Bartle Frere.

And what is to be the end of all this now, and now particularly do the Cape people miss *their* Governor, for now superior qualities in everything are wanted. Dear Sir Bartle, you know the material we have; it is good, but who is to guide? It is plain to every thinking mind that our position is becoming more critical every day. . . . But with deep sorrow let me say, England's, or rather Downing Street's, treatment has not tightened the bonds between the Mother Country and us. You know we have a large circle of acquaintances, and I cannot say how taken aback I sometimes am to hear their words. See, in all former wars there was a moral support in the thought England, our England, is watching over us; it strengthened us, and kept, to a certain measure, the savage in control. Now there is but one cry, 'We will have no imperial help.' Why is this? We have lost confidence in a Government who could play with our welfare, and among the many injuries done us, the greatest was to remove from among us a ruler such as Your Excellency was.

As to the effect of abandonment of the Transvaal on the prospects of confederation, Frere says, writing to Sir M. Hicks-Beach:

December 3, 1879.

To every colony concerned such a step must appear as a confession of weakness, of infirmity of purpose, and of disregard for solemn pledges and obligations which would destroy all respect, all wish to belong to a Government which could so behave.

Again, writing to the same gentleman on that date :

When our powers of enforcing the law and upholding the authority of Government were at the lowest, in April last . . . experienced men at Pretoria gave me through Colonel Lanyon the following estimate of the strength of parties in the malcontent camp : The educated and intelligent men of influence who advocated the most extreme measures, or were prepared to acquiesce in them, were reckoned at not more than eight. Three, or perhaps four, were men of property in the Transvaal, the rest foreign adventurers, with no property and little weight beyond that due to their skill as political agitators. Their unflinching and uncompromising followers in the Boer camp were not reckoned at more than eighty. The disaffected waverers who, according to circumstances, would follow the majority either to acts of overt resistance to government and lawless violence, or to grumble and disperse, 'accepting the inevitable,' were reckoned at about 800 at the outside. The rest of the camp, variously estimated at containing from 1,600 to 4,000 in all, but probably never exceeding 2,500 present at one time, were men brought to the camp by intimidation, compulsion, or curiosity, who would not willingly resist the authority of government, and would, if assured of protection, prefer to side with it.

Dutch disaffection (Sir Bartle writes, referring to the Cape Colony) of a dangerous kind is confined to a small clique of Hollanders and colonial Dutch republicans, who have little influence except through a temporary alliance with English humanitarians and Radicals.

Again, later :

These Dutchmen are slow to move, but bitter and obstinate when roused, and apt to move in an angry crowd. If any number of them join the republican faction there will be serious trouble in South Africa, and the drifting may end by these colonies drifting away from the Empire.

Frere to Lanyon, on leaving South Africa.

Tell Pretorius [the ex-President] and all sincere Transvaal men they have my best wishes for their prosperity, and that they will see in joining you, to give good government to the country, the best road to the same independence as their friends here [*i.e.*, at Cape Town] have achieved.

Frere to Lord Kimberley.

I would most emphatically urge that an encouragement to

rebellion fatal to our supremacy in all the rest of South Africa, would be given by such a step as appointing a commission before the Boers, yielding either to moral force or force of arms, have distinctly submitted to our authority.

Referring to the suggested members of the proposed commission, he says :

There are men on the Colonial Bench whom I would have regarded as excellent selections a few months ago, but who would now be much mistrusted by their English fellow colonists. [It will be remembered Sir Henry de Villiers was appointed a member of that commission.]

MR. R. W. MURRAY TO SIR B. FRERE, MAY 16, 1881.

Ask your English statesmen (he writes), if in the history of the world there was ever such a cruel desertion of a dependency by the parent State. How can England hope for loyalty from South Africans? The moral of the Gladstone lesson is that you may be anything in South Africa but loyal Englishmen.

COLONEL LANYON WRITES.

PRETORIA, *March* 29, 1881.

Last night the saddest news I ever received in my life came in the shape of a letter from Wood. . . . After three Secretaries of State, three High Commissioners, and two Houses of Commons had said that the country should not be given back, it seems a terrible want of good faith to the loyalists that this decision should have been arrived at. The scene this morning was a heart-breaking one, the women, who have behaved splendidly all through the siege, were crying and wringing their hands in their great grief; the children were hushed as if in a chamber of death, and the men were completely bowed down in their sorrow—well they might, for the news brought home ruin to many and great loss to all. I am ashamed to walk about, for I hear nothing but reproaches and utterances from heretofore loyal men, which cut one to the very quick. How I am to tell the natives I know not, for they have trusted so implicitly to our promises and assurances. . . . One man who has been most loyal to us (an Englishman) told me to-day, 'Thank God my children are Africanders, and need not be ashamed of their country.'

Again:

April 26, 1881.

The Boers are practically dictators, and have been ruling the *country* in a manner which is simply humiliating to Englishmen.

Active persecution is going on everywhere, and, consequently, all that can are leaving the country. Thirty families have left Pretoria alone. B—— and M—— have left, having been frequently threatened because of their having been members of the executive, and those two poor fellows, J—— and H——, are completely ostracized for the same reason. They are both ruined men, practically speaking, and all because they trusted to England's assurances and good faith. . . .

Mr. Rider Haggard writes.

June 6, 1881.

Then comes the case of the loyal Boers, men who believed us and fought for us ; and are now, as a reward for their loyalty, left to the vengeance of their countrymen, a vengeance that will most certainly be wreaked, let the Royal Commission try to temper it as they will.

Sir Bartle Frere to Mr. J. Maclean, on the Convention of Pretoria.

February 23, 1883.

Mapoch and other chiefs to the east and north-east, who had been loyal to the British rule, have been attacked, and great numbers of their followers have been slaughtered. A large 'commando,' said to comprise 2,000 burghers with two cannon supplied by the Cape Government, is at present engaged in crushing this tribe, blowing up their caves with dynamite; their greatest offence is fidelity to the British Government. . . .

To the natives of the Transvaal and its neighbourhood the surrender by the British Government has brought loss of all security for liberty, life, or property.

Address to Frere on leaving from the Natives of Mount Cake.

Our hearts are very bitter this day. We hear that the Queen calls you to England. We have not heard that you are sick, then why have you to leave us? . . . By you we now have peace. We sleep now without fear. Old men tell us of a good Governor Durban (Sir Benjamin D'Urban) who had to leave before his good works became law, but red coals were under the ashes which he left. Words of wicked men, when he left, like the wind blew up the fire, and the country was again in war. So also Sir George Grey, a good Governor, good to tie up the

hands of bad men, good to plant schools, good to feed the hungry, good to have mercy and feed the heathen when dying from hunger. He also had to leave us. We do not understand this. But Your Excellency is not to leave us. Natal has now peace by you, because God and the Queen sent you. Do not leave us. Surely it is not the way of the Queen to leave her children here unprotected until peace is everywhere. . . . We shall ever pray for you as well as for the Queen. These are our words to our good Governor, though he turns his back on us.

Mr. Martineau's Description of the Last Farewell to Sir Bartle Frere.

For intensity of feeling and unanimity it would be hard in our time to find a parallel to this demonstration of enthusiasm for a public servant. The Capetown people are by race and habit the reverse of demonstrative ; yet it was noticed that day, as it had been noticed when Frere left Sattara thirty years before—a sight not uncommon two or three centuries ago, but almost unknown among men of English or German race in our day—that *men* looking on were unable to restrain their tears. At Sattara and in Sind the regret at losing him was softened by the knowledge that his departure was due to a recognition of his merit, that he was being promoted in a service in which his influence might some day extend with heightened power to the country he was leaving. It was far otherwise when he left the Cape. On that occasion the regret of the colonists was mingled with indignation, and embittered with a sense of wrong.

APPENDIX H.

CHIEF JUSTICE KOTZÉ'S REPLY TO MR. KRUGER'S ASSERTIONS.

See my note at end of this memo.
(Signed) PAUL MARÈ.

MEMORANDUM.

Saturday, 7th September, 1895.

THIS afternoon, at 5 o'clock, I had, together with Messrs. P. W. T. Bell, E. F. Bourke, and Dr. Engelenburg (members of the Celliers Memorial Committee), an interview with the State President at His Honour's house. When this interview was over and we had bid the President good-bye, His Honour said, 'Judge, I wish to speak to you privately for a few moments.' The other gentlemen then left the room and I remained behind, when the following took place between me and the State President. I have thought it necessary, immediately upon reaching my house, to place in writing the following memorandum or notes, which as nearly as possible contain the very words of our conversation :

PRESIDENT : Look, I wish to speak to you a little about the Volksraad resolution concerning the proclamation and lottery of ground. I don't wish to enter into the case itself, but I am told that they have, after lots had been drawn for the ground, again proceeded to peg over the ground, and that they will again bring the matter before the Court. Now, how can this happen, for the law says a Volksraad resolution is law, and if I have published it then everyone must respect it as law. What is now your view on the subject ?

CHIEF JUSTICE : I do not know anything of the particulars of the case, and of what has taken place on the ground, with regard to the lottery or subsequently, I can in no event speak about that,

for if the case should come on there is but one course open to the Court, and that is to enforce the law.

PRESIDENT: Yes, I know, and therefore I speak to you about it; not upon the facts, for possibly my information may not be quite correct, but on the resolution of the Volksraad. What has happened at the lottery, and how the people came up there in numbers and rushed each other, proves that I could not do otherwise than withdraw the proclamation, or murder and manslaughter would have occurred in the land. But never mind that for the present. What I wish to speak to you about is that the Court must respect the Volksraad resolution. I hear you stated in the Hess case that you had changed your opinion as expressed in the case of Doms, and that the Court is not bound by a resolution of the Volksraad. How can this be? The law clearly says that all laws and resolutions, published by me, are of force, and cannot be questioned; only the people can in the following year petition against these, and then the Volksraad can decide whether it will alter the resolution. You must now tell me that you also think that this is so, and strengthen the bond of brotherhood, so that no conflict may arise, otherwise the members and the people will rise against the Court, and I will be in a difficult position. The country may get into great difficulty, rebellion may be occasioned, and you must set my mind at ease. Now tell me what you do think?

CHIEF JUSTICE: I did not say in the Hess case that a resolution of the Volksraad cannot, under any circumstances, have the force of law. This entirely depends upon the circumstances. I said that I had altered the opinion expressed by me in the McCorkindale case in certain respects. Everything proceeds from the people. A Court must inquire whether a given law be indeed law, and whether a law or a resolution is in conformity with the Grondwet.

PRESIDENT: Oh no. Now you speak too indistinctly. How can you say so? The Volksraad is the highest authority, and everyone must respect the resolutions and laws of the Volksraad, as published, and submit thereto; otherwise there will be discord and conflict. You may be sure of that, and I can take an oath to that effect, that if the Court does not respect the Volksraad resolution, then there will be trouble. The Volksraad will rise up against the Court. Look, when the other day the case for an interdict came on, several of the Volksraad members told me the Court would reject the resolution, and I defended the Court, and said the Judges would act according to the law and do justice, and not reject the resolution. Now, you see, I always stand up for my Judges, but if you (*i.e.*, the Judges) reject the resolution of the Volksraad, then I fear for the consequences. I will then

be obliged to suspend you. (CHIEF JUSTICE smiling.) Yes, you laugh over it. It is a serious matter. A conflict will surely happen, which will mean discord and danger to the State. How will I get the people satisfied again ?

CHIEF JUSTICE: I smile because President speaks of suspension. A conflict between the Volksraad and Court is certainly a serious matter. I do not think lightly of the consequences resulting therefrom, and I do not fear it. The Court never acts hurriedly or precipitately. The Court will do its duty and maintain the Grondwet and other laws. Why should this cause discord. The people are too sensible for that.

PRESIDENT: Now, yes; but set my mind at ease that you Judges will respect the resolution of the Volksraad. You can do nothing else, for you, too, stand under your oaths. Is, then, a resolution of the Volksraad, the highest authority, not binding on everyone ?

CHIEF JUSTICE: I can say no more than that a law properly passed, and a resolution taken according to law, may be of force as far as it goes.

PRESIDENT: But how must I now understand you ?

CHIEF JUSTICE: Say, for instance, that eleven members of the Volksraad pass a resolution, while the law prescribes that twelve members form a quorum, now will such a law or resolution have to be respected ? Certainly not.

PRESIDENT: But in that case I would not publish such a law or resolution.

CHIEF JUSTICE: Yes, but suppose that after all you do publish it ? Or, suppose the Volksraad, without any inquiry, takes a summary resolution to dismiss you from office ?

PRESIDENT: No, no. You know this is not what I mean. I merely want the Court to recognise and respect a resolution taken in the usual way by the Volksraad. The resolution of which I am speaking is also as the First Volksraad wishes to have it. Look, there can be no doubt, and you must do your best so as to regulate matters that no conflict and disorder can arise. This can alone be done by acknowledging the resolution and obeying the voice of the Volksraad, which is the highest power.

CHIEF JUSTICE: I cannot say anything else than that the Judges will act carefully according to the laws of the land. The Judges dare not do anything else.

PRESIDENT (rising): Now, yes. I trust you will think well over what we have here been talking about privately with each other.

This terminated our conversation, and I left the President. On coming outside I found Messrs. Bell, Bourke, and Engelburg

at the street gate waiting for me. The conversation between me and the President lasted from about eight to ten minutes.

(Signed) J. G. KOTZÉ.

This memorandum was shown me in September, 1895, by Chief Justice Kotzé, when I was chairman of the Grondwet Revision Commission of the First Volksraad, whereupon I also read the same.

(Signed) PAUL MARÈ.

Certified a true copy of the original as read and compared by me.

(Signed) FRED J. LUNNON,
Notary Public.

APPENDIX I

THE JUDICIAL CRISIS IN THE TRANSVAAL

'TRANSVAAL ADVERTISER,' MARCH 15TH, 1897.

WHILE there is yet time, we should fail in our duty to the people of this Republic if we did not urge upon the Government the propriety and wisdom of reconsidering the vitally important subject of the position assumed towards the judges of the High Court. Efforts have been unceasingly made for some time past to obscure the issues in the case, and to impress upon the ignorant and easily-led burghers of this Republic that it was necessary to restrain the judges of the High Court in the performance of those duties which are imposed upon them by virtue of their office. Under any circumstances, the time has arrived when it is necessary, once for all, to answer the misleading statements which have been put forth in defence of the action of the Government, notably, by the *Volksstem*, the *Press*, the *Standard and Diggers' News* here, and *Ons Land* in the Cape Colony. The object of the Government organs has been to obscure the nature of the attack upon the High Court by the adoption of tactics which every right-minded man must know are meant to cover the misdeeds of the Government and Legislature. The Chief Justice has been assailed upon the matter of the 'Brown' judgment, both as to its legal soundness and to the time and circumstances under which it was pronounced. It has been made to appear that it was delivered for a personal and political purpose, and under that guise the important constitutional questions raised by it have been discreetly kept in the background. It is not necessary to refute this attempt to lower the status of the Chief Justice and his colleagues, as it is abundantly clear that if they had acted in the mode alleged, they would have done their best to defeat their own ends. It is not our purpose, however, to call attention to side issues in this important matter, but to state as simply and clearly as we can the facts of the case and

their bearing upon the future of the Republic. In the 'Brown' judgment the Court laid down the principle of its right to test laws made by the Volksraad by a reference to the written constitution of the country. The legal advisers of the President, Messrs. Coster and Leyds, doubtless finding that the establishment of such a principle would go far to make the position assured by the President and his obedient Legislature untenable, probably forced upon his Honour the necessity for direct legislation upon the matter. The Law No. 1, 1897, was consequently brought in, discussed in secret session, and passed through the Volksraad in the shortest possible time, viz., three days. That this action of the Government and the Legislature was ill-advised and dangerous to the people of this Republic, is shown by the universal condemnation which it has met, not only by the independent press of South Africa, but also of Europe, both France and Germany having joined in the denunciation of the object of the so-called law.

It cannot too often be impressed upon the public that for the present the soundness or unsoundness of the 'Brown' judgment has nothing to do with the present position of affairs. As a civilized nation, and, as is boasted, an independent State, the Transvaal is bound to respect the judgment of its own High Court. Should it be considered by the Government or the Legislature that the law or constitution, as expounded and interpreted by its own High Court in any particular case, are found detrimental to the interests of the State, they are within their right, the one to propose and the other to adopt measures in a legal and constitutional method, for bringing about a change either in the law or the constitution. Instead, however, of adopting this safe course, one in which the judges would probably have been willing, as well as competent, to give the benefit of their advice, a drastic measure was secretly drafted, considered, and suddenly placed before the Volksraad, and rushed through its stages in the shortest space of time. The plea of urgency was alleged in explanation of this precipitate action, as, according to the President, the newly proposed law could not brook an hour's delay. Under this guise of necessity a fatal step has been taken which has aggravated the evil, and beyond question has endangered the rights, liberties, and lives of every inhabitant in this State. This was done while there was yet time to recede, and against the solemn and unanimous advice and warnings of the judges that there exists at present no real danger and no necessity for taking immediate steps. The wise counsels of the judges against hasty legislation, and their assurance that the matter could be calmly and satisfactorily settled in the *ensuing* May session of the Volksraad were ignored, and the

letter of the five judges was not even officially placed before the Volksraad, as they had requested. Just as the Volksraad was rushed, a similar attempt was made to rush the judges, who wisely refused to be a party to hasty legislation, which had for its aim the complete removal of the stability and independence of the judiciary. It is this very measure, proposed by the President and his advisers, and sanctioned by the Volksraad, that forms the real ground for all the uncertainty and anxiety which at present exist. It is this fatal step, and not the 'Brown' judgment, which has agitated men's minds to their very depths, and both in and out of South Africa has shaken confidence in the Transvaal as a civilized State. It is not difficult to account for this state of things. Under the plea of necessity, and under the plea of uncertainty, which has been used as a kind of Government scarecrow, a state of chaos and confusion has been created. Instead of calmly and with dignity setting to work to remove what might be considered objectionable in a legal and constitutional way, a measure is adopted which virtually amounts to an attack both on the judges individually and on the independence of their high office. The Volksraad, contrary to the Constitution or Grondwet, practically changes itself into a Supreme Court of Appeal, and declares that the judges in the 'Brown' judgment—a judgment which by the law and Constitution of the land is final, and from which there is no appeal—have wrongly declared the law. Here the Volksraad clearly went beyond its own province and powers. It may just as logically reverse the 'Brown' judgment. It is perfectly clear that until the Grondwet has been duly amended, the interpretation of the Grondwet by the High Court must be accepted by every person and every department of State in the country. The Volksraad may, in the exercise of its legislative functions, interpret the Constitution for itself, but it cannot interpret the Constitution so as to bind the Court. It is the exclusive right and duty of the High Court to interpret the Grondwet or Constitution for itself whenever, in any given case before it, it becomes necessary so to do. Again, the new measure—we cannot consider it law—is a distinct breach and violation of the numerous laws which guarantee to the members of the Bench their office for life. It is also a distinct breach and violation of the law which safeguards the judges against any interference on the part of the Executive or Legislature, and which provides that the dismissal of a judge can only take place after a proper charge brought before, and duly investigated by, a specially-constituted tribunal, and after its verdict of guilty, and none other. All these constitutional and necessary guarantees have been blown to the winds, and all these safeguards have been

ruthlessly destroyed. It is, therefore, nothing but natural that men should fear and tremble, and ask themselves the question—What next? The spectacle of independent judges being summarily dismissed at the dictation of the President, in violation of their appointment for life, and cast adrift, converts the Republic into an uncivilized and barbarous country. It is an act of injustice and unrighteousness which might be expected from a despot, but which will inevitably bring appropriate punishment upon a country which boasts of its civilization and Christianity. It is this which has made the capitalist more than uneasy about his investments in properties of all descriptions. It is this that has created distrust in the mind of the poor and industrious man who has invested his modest savings in some form or other in the country, and who no longer feels safe as to the security of such investment. The argument advanced by one of our local contemporaries, that the recent action of the Government and Volksraad is to be justified because many rights on the gold-fields are secured by mere *besluiten*, or resolutions of the Volksraad, is thus seen to be a hollow sham. Men naturally inquire—when the independent and highest judges of the land are treated in this summary, illegal, and drastic manner by the simple brushing away of the laws which guarantee their position for life, and protect them against improper interference and dismissal—of what account are we and our belongings—we, who are simple burghers or unenfranchised inhabitants of the land? It is a mockery to tell us that, in order to secure our rights, the rights of the judges of the land, clearly and solemnly guaranteed, must be swept away; rights and guarantees, moreover, established quite as much for the protection of the public and the gold industry as for the judges themselves. The public have a right to insist on the dignified, impartial, and independent administration of justice. To deprive the people of this right is a palpable invasion of their liberties. It is a natural inference that what has happened to the judges to-day may happen to the burgher to-morrow. This is the *real issue* and the true position of the question. It is that which has created the terrible tension. It is that which makes men marvel at the astoundingly dangerous feats performed recently by President Kruger. It is not to be forgotten that he has boasted frequently of late that the principles of the Republic and of himself were that 'Right is might,' and not the converse, 'Might is right.'

We may just refer to a statement which has been much made of by the apologists for the Government, viz., that the honoured Chief Justice of the Cape Colony 'is heartily at one' with the attitude adopted by the President and his legal advisers with *regard to the* judges. It is scarcely probable that so eminent

and experienced a jurist would give such an opinion, and we prefer to wait until Chief Justice de Villiers himself authorizes such a declaration. In the meantime we must protest against the attempt to identify that gentlemen with the sentiments of Messrs. Coster and Leyds in the development of this miserable and fatal business. The Government have sown the wind, and of a certainty will reap the whirlwind, and no man possessing a sense of responsibility can dare approve of the attack made upon the independence of the judges in the exercise of their judicial functions. A measure which reduces the judges to the level of mere servants of the President, who shall have the right at any time to interpellate them on pain of instant dismissal, even when a case may be pending against the Government, endangers the liberty of the citizen and the State. This, we repeat, is the issue; and it behoves all men who have interests in this country, or wish well to the Republic, to avoid being led away by the shallow defences made by the apologists of the Government for an attack upon the sacred liberties of the people.

APPENDIX J

EXTRACT FROM THE 'TRANSVAAL ADVERTISER' OF DECEMBER 31, 1898

It has been asserted that under certain circumstances 'old men see visions, and young men dream dreams.' It may be permitted to us who are old, to see the vision of a regenerated Transvaal when the present regime has been swept away, and its corruptions, hypocrisies, and prostitution of the powers with which it has been entrusted shall be regarded as a hideous nightmare. Before the close of the present century we believe that the reign of terror which has been established by repressive laws will have given place to freedom, when justice shall not be polluted at its source, when the rights of all shall be acknowledged, and peace and contentment following upon good government shall prevail. It is impossible that the country should enter upon a new century clad in the mantle of ignorance, prejudice and hatred of all that is good and true and noble in sentiment and action. When that time arrives the work in which the *Transvaal Advertiser* has been engaged for the past sixteen years will have been accomplished. However deeply its principles may have been entombed by the mighty powers of selfishness, hypocrisy and sordid avarice, its epitaph shall be 'Resurgam.'

J. Scoble.

APPENDIX K

SIR BARTLE FRERE AND THE NOMINEE LEGISLATURE OF THE TRANSVAAL.

In April, 1879, the then Administrator at Pretoria, Colonel Lanyon, wrote a private note to Mr. Justice Kotzé, asking him to come round to Government House, as Sir Bartle Frere was anxious to see him. On arriving at Government House Mr. Kotzé was shown a draft Constitution providing for a Legislative Assembly, consisting of the members of the Executive, and of an equal number of nominee members. On being asked his views on the draft Constitution the judge condemned it upon the twofold ground, that first, it would not suit the people of the country, who had always been in the habit of electing their own representatives to the Legislature (Volksraad); and secondly, it was contrary to the terms of the Annexation Proclamation, which had led the public to expect a representative Legislature. A departure from the proclamation in this respect was calculated to cause opposition to the Government by those who had supported the Annexation at the time. The result was, that this Constitution was not immediately put into practice, it being only promulgated in the *Gazette* early in the following year 1880, and, as predicted, caused widespread disaffection amongst all classes.

APPENDIX L.

DEVASTATED NATAL.

It is almost impossible to know how to begin a letter when placed in the position that we Loyalists occupy in Natal, and, I may as well say, the whole of South Africa. To say that we have been ruined is practically nothing. The circumstances of each individual case are far more heartrending than the total result. Not only does there seem to be very little sympathy in the hearts of those who hold the high offices in this country and at home, but, further, the military authorities both here and at the Cape have peculiar methods of their own in dealing with the several matters entrusted to them. We who are loyal are expected to sit down and be content, although we have no homes, very little food, less clothing, and no money.

Some details may be of interest. Imagine yourself in a newly-built house, with every room neatly and comfortably furnished, your business bringing in sufficient to enable you to live without anxiety. Then try, if it be possible, to imagine yourself and family flying for your life with less than an hour's notice, leaving everything and escaping with only the clothes you stand upright in, to tramp sixty miles through a country such as this without the slightest shelter, and with only what food could be placed in your pockets before starting. Hurrying through the terrible heat of the day, walking through rivers, and lying on the grass for a bed, with a heavy rain descending to add to its discomfort, we finally arrive at a town where we are allowed a shilling each adult per day to provide for all our wants.

On returning to our homes, we find that after the semi-savage Boer has occupied them for a time the best of our furniture has been taken into the Transvaal, even by some of the members of the First Raad—that is to say, the Boers' House of Lords. Other furniture has been taken by the disloyal Natal Boer, and what could not be taken has been destroyed for fire purposes. To add to our distress and disgust, sick horses or cattle have

been taken into our houses and starved to death, so that they should die inside, and the terrible remains of these poor animals have floated about our floors, so that the rooms cannot again be used without new woodwork. Not only so, but the wretches have violated all decency in every room, so much so that it will be sickening ever to remember it. The walls have been plastered with the same filth as lies upon the floors. The window-sashes are smashed, doors broken down and burnt, ceilings destroyed, and sometimes floors broken up to provide fuel for the fire. The kitchen range is smashed, the garden devastated, choice fruit-trees, grape vines, etc., chopped down, and fences destroyed. The wreckage is beyond description, and all this by the saintly Boer, so much worshipped by the ignorant in our own country.

The Question of Compensation.

Now, turning to the high officials, we hear something of compensation. Someone in the House of Commons says full compensation must be exacted; another says the Loyalists must be compensated; and another says there are great difficulties in this question of compensation; but I have not heard anyone say, 'What are these loyal people doing to obtain food? Can't we give them immediate help?' People at home cannot realize what misery we have to endure. This is our position to-day: The Mansion House Fund allows each woman one shilling per day, each child sixpence per day, with one or two rooms, according to the size of family. The men get nothing, save one or two free meals per day. There being so many men from up-country, the Transvaal and Free State, etc., it is impossible to get work at any price, so we live in a state of semi-starvation, and get what old clothes we can to cover our nakedness. While we are enduring this the Home Government says, 'You shall be compensated'; but we say, 'How shall we exist until that time comes?' I know men whose income was nearly one hundred a month now living on borrowed money; but it is not all of us who can raise money on our property, considering that it is in the hands of the Boers, and may be completely destroyed. How the up-country towns are going to start again I do not know, unless the Home Government come to our rescue at once. So far we have suffered and paid dearly for our loyalty, while the rebel has grown rich and fat before our eyes.

Clemency for Rebels.

Now comes the third point concerning the military. Their doings with the rebels and others simply confound us. The rebels are treated with the utmost consideration; it curdles our

blood to see this, for we who live here know what it means. The treatment meted out to these vile creatures is unrighteous and unjust, and will be the cause of bloodshed after the war is over. The military authorities, as you have doubtless seen, accept the surrender of men anywhere without their arms or ammunition, which they have buried in some secret place, and these men are allowed to return home even without a cross word to take up their arms at a time that will suit them. On other occasions they are allowed to surrender with the oldest rubbish in the shape of arms that can be scraped together, while their Mausers are at home. Can you wonder, then, that we who are to live here when the military are gone are disgusted at their ignorance or weakness? Further, as regards the Boers who have surrendered, they will every one of them take up arms again when Roberts and Buller have got further up-country. It is good policy for a lot of them to stay behind; but our Generals don't know the Boer, and will not be told.

The Penalty of Loyalty.

It makes our blood boil to see some men in our House of Commons continually asking of the welfare of the Boer prisoners, but very seldom do we see much said concerning our prisoners at Pretoria. You who live at home do not know and feel as we do. You have only newspaper reports to read, and different statements made in the House, many of which are radically misleading, because written and spoken by men whose experience in South Africa may run into one or two months, and perhaps not even that. For instance, take Mr. Churchill, the correspondent of the *Morning Post*. He has hardly been here sufficient time to know where he is, knows nothing of the country, the people, or customs, has no interest in or care for the country, and will soon be gone; yet he desires to counsel us, who have been years in the colony, and know everything concerning it, and have our all invested here; and yet thousands at home will think him correct.

It is a grand thing to talk of loyalty at home, where it costs nothing; but be here at the present time, and you will see that loyalty means a different thing altogether. It does not pay to be loyal. The disloyal always comes off the best. If you were here you would not ask an explanation. It was so before I came into the colony, and during the ten years that I have been here it has been the same. Do you wonder, then, that our feelings are strong against the disloyal, and that we are hurt at our own country compelling us to suffer, while it seems afraid to punish the rebellious?—*Daily Chronicle*, May 31, 1900.

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